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Introduction
In one sense this introduction is similar to a typical one because it serves to 
introduce the ten previously published articles now collected in this book. 
In a second and larger sense, it is not similar to a typical introduction for two 
reasons. First, my path to the writings of Max Weber was not a typical path, 
and second, my approach to, and my understanding of, Weber’s writings are 
not very typical. Accordingly, this introduction has two parts; in the first 
part I explain how I began to approach Weber’s thinking and in the second, 
what prompted me to write the pieces in this collection and how I think they 
have fared over the years since they first appeared.
A Path to Weber
The education and training that I have is not in sociology but philosophy 
and my interest in sociologists is relatively speaking, rather recent. All of my 
degrees, including my Ph.D., are in philosophy. Beginning in the late 1960s, 
I studied philosophy which in the United States at the time was dominated 
by what is usually referred to as analytical philosophy and is divided into 
two types, one earlier and one later. The earlier one was based primarily on 
the writings of Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein and emphasized 
that philosophy was a wrong-headed experiment which could be cleared up 
by making sure that language is used like mathematics and logic. The later 
philosophy was based on Wittgenstein, and while he later changed his mind 
about the degree of complexity in the use of language, he still contended that 
philosophical problems were mostly problems with language. If one cleared 
up the linguistic ambiguities and difficulties, then one would be on the way 
to solving problems in philosophy. 
Both of these approaches to philosophy were somewhat attractive because 
they centered on language, but both were less than compelling because they 
lacked the focus of what philosophy was historically; that is, an understand-
ing of the nature of human life, society, and of a future life. After a couple of 
years’ interruption I returned to philosophy, but this time I studied classical 
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philosophy – the Pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle. A change in universi-
ties prompted a change in emphasis – less on the Greeks and more on the 
Germans, particularly Kant. A return to the University of South Florida did 
not mean a return to the Greeks; rather, it meant a continuation of the study 
of Kant with the expectation that I would write a doctoral dissertation on 
Kantian epistemology in which I would be focusing on the Paralogisms sec-
tion of the Kritik der reinen Vernunft. This was going to be, and was, the 
first dissertation in the brand new Ph.D. program in philosophy at the Uni-
versity of South Florida; hence it was not going to be a typical one and so it 
turned out. Instead of writing on Kant’s Kritik, I was encouraged to write it 
on the Neo-Kantian arguments over the nature of space and I successfully 
defended my dissertation The Neo-Kantian “Raum” Controversy: From 
Trendelenburg to Vaihinger in the spring of 1992. Having devoted much of 
two decades to philosophy, I was rather certain that the next two decades 
would have a similar focus. After all, I was a firm believer in David Hume’s 
“principle of nature’s uniformity” – that the future will conform to the past. 
In a curious twist that I am convinced that Max Weber would have found 
amusing, I accepted a professorship at the American University in Bulgaria 
in 1994. My primary task was to teach the history of philosophy, something 
I did for the first two years of my time there. However, at the end of 1996 the 
political and economic situation in Bulgaria was collapsing: there was ram-
pant inflation, increasing shortages, and rationing of food. The history of 
philosophy no longer seemed so interesting because it no longer seemed rel-
evant. The students at the American University in Bulgaria were primarily 
Bulgarian, and those who were not came from other eastern European 
countries whose populations were undergoing similar political and eco-
nomic upheavals. As a result, I turned my attention to teaching courses that 
I thought would better reflect the upheavals that the students were living 
through – so I began teaching courses on social-political philosophy and 
that led me back to Max Weber.
The first time that I began to read Max Weber was shortly after finishing 
my Ph.D. I was Prof. Stephen Turner’s assistant at the University of South 
Florida and had participated in his graduate seminar devoted to Weber. As 
Turner’s assistant, I was also somewhat involved in the editing of Turner’s 
Max Weber. The Lawyer as Social Thinker (along with Regis Factor, Rout-
ledge 1994). My tasks included commenting on the second chapter of Turner 
and Factor’s book with the Neo-Kantian context and its influence on We-
ber. Both Turner’s graduate seminar and their book emphasized Weber’s 
long-standing concerns with methodological issues in sociology and law, 
which meant an emphasis on reason. However, Turner had a keen apprecia-
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tion for and an understanding of the irrational aspects of Weber’s thinking 
and he frequently drew my attention to that. In fact, it was not the usual 
approach to Weber and the development of reason that concerned me in 
Bulgaria, but the irrational and personal aspects: “Leidenschaft”, “Augen-
maß”, “Gesin nungs ethik”, and “Charisma”. These were regarded as inter-
esting topics by many scholars who wrote on Weber, but were not thought 
of as being as important for Weber as other topics like reason, calculation, 
and socio-economics. Close readers of the Protestantische Ethik quite prop-
erly focused on self-controlled practice of asceticism, although I found that 
the irrational basis for that to be far more interesting. The first result of my 
concern with Weber’s sociology of religion was thus an article on mysticism. 
While I have certainly appreciated Wolfgang Schluchter’s ground-breaking 
study of Weber’s development of rationality, I have also been impressed by 
those who have looked at the “less-rational” side of Weber: Wolfgang 
Mommsen, Wilhelm Hennis, and Friedrich Tenbruck. Added to that, my 
own writings on Weber’s sociology of religion have tended to focus on many 
of these “irrational” forces. While I agree that rationalism plays a funda-
mental role in the thought of Max Weber, it is my belief that there are irra-
tional aspects of human life which are just as important. Rational capitalism 
may very well be the most important force in modern life, but Weber also 
maintained that charisma was its equal. Furthermore, as Weber pointed out 
in the famous “switch metaphor” in the “Einleitung” to the first volume of 
the Wirt schafts ethik der Weltreligionen interests may be the predominate 
forces in everyday living. However, ideas are the switches determining the 
tracks those interests move along. Indeed, much of the “Einleitung” is de-
voted to the determining ideas and irrational forces and not to material and 
ideal interests or to the process of rationalization. 
The Individual Essays
The ten articles in this collection represent almost half of the twenty-plus 
essays that I have published over the last fifteen years. As with most of my 
writings on Max Weber, they were inquiries into specific aspects of his 
thinking and certainly not written with the expectation that they would one 
day be part of a collection. Nonetheless, this collection has a cohesiveness 
that goes beyond the topic of the sociology of religion and also displays a 
pattern of development. Later investigations often impelled me to reexamine 
what I had written previously. This is most evident in the notion of charisma 
but also applies to other themes. These ten essays have been chosen because 
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they focus explicitly on specific aspects of Weber’s sociology of religion; 
however, they often reflect concerns which overlap with other aspects of 
Weber’s thought. That is because Weber’s thinking was rarely confined to 
one discipline but frequently encompassed several. Trained in law, professor 
of economics, a political thinker, and a founder of sociology, Weber’s inter-
ests were wide-ranging. And although this is one of many fascinating things 
about Max Weber’s work, it is also one that sometimes causes difficulties in 
writing about him. During Weber’s lifetime many scholars preferred to spe-
cialize in one discipline and while this inclination is still often encouraged 
today, Weber rejected it as being too confining and artificial. So here too I 
think it is to our scholarly benefit to follow him. 
Chapter One is on Max Weber’s mysticism and its origins are two-fold. 
Western mysticism has always been fascinating and one of my earliest pub-
lications partially focused on it. “The Antinomy of God” was published in 
the Simmel Newsletter – now entitled Simmel Studies – and in it I attempted 
to show how Simmel looked at two opposing views of the relationship be-
tween God and man. Meister Eckhart’s mysticism represented the attempt 
to lose oneself in order to achieve the mystical union with God. Nietzsche’s 
claim “God is dead” represented its antinomy – that God needed to disap-
pear in order for man to become who he is destined to be. Simmel did not 
seem to take sides, although I suspect that he suffered from agreeing with 
both. The relevance here is that Eckhart was an example of the passive ves-
sel that Weber is known for. Weber frequently used opposites in order to 
clarify concepts, and so he used the conceptual opposition between the pas-
sive mystic and the active ascetic to highlight the characteristics of each 
type of religious figure. In this essay I attempted to draw more attention to 
his conception of the mystic, both because I believed that it was definitely 
warranted and because I thought that a fuller account of what Weber be-
lieved a mystic is, was warranted. The essay concluded with an account by 
Eduard Baumgarten about an exchange between Max and Marianne re-
garding the possibility of being a mystic. It is likely that the story is accu-
rate and there is a distinct sense that Weber may have occasionally thought 
that he had some mystical tendencies. I did not claim that he was one and I 
do not do so now; however, I believe even more that Weber had a much 
fuller understanding and far better appreciation of mysticism than many 
scholars give him credit for.
Chapter Two deals with Max Weber’s notion of charisma. When I began 
investigating this subject I realized that some scholars had published a num-
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ber of articles on it. I learned a great deal from Stephen Turner’s “Charisma 
Revisited” which appeared in the Journal of Classical Sociology in 2003 and 
from Martin Riesebrodt’s “Charisma” that was included in that great collec-
tion by Riesebrodt and Hans G. Kippenberg Max Webers “Religionssyste-
matik” (Mohr Siebeck 2001). I also benefited greatly from Thomas Kroll’s 
“Max Webers Idealtypus der charismatischer Herrschaft und die zeitgenös-
sische Charisma-Debatte” contained in that other very helpful collection 
Max Weber’s Herrschaftssoziologie edited by Edith Hanke and Wolfgang J. 
Mommsen (Mohr Siebeck 2001). I learned from these scholars that Weber 
borrowed the notion of charisma from Rudolf Sohm and that he modified it 
to apply to various instances of leadership. What I did not learn from them 
was how much Weber modified it and, perhaps more importantly, what he 
actually meant by “charisma”. “Max Weber’s Charisma” was my attempt to 
go back to what Weber believed charisma was and to explain it. This essay 
was only the third one that I had written on Weber and, while I believed that 
it would prove helpful, I never expected how important it would become. It 
has become one of the few “standard works” on charisma. Since 2009 it has 
been the “Most Cited” article in the Journal of Classical Society. Moreover, 
it has helped clarify what Weber believed charisma to be and to help stimu-
late others to explore this foundational concept. 
Chapter Three is devoted to Pericles. “Max Weber’s Pericles – the Political 
Demagogue” evolved from three important sources. First was Wilhelm 
Hennis’ Max Weber und Thukydides (Mohr Siebeck 2003) and the second 
was from doing a review essay of Peter Lassman’s Max Weber (Ashgate 
2006). This massive collection was filled with important contributions in a 
wide-ranging area of Weber’s thinking, but what I believed to be the most 
important section was on Weber’s politics. “Thirty Years of Political Think-
ing: Peter Lassman’s Max Weber” was published in a 2008 issue of History 
of the Human Sciences. Both collections convinced me of the primacy of the 
political but also revealed a lack of appreciation of Weber’s Greek sources for 
his political philosophy. The third source was Weber’s remarks in Politik als 
Beruf where he reminds us that “demagogue” did not originally have polit-
ically charged sense and that Pericles was as much of a demagogue as Cleon. 
In doing the research for this essay I discovered that Weber was intrigued by 
the Greeks and had developed a high regard for Thucydides. It also revealed 
that as much as the original notion of charisma may have been predicated on 
actions, much of it was also founded upon the power of words. Pericles rep-
resented the rare charismatic leader who led as much by his words as he did 
by his actions. Finally, it helped re-enforce the notion that Weber often 
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looked to history in order to help explain modern phenomena and that his-
torical figures could provide an ideal for contemporary problems. 
Chapter Four is about asceticism. Given Weber’s apparent lack of interest in 
mysticism, it was understandable that this topic was mostly ignored by 
scholars. However, given the amount of attention that Weber devoted to 
asceticism, it was not understandable why this topic remained neglected. 
“Max Weber’s Notion of Asceticism” was intended to help rectify this by 
explaining exactly what he meant by the term “asceticism” and by compar-
ing his use of this concept with the more traditional use. Despite the fact that 
the notion of asceticism played a prominent role in his thinking, Weber nev-
er provided a full definition of it. He did however provide a contrast be-
tween what he referred to as “polar concepts”: between “asceticism” and 
“mysticism”. However, in the history of Christianity these two concepts 
were not at odds with each other but were frequently applied to the same 
individual. Two things seemed apparent from the investigation of Weber’s 
accounts of asceticism: first, his account was not to be regarded as histori-
cally accurate but was an “ideal typical” account, and second, that he sof-
tened his opposition between the terms. This was partially because of his 
understanding of the four major monastic reform movements. Thus, as 
much as Weber frequently contrasted concepts in order to achieve more 
methodological clarity, he fully recognized that in the “real historical 
world” there was often conceptual overlap.
The next three chapters are not just concerned with religious and sociolog-
ical subjects but also with political thinking. Like the chapter on Pericles, 
these chapters cross over the borders between disciplines and underscore 
Weber’s multi-disciplinary approach. The study on asceticism reinforced 
the belief that there was a political component to Weber’s conception and 
that he considered Luther’s rejection of politics and acceptance of authority 
to be an unfortunate consequence of his more traditional and more com-
promising type of religious convictions. It also reinforced Weber’s subtle 
preference for Calvin’s more radical theology and his approval for Calvin’s 
political convictions. Luther was more of a naïve idealist and a religious 
believer in worldly harmony whereas Calvin was more of a revolutionary 
and a realist who believed that politics was a matter of conflict. This study 
also reinforced my own belief that many scholars writing on Weber lack 
the proper understanding of the theological disputes that lurked in the 
background to Weber’s writings in the sociology of religion. In this case, 
the mid-nineteenth century Protestant debate about conscience was cru-
7The Individual Essays
cially important for understanding Weber’s political interpretation of as-
ceticism. 
Chapter Five is focused on Weber’s views regarding the differing Protestant 
approaches to politics. Both Luther and Calvin believed man’s fall from 
grace was self-inflicted and they emphasized that God gave humans a con-
science which was their primary moral guide. They also believed the state 
was necessary; however, they had differing approaches to the state. For Lu-
ther, the state was a necessary evil and as such politics should be shunned. 
Since the state was the earthly kingdom, one was expected to obey the ruler 
under all circumstances. For Calvin, the state was necessary but not an evil; 
it was more like food and water. Like Luther, Calvin believed that one was 
bound to obey the ruler, but only up to a point. In Calvin’s view, the ruler 
has a contract with his subjects and he breaks that contract when the ruler 
becomes a tyrant. More importantly, the tyrant has also broken his contract 
with God. Accordingly, Calvin believed the subjects not only have the right, 
but the duty, to rise up against the tyrant. Weber’s own political inclinations 
were far closer to Calvin’s active politics than to Luther’s passive indiffer-
ence. Furthermore, Weber believed that Luther’s belief in the highest moral 
code was not possible for most people – only those like Jesus and St. Francis 
could live the saintly life. The belief in peace on earth was a dangerous illu-
sion and those who were that idealistic had no business playing in politics. 
In Weber’s view, politics is struggle and the political actor must be both re-
alistic and responsible. 
Chapter Six is on Weber’s writings about ancient Judaism and specifically 
the role of the Old Testament prophets. Eckart Otto had just published the 
volume on Das antike Judentum and reading through this prompted me to 
reevaluate what I had written in “Max Weber’s Charisma.” When I wrote 
that piece I regarded myself as fortunate because Weber specifically identi-
fied Rudolf Sohm as the source for the basis of his conception of charisma. 
This was one of the rare times that Weber singles out the source for his idea 
but which unfortunately made me content to concentrate primarily on 
Sohm. Weber’s discussions of the Old Testament prophets made me recon-
sider and recognize that they also served as ideal typical representatives of 
the charismatic leader: ones who combined religious and political convic-
tions. In “Max Weber’s Charismatic Prophets” I attempted to show that 
Weber was not just interested in the religious and cultural ideas of ancient 
Judaism but that he regarded some of the prophets as possible “models” for 
contemporary society. Amos, Jeremiah, and Isaiah were called by God to be 
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prophets and to remind the Jews of their Covenant. In so doing, they em-
phasized the need for political justice as well as ethical fairness and with 
their sense of ethical responsibility were representatives of genuine, respon-
sible political leaders. 
Chapter Seven focuses on “Kulturprotestantismus”. This term is somewhat 
difficult to define but it more or less represents the dominant conception of 
Protestantism in northern Germany during the second half of the nine-
teenth century. Protestantism was not regarded merely as a religious phe-
nomenon, although it was one and an important one at that. In addition, it 
represented the sense of German “culture.” “Kultur” was not just applicable 
to the arts and sciences but rather represented the most elevated and noble 
aspects of German thinking. It is not too much of an exaggeration to suggest 
that “Kultur”, and by extension “Kulturprotestantismus”, contained the 
“essence” of being “German.” Of course this excluded entire groups of peo-
ple, including Catholics and Jews. However, since most Germans seemed to 
believe that members of both of these groups were insufficiently German 
anyway, it did not matter. Besides, Bismarck had convinced many Germans 
that German “Kultur” needed to be defended against the Catholic Pope and 
his Doctrine of Infallibility, while the on-going current of anti-Semitism 
ensured that Jews would continue to be regarded as a “Pariah-People”. It is 
against much of this background that “Weber and ‘Kulturprotestantismus’” 
was written. Shortly before he died, Heinz Steinert had published a book 
that was rather critical of Weber’s Protestant Ethic. Invited to contribute to 
a collection in Steinert’s honor, I thought that “Weber and ‘Kulturprotes-
tantismus’” would accomplish two goals. First, it would address some of 
Steinert’s points about not understanding Weber and second, it would pro-
vide a theological-cultural background for a better understanding of We-
ber’s work. This context included discussions of the “Kulturkampf” as well 
as of the special Luther celebrations of 1883. Many theologians gave address-
es in honor of the 400th anniversary of Martin Luther’s birth whereby I 
focused on three of the most important, Julius Köstlin, Albrecht Ritschl, 
and Adolf Harnack. I also included Heinrich von Treitsch ke because he was 
not only one of the most influential German professors and political think-
ers but was a close family friend of Max Weber Sr. and Max Weber Jr.’s 
teacher in Berlin. All four of these men regarded Luther as more than a reli-
gious reformer, having laid the foundation for “Kulturprotestantismus” 
which for Max Weber was the modern embodiment of both the strengths 
and weaknesses of modern German politics and culture. 
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Chapter Eight is devoted to the question of the connection between China 
and capitalism. Written originally as a paper for the London conference on 
Weber and China, “Max Weber on Confucianism versus Protestantism” 
was my attempt to explicate the reasons why Weber thought that capitalism 
could never develop in China. It is important to note  two things: that We-
ber was not chauvinistic about China and that he never maintained that it 
could not develop into a capitalist society. Weber adhered religiously to his 
often stated principle that scholarship should be value-free and did so in his 
writings on the economic ethics of the world’s religions. He also main-
tained that capitalism had not and could not develop in China until the in-
credible power of traditionalism was overcome. Luther, and more impor-
tantly, Calvin had radically challenged traditionalism in the West and had 
led the way to the development of capitalism. Weber sought to show that 
while China shared a number of important traits with the West, there were 
enough significant differences accounting for the lack of capitalist develop-
ment. Weber was happy to concede that China was a rational and legal-
ly-oriented society. However, he pointed out that rationalism was rather 
focused and not all-encompassing with the law based more on tradition 
than on reason. More importantly, China embraced magic and traditional-
ism, revering ancestors, the earth and heavens. Finally, Confucianism 
taught that moderation and honor led to happiness, prosperity, and long 
life, whereas Protestantism was radically ascetic and did not believe in any 
of those ideas. Instead, one denied that one’s life on earth had any redeem-
ing value and devoted one’s self to the belief in a better future life. As a re-
sult, the differences between the West and China not only did not challenge 
Weber’s claim but rather served to underscore his thesis that rationalism 
developed only in the West. 
The penultimate chapter confronts the thorny problem of theodicy. As the 
title indicates “‘Sinn der Welt’: Max Weber and the Problem of Theodicy” 
two interconnected issues are addressed. First the issue of “meaning” or 
“sense” for Weber. Weber had two broad ways of employing the word 
“Sinn”. In one way, “Sinn” was scholarly and was applicable to scientific 
investigations. There was an “objective sense” that could be explicated and 
verified. In another way, “Sinn” was personal and was applicable to person-
al values. In particular, it dealt with the question of whether life (“the world”) 
had sense. Either it did have “sense” or it was random, arbitrary, and chaot-
ic. The fact that there is so much suffering in the world leads one to suspect 
that the world has no meaning; why would a powerful and beneficial deity 
either inflict pain and suffering or allow it to happen? Also, it is not simply 
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a question of whether evil people deserve to suffer, because the innocent 
ones seem to suffer just as much if not more. The problem of theodicy is the 
problem of how to reconcile the belief in God with the notion of suffering. 
Weber sets out answers to this in his discussions of the three major religious 
approaches to the problem of suffering. In addition, he adds a new type of 
theodicy: a positive theodicy where individuals who have been granted good 
fortune attempt to justify it on the grounds that they somehow deserve it. 
This essay shows how important the “philosophical” question of the mean-
ing of life was to Max Weber. While he may have little use for his more 
speculative predecessors, Weber was just as convinced that the questions of 
what to believe and how to live were just as important to him as they had 
been to Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel. 
The last chapter focuses on the first several pages of the Protestant Ethic. It 
almost always seemed that commentators on Weber’s books skimmed over 
much of the initial chapter of the book and moved on to the more interesting 
sections on Luther, Calvin, and the Sects. These seemed more engrossing 
because they dealt with the fundamental themes of the book: the notion of 
“Beruf”, the Doctrine of Double Election, the ascetic life, rational calcula-
tion, and profitability. However, while of some interest in themselves, both 
theological notions seemed more like prologues to the economic and socio-
logical aspects of the book. Even though the two theological notions did not 
generate all that much interest they at least received some. In contrast, the 
opening pages were virtually ignored because they were not understood, 
Weber having begun with a series of references to an obscure author named 
Martin Offenbacher. These were statistics and quotations drawn from his 
studies about the confessional differences in Baden, a small, southwestern 
part of Germany. Yet Weber included them for a reason and much of the 
“Statistical Origins of the ‘Protestant Ethic’” was devoted to uncovering 
what that reason was. It was statistical confirmation of the claim that reli-
gious affiliation influenced economic well-being and showed that Catholics 
in this area tended to be less well off than the Protestants who also lived 
there. As one of Weber’s former students, Offenbacher provided a statistical 
starting point to the question of how modern capitalism developed. Werner 
Sombart had just published his two-volume Der moderne Kapitalismus and 
Weber believed that while Sombart had made some valuable points, his 
overall thesis was theoretically questionable and factually unsound. The 
first section is Weber’s critique of Sombart’s theory and his substitution of a 
less grandiose and more probable explanation. The “Statistical Origins” of 
the ‘Protestant Thesis’” does more than explore and explain Weber’s reliance 
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on Offenbacher’s dissertation in that it also provides a critique of some of 
Weber’s detractors who insisted that he and Offenbacher misused or misin-
terpreted the statistics. Instead of misleading his readers, Weber used Of-
fenbacher’s work as a “paradigm case” to help explain the origins of modern 
capitalism. 
Concluding Comments
Weber’s thinking continues to fascinate and this is particularly true regard-
ing his writings on the sociology of religion. Many of his major themes jus-
tify more scholarly investigation. Many of them could benefit from further 
examination and many of his key concepts could be helped by more clarifi-
cation. The essays assembled in this collection were never intended to be 
definitive statements, but impulses to prompt others to examine these no-
tions. I have recently tried to deal with many of these themes in a more 
comprehensive treatment in the Fundamental Concepts in Max Weber’s So-
ciology of Religion (Palgrave 2015). With his various writings, Max Weber is 
justifiably regarded as the founder of the sociology of religion and will con-
tinue to fascinate scholars far into the future. For me, the essays contained 
in this collection do not represent the end of my study of Max Weber’s soci-
ology but only its beginning. It is my continuing hope that scholars will find 
some ideas in this collection which might spur them to engage further in 




During Max Weber’s life time a number of German thinkers investigated 
mysticism: among them Wilhelm Preger, Rudolf Otto, and Weber’s own 
friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch. To this we can add the intriguing fig-
ure of Friedrich von Hügel (Preger 1962, Otto 1971, 1997, Troeltsch 1912, 
von Hügel 1999). However, the standard view is that Weber was not inter-
ested in mysticism or if he was it was for other reasons. Marianne Weber 
mentions mysticism only once and that in connection to Rilke; Bendix puts 
Oriental asceticism in opposition to occidental asceticism; and Schluchter, 
who is the authority on Weber’s sociology of religion, focuses primarily on 
the opposition between ascetic activity and mystical passivity (Weber 1926: 
464; Bendix 1977: 203; Schluchter 1989: 132). There is no question that We-
ber’s concern from Protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus 
(1905) to his last years was with asceticism; however, from that work until 
his death he was intrigued by mysticism. There are a number of passages 
where he treats the topic, some in Protestantische Ethik, more in Wirtschaft 
und Gesellschaft, and to a greater extent in Gesammelte Aufsätzes zur Reli-
gionssoziologie. Except for Schluchter’s treatment and Mitzman’s comments 
(Mitzman 1979), there is virtually nothing written on Weber’s interest in 
mysticism. There are only two works that even deal with the topic and both 
of those are concerned with other matters as well: Bynum is interested in 
Medieval women mystics (Bynum 1988) and Robertson is also concerned 
with Hegel, Luther and modernity (Robertson 1975). In what follows, I will 
argue that, for Weber, mysticism was more than an intellectual antipode to 
asceticism; indeed, as I shall argue, Weber had a growing interest in mysti-
cism from 1910 onwards. 
It is not easy to say what mysticism is, although it is not very difficult to 
say what it is not: it has no confession, it has no dogma, it has no church, etc. 
(Tauler 1923: I: XIX). Bernard McGinn, one of the leading authorities on 
mysticism, declines to define it but he notes that its origins lie in the notion 
of “hiddenness” (McGinn 1994: XI, 41). Instead, he offers three markers for 
it: it is a part of religion, it is a process, and it is the attempt to express the 
consciousness of God (McGinn 1991: xiv-xvi). He summarizes mysticism as 
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the “consciousness of the presence of God” (McGinn 1994: 70, McGinn 
1998: 12). William James was also reluctant to attempt to define mysticism 
(James 1994: 413). His reluctance partially stemmed from his belief that his 
own constitution shut him out from enjoying mystical experiences. None-
theless, in his Gifford Lectures from 1902 – The Varieties of Religious Expe-
rience – he suggested that it is an ability to see the truth in a special way 
(James 1994: 412). He offered his famous four markers for mysticism: 1) It is 
ineffable, there is no positive way to describe it; it must be experienced; 2) 
Nonetheless, it has noetic qualities, so that it counts as a type of knowledge, 
albeit not in any normal sense1; 3) Mystical states are transient and of short 
duration2; 4) It is passive – the person in a mystical state feels gripped by 
some higher power. James’ discussion of mysticism caused considerable in-
terest but also considerable concern. Von Hügel was so impressed by Varie-
ties of Religious Experience that when he completed his own two-volume 
The Mystical Element of Religion in 1908 he sent an autographed copy to 
James (see Adams 1986: 69). Von Hügel shares with James the emphasis on 
experience and he makes a number of appreciative remarks about him.3 
However, in a letter to James he complained that James’ treatment of reli-
gion seemed to over-emphasize the “personal and the private” (see Adams 
1986: 69). And, in The Mystical Element of Religion, von Hügel acknowl-
edges that in the history of religion there was the almost exclusive emphasis 
on theological concepts and formulations to the exclusion of the individual 
and the experimental. Now, however, he objects to James’ Varieties of Reli-
gious Experience because James’ overemphasis on the personal and experi-
ential. His friend, Ernst Troeltsch, shared von Hügel’s assessment.4  Troeltsch 
published a review of James’ Varieties of Religious Experience and in the 
same year he devoted considerable space to James in his Psychologie und 
Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschaft.5 
1 See James 1994: 414–415, 442, 461. Lewis White Beck wrote: “Now one thing that philos-
ophers seem unable to do is remain silent about the unnameable, the indescribable, the ineffa-
ble.” Beck 1996: 50.
2 The Beguine mystic, Mary of Oignies, seems to be the exception. She supposedly had an 
ecstatic rapture that lasted 35 days. See McGinn 1998: 37–38 and 337, note  42.
3 Peter Neuner held that experience plays a fundamental role in von Hügel’s thinking. 
Neuner 1977: 49. For von Hügel’s comments on James, see von Hügel 1999, II: 30, 41, 266.
4 The Protestant theologian Troeltsch and the Catholic religious thinker von Hügel had a 
long friendly relationship. Their correspondence began in 1901 and ended with Troeltsch’s 
sudden death in 1923. This cancelled Troeltsch’s trip to Great Britain where he was to give 
lectures in London, Oxford, and Edinburgh. Von Hügel had arranged this trip. He edited the 
lectures that Troeltsch was going to give and published them in 1923 (Troeltsch 1979). For an 
account of their relationship and Troeltsch’s letters to von Hügel, see Troeltsch 1974.
5 See Troeltsch 1982: 69 and Troeltsch 1905. Troeltsch also gave a complementary yet crit-
ical account of James after his death. See Troeltsch 1913. 
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Troeltsch begins by noting contemporary thinkers’ mistrust of church 
dogma and their endorsement of empiricism (Troeltsch 1905: 6). That he has 
James in mind is clear: he refers to James’ Varieties of Religious Experience 
as the “best and finest achievement of modern psychology of religion.” 
(Troeltsch 1905: 14). He applauds James for his emphasis on empirical stud-
ies and commends him for showing the psychological element in religious 
feeling (Troeltsch 1905: 16–17). However, Troeltsch objects that this is only 
psychology and that it leads James to under-appreciate the intensity of reli-
gious and mystical feelings. He also objects to the emphasis on the single 
and empirical, which tends to blind James to the whole and rational side that 
makes up religious experiences (Troeltsch 1905: 22–23). Troeltsch looks to 
Kant as a corrective to James’ all pervasive emphasis on the empirical. That 
does not mean that Troeltsch agrees with Kant’s transcendental idealism 
when it comes to religious investigations. Schleiermacher had already com-
plained that Kant’s religion is too ethical and that he did not appreciate the 
religious sense that he describes as the feeling of absolute dependence on 
God (Troeltsch 1905: 34–35). Troeltsch approvingly lists Schleiermacher’s 
investigation of his self with the mystical self-preoccupations of Augustine 
and the mystics. One point of Troeltsch’s work is to comment on James’ 
Varieties of Religious Experience. A second point is to show that there are 
Protestant correctives to James and Kant. But a third point is to show the 
depth of mystical feeling, regardless of whether it is Catholic or Protestant. 
Troeltsch’s Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie is valuable in itself, but its 
importance increases when it is presented in context. He read it in St.  Louis 
at the 1904 International Congress of Arts and Letters that was held in com-
memoration of the 100 years of the Louisiana Purchase. He and his friend 
Max Weber traveled there together, spending approximately five weeks in 
close company.6 When Troeltsch was working on Psychologie und Erkennt-
nistheorie, Weber was working on Protestantische Ethik. During their jour-
ney to America they had numerous discussions and it is likely that the topic 
of mysticism arose.7 In any case, even in Protestantische Ethik there are 
“tantalizing references” to mysticism (Robertson 1975: 242). 
The first references are to the German mystic Johannes Tauler (Weber 
1993: 36–38, 47). Tauler was a student of Meister Eckhart and learned much 
6 See Rollman 1993. We have yet to have a definitive account of the Weber-Troeltsch rela-
tionship. We know that they were friends for over seventeen years, that the Troeltschs lived 
upstairs in Weber’s Heidelberg house from 1910 to 1915, and that they had a high regard for 
each other’s works and opinions. See Graf 1987.
7 Hennis claims that James was a major influence on Weber and that it was through 
 Troeltsch that he learned to appreciate James. See Hennis 1996: 54–66.
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from him. They are two of the most important Rheinland mystics and both 
where highly influential. There are, however, a number of dissimilarities. 
Meister Eckhart was a trained scholastic and his sermons were filled with 
metaphysics. He was not always understood and he knew this: he reported-
ly asked: “what may I do if someone does not understand that?”8 Tauler, by 
contrast, strove to write in such a way that his many listeners could follow 
what he was saying (Preger: Band 3, 140; Clarke 1949: 44–45). Moreover, 
after his “conversion” he was far more concerned about the welfare of his 
listeners and he tailored his sermons to deal with mundane matters as well 
as metaphysical ones.9 These first references are on Weber’s chapter on Lu-
ther (Chapter 3). The connection between the mystic Tauler and the reform-
er Luther may seem tenuous at first. However, from 1515 to 1518 Luther 
read Tauler and he learned to appreciate many of his ideas. Weber was aware 
of this influence and he assumes that many of his readers would know that 
as well. That is why in his remarks on the origin of the word “Beruf” he 
notes that the first similar usage is found in one of those German mystics 
whose influence on Luther is recognized (Weber 1993: 37). In a note  Weber 
allows that there is no certainty that there is a direct influence from Tauler’s 
use of “Beruf” to Luther’s use; nonetheless, he suggests that there is.10 Fur-
thermore, he stresses that there are strong traces of Tauler’s thinking in Lu-
ther’s works such as “Freiheit der Christenmenschen” (Weber 1993: 36, 
note  40). In a slightly later note  Weber contends that Tauler’s use of the word 
“Beruf” is in principle the same as Luther’s, both in its spiritual sense as well 
as the worldly, and this is an instance where the German mystics share a 
common opposition to the Thomists (Weber 1993, 41, note  45). In the same 
note  Weber states that Luther and the mystics share the same belief in the 
equality of vocations but also that there is a hierarchy that is God given. 
Another similarity that Luther shares with the mystics against the Church 
8 “Was mac ich, ob ieman daz niht enverstêt?” He also said “Who has understood this 
sermon, to him I wish him well. Were no one present here I would have preached to this col-
lection box.” See Otto 1971: 18.
9 See Preger 1962, III: 97. The story of Tauler’s “conversion” is that, supposedly, a man 
came to him and told him that he was only a beginner and did not understand spiritual mat-
ters. This prompted Tauler to devote a number of years to self-examination. Tauler 1923, I: 
XXXI. However, there has been research that purportedly shows that this person was not 
Tauler. See Clarke 1949: 41–43. Beck stresses Meister Eckhart’s single concern with the soul 
and his indifference towards the world: “But Eckhart has little interest (in his mystical works 
at least) in the world; he is interested in the soul”. Beck 1996: 52. 
10 Weber’s justification is Tauler’s “beautiful sermon” on Eph. 4 where Paul appeals to his 
readers to “lead the life worthy of the calling to which you have been called.” Tauler begins 
with “Brüder, ich gebundner Mensch in Gott, ich bitte euch, daß ihr würdig wandelt in der 
Berufung, zu der ihr berufen seid, mit aller Demut und Sanftmut und mit Geduld einander in 
Liebe vertrag.” What follows is Tauler’s four point commentary. Tauler 1923: 42–48. 
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is the belief that there is no priest that can help and that religion is essential-
ly personal.11 Weber cites or mentions Tauler at least five more times.12 Per-
haps most interesting is Weber’s connection of Luther to the mystics in re-
gard to the unio mystica (Weber 1993:71). Now Weber allows that this devel-
oped in Lutheranism. He also acknowledges that Luther’s unio mystica is 
not the yearning to be one with God as found in “That Contemplative” 
Bernard of Clairvaux.13 And, Weber does draw the distinction between the 
medieval Catholics who lived from hand to mouth and the Lutherans and 
especially the Calvinists who dedicated their lives to work (Weber 1993, 76). 
He also notes that Luther never had the inclination to take flight from the 
world, one of the defining characteristics of a mystic (Weber 1993: 90 
note  145, McGinn 1994: 120, 127). And he draws his distinction between the 
passivity of the mystic with the activity of the ascetic (Weber 1994: 72–73). 
However, he cautions: that “mystical contemplation and rational ‘Berufs-
askese’ do not exclude each other” (Weber 1993: 72 note  99). More impor-
tantly, the famous distinction between the mystic as vessel and the ascetic as 
tool was added in 1920 when Weber had completed his studies on Wirt-
schafts ethik and had prepared Protestantische Ethik for Band 1 of his Ge-
sam melte Aufsätze zur Religionssoziologie (Weber 1993: 73, 183 [221] As the 
45 pages of changes and additions in Weber 1993 show, Weber made a num-
ber of important changes. These included a number of additional references 
to Troeltsch – in particular, to Troeltsch’s Soziallehren.14 Like Protestan-
tische Ethik,  Troeltsch’s Soziallehren was first published in the Archiv für 
Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik beginning in 1908 and ending in 1910. 
The Archiv was the journal that Weber, Edgar Jaffe and Werner Sombart 
took over in 1903.15 Troeltsch then reworked major parts of Soziallehren and 
published it as Band 1 of his Gesammelte Schriften in 1912. He also added 
chapters on Calvinism, sects, mysticism, and a conclusion. Troeltsch and 
Weber had many points of convergence, such as their views on Luther and 
Calvin and the distinction between Church and Sect (Winckelmann 1987: 
200). However, as Troeltsch pointed out in 1910, he and Weber had different 
objectives and different goals (Winckelmann 1987: 189, 192). Whereas We-
ber dealt with religion in so far as it was an economic issue, Troeltsch dealt 
11 Guttandin 1998: 74. Weber writes: “no one could help him. No priest – for only the cho-
sen can spiritually understand the Word of God.” (“Niemand konnte ihm helfen. Kein Predi-
ger – denn nur der Erwählte kann Gotteswort spiritualiter verstehen.”) Weber 1993: 62.
12 Weber 1993: 45 note  56, 47 note  61, 72 note  99, 80 note  127, 96 note  157.
13 For a detailed account of Bernhard’s erotic mysticism and especially his erotic commen-
tary on the “Song of Songs” see McGinn 1994: 158–224, esp.  178–180, 187–190, 193–222.
14 See especially Weber 1993: 158 [1], 175 [123], 177 [149], 191 [328], 195 [384].
15 Weber and Sombart dropped out of their editor roles in 1909. See Weber 1990: 603 note  3.
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with it as a larger cultural one. Furthermore, Weber was concerned primar-
ily with Church and Sect. This was not the case with Troeltsch. As Trutz 
Rendtorff has shown, Troeltsch devotes 50 pages to sects and over 90 pages 
to mysticism (Rendtorff 1993, 179 note  2.). And, he devotes approximately 
40 pages to asceticism. 
Troeltsch took up Weber’s distinction between Church and Sect but he 
added a third type: mysticism.16 Much of Troeltsch’s discussion of mysti-
cism is not relevant for the purposes of this paper: he discusses a number of 
Protestant mystics, including Munzer, Schwenkfeld and Sebastian Franck. 
He also treats the mysticism of the Dutch and the English as well as that of 
the Quakers and the Herrnhuter (Troeltsch 1912: 878–925). In addition to 
these, Troeltsch also looks at philosophers. Leibniz and Spinoza have mys-
tical elements in their writings, and he notes that both Schelling and Hegel 
confess to having been influenced by the German mystics. What is of con-
cern here is Troeltsch’s overall view of mysticism. Like Weber, Troeltsch 
sees mystical elements in Luther (Troeltsch 1912: 849). And, like Weber, 
Troeltsch sees Protestant mysticism as stemming from Bernard and others 
from the late Middle Ages (Troeltsch 1912: 850). The mystic rejects any “ob-
jectification” of the religious experience, such as dogma or rites, and believes 
that mysticism in the widest sense is the experience of the immediate pres-
ence of God. He traces mystical experiences to Paul but notes that ancient 
civilizations such as the Greeks and the Persians also had people who had 
mystical experiences.17 There is also mysticism in a narrower technical sense, 
and here he points to, among others, the intellectual mysticism of the Do-
minicans and the willing mysticism of the Franciscans (Troeltsch 1912: 856). 
Mysticism is an immediate and individual living process as opposed to ex-
ternal authority, dead letters and sterile ceremonies (Troeltsch 1912: 858–
859). Instead, “The entire mystical thinking stands indeed in the service of a 
personal living piety….”18 None of this is found in Calvin, who is bound up 
with the notion of sects. Instead, mystical elements are found in Luther 
(Troeltsch 1912: 860). Now Troeltsch is able to spell out the differences be-
tween the Baptismal sects and the mystical individual. The former knows 
the laws of Jesus, the Sermon on the Mount, and with the living according 
to the absolute law of nature. The latter knows only the spirit, its freedom 
16 Troeltsch sets out the three types in a paper from 1911 entitled “Epochen und Typen der 
Sozialphilosophie des Christentum” where he defines the mystic as one who has the “belief in 
the immediate presence of Christ in the soul.” Troeltsch 1925: 126.
17 Troeltsch 1912: 851–852. He cites a number of sources but particularly Erwin Rhode’s 
Psyche and William James’ Varieties of Religious Experience.
18 Troeltsch 1912: 859. Among others, Troeltsch cites von Hügel’s The Mystical Element of 
Religion.
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and its inner movement (Troeltsch 1912: 863). The Baptist has the external 
word as rule and external authority; the mystic has the inner word and in-
ternal tiny spark.19 There is some degree of individuality in the sects, but it 
is nothing like the “radical individuality” of the mystic (Troeltsch 1912: 
864–865). The mystic is indifferent to others; his primary, if not exclusive, 
concern is with God. However, Troeltsch admits that there is a social aspect 
to the mystic. There may be connections with other like-minded people out-
side of the monastery (Troeltsch 1912: 866). Troeltsch again stresses the dif-
ference between a member of a sect and a mystic, with the former basing his 
beliefs upon text and authority while the latter bases his beliefs upon the 
feeling of freedom (Troeltsch 1912: 875–876). Troeltsch concludes his “over-
view” of mysticism by remarking on its lack of inclination towards organi-
zation and stressing the mystic’s concern with his (or her) soul.20 
We do not know Weber’s thoughts regarding Troeltsch’s discussion of 
mysticism in the Soziallehren. However, we can get a fairly good idea from 
comments that he made on a paper that Troeltsch presented at the first meet-
ing of the Deutsche Soziologischen Gesellschaft in Frankfurt in October 
1910. The paper that Troeltsch gave was “Das stoisch-christliche Naturrecht 
und das moderne profane Naturrecht.” There he sets out the three types: 
Church, sect, and mysticism. The last, he argues, is “in truth a radical, ‘com-
munity less’, individuality.”21 It is independent of history, culture and other 
intermediaries. 
We can get a sense of Weber’s estimation of Troeltsch’s paper in a letter to 
Franz Eulenburg. He thought it excellent (“ausgezeichnet”), in part because 
it was totally “value free.” And, the debate about it was the day’s best.22 
In 1917 Rudolf Otto published Das Heilige which some compare in im-
portance to Schleiermacher’s Reden. Like James and many others, Otto 
does not offer a definition of mysticism. He does give the essential charac-
teristic as that of the divine dominating the mortal.23 He emphasizes the 
19 Troeltsch 1912: 863. While many mystics spoke of a small spark, it is perhaps best asso-
ciated with Meister Eckhart. Clarke 1949: 19–20.
20 Troeltsch 1912: 939–940. Consider this remark about Troeltsch’s mystic: “The mystic, 
one could say, can live with the Church, though the Church does not mean very much to him 
or her. Mysticism sets a pattern for a personal quest for religious well-being.” Steeman 1975: 
200. 
21 Troeltsch 1925: 173. The mystic stands in immediacy with Jesus or God. Later, he says 
that mysticism “is the radical, organizationless, individuality of the immediate religious ex-
perience.” Troeltsch 1925: 186. 
22 Wolfgang Schluchter suggests that Weber’s interest in mysticism was prompted initially 
by his work on the Russian Revolution of 1905, but that the catalyst for a major rethinking 
came with Troeltsch’s paper. See Schluchter 1989: 129. See Weber 1994: 655.
23 Otto 1997: 107 note  1. He bases this on part on Schleiermacher’s Reden of which he 
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mere mortal mystic’s feelings of nothingness with the greatness of God, and 
following Schleiermacher he stresses the Christian’s feeling of absolute de-
pendence on God (Otto 1997: 9–12, 20–25, 30). We do not know what We-
ber thought of the book, or indeed whether he had read it.24 However, we 
have good grounds to believe that Weber read the two articles on mysticism 
in the second edition of Logos. Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der 
Kultur, if for no other reason than that he was involved in developing the 
journal. One article was entitled “Mystik und Metaphysik” by Sergius Hes-
sen from St. Petersburg and the other “Formen der Mystik” by Georg Meh-
lis, the editor of Logos.25 Mehlis argued that, despite the apparent contradic-
tion between form and mysticism, he could distinguish between two types: 
theoretical and practical. Like Windelband, who considered Meister Eck-
hart to be the father of mysticism (Windelband 1993: 264), Mehlis regarded 
him as the dominant theoretical mystic (Mehlis 191: 246–247). It is Eckhart’s 
attempts to deal with the “coincidenta oppositorum” and with the necessity 
of absolute quietness (Mehlis 248, 243). It is the notion of absolute silence 
that Weber emphasizes. 
In the section on “Religionssoziologie” from Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
Weber writes: “Only if the creaturely in man is totally silent can God speak 
in the soul”.26 In the “Religionssoziologie”, Weber places mysticism on an 
almost equal footing with asceticism. He writes that “either” there is the 
ascetic “or” there is the mystic. The ascetic works in the world as a “tool” 
(“Werkzeug”) of God (Weber 1980: 328, 331, 332). This does not mean that 
the ascetic approves of the world; indeed, the ascetic is world-rejecting 
(“Weltablehnend”). In contrast, the mystic does not simply reject the world, 
the mystic wishes to flee from it (“Weltflucht”) (Weber 1980: 330). Weber 
draws another contrast between the activity of the ascetic and the passivity 
of the mystic-the former is God’s tool and the latter is God’s “vessel” 
(“Gefäß”) (Weber 1980: 331). The mystic does not do; the mystic wishes to 
have. What the mystic wishes to have is a certain type of knowledge; that is, 
thinks highly. Otto wrote an enthusiastic introduction to his edition of the Reden published 
in 1899 in honor of the 100 years since its first appearance. It is dedicated to Dilthey because 
of his biography of Schleiermacher. It also includes three references to James. See Schleier-
macher 1899.
24 Marianne Weber does not mention Otto and there is nothing in the 1911–1912 corre-
spondence. But it is difficult to believe Weber and Troeltsch did not discuss Otto and his 
works given the latter’s extremely high regard for him. Both Troeltsch and Otto believed in 
the history of religions theory and both had considerable respect for Schleiermacher based on 
serious studies of him. See Drescher 1993: 379 note  257. 
25 Hessen 1912 and Mehlis 1912. See also Weber 1998: 75, 77, 87, 96–97.
26 “Nur wenn das kreatürliche im Menschen völlig schweigt, kann Gott in der Seele re-
den….” Weber 1980: 330.
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specifically, of God. Weber insists that this particular type of feeling counts 
as a particular type of knowledge for the mystic. In order to know God, that 
is, to overcome the distance between God and man, man must refrain from 
action and must empty himself as much as possible. This is necessary to 
create the possibility for the mystic to engage in the “unio mystica” with 
God (Weber 1980: 330). Weber appears to acknowledge that there are diffi-
culties with maintaining the opposition between the active ascetic and pas-
sive mystic when he allows that the distinction is fluid (Weber 1980: 330). 
The mystic is not completely passive; the emptying of oneself is an activity. 
Furthermore, Weber writes of the “energetic concentration” that is the mark 
of the mystic (Weber 1980: 331). The difference that Weber seems to suggest 
is that, for the ascetic, activity is a goal in itself whereas, for the mystic, it is 
merely a means to an end. To the ascetic, the mystic’s inactivity is an indica-
tion of the mystic religious sterility with his emphasis on feeling. The ascet-
ic also believes that the mystic abdicates his role in working for God. From 
the mystic’s point of view, the ascetic’s concern with worldly activities leads 
to a life containing insurmountable tensions between power and good (We-
ber 1980: 331). Weber points to another contrast: the world-fleeing mystic is 
perhaps more dependent on the world than the world-rejecting ascetic. The 
mystic lives on the voluntary offerings of man and nature, be they berries 
and nuts or alms and donations (Weber 1980: 331). Weber offers another 
contrast between the ascetic and the mystic, since the ascetic lives and works 
within the world he has an interest in the meaning of it. For the mystic, who 
cares not for the world but for another higher “reality”, there is no need to 
be concerned with the world’s meaning (Weber 1980: 332). Weber also con-
trasts the differences in humility. For the ascetic, humility is the way in 
which he must regard his worldly success-that it is not his, but rather God’s 
success. For the mystic, humility is associated with the way in which he lives 
within the world – he minimizes his worldly activity in order to achieve the 
silence that is necessary for him to seek refuge in God (Weber 1980: 332). He 
seeks the continuous “quiet euphoria” of contemplation. This need for quiet 
marks all mystics, whether they are from the East or the West (Weber 1980: 
330). As in Protestantische Ethik, here also Weber uses Tauler as the repre-
sentative of Western mysticism. It is Tauler who after the day’s work wishes 
to retire at night in order to have the possibility of the “unio mystica” (We-
ber 1980: 333, 330). And, like Troeltsch, Weber stresses the mystic’s individ-
uality and lack of social interaction. In fact, the mystic does not have a strong 
sense of social activity in general. He is alone and wishes to be alone: he does 
not want to do, but to “feel.” If there is any basis for the development of a 
“genuine mystic community action” (“genuiner Mystik Gemeinschaftshan-
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deln”), it stems from the acosmism of feeling of mystical love (Weber 1980: 
333). Contemplation, not action, has been the watchword of Christian mys-
tics. Weber claims that certain mystics have even seen that activity is better 
than contemplation, and he cites Meister Eckhart as an example (Weber 
1980: 334). Eckhart gave a sermon in which he commented on Luke 10: 38–
42. In that passage, Martha complains that she is working hard and Mary is 
doing nothing but listening. Jesus tells Martha that she should not be trou-
bled and that Mary does the “one needful thing.” Mystics, from Origen on 
have interpreted this passage as Jesus’ endorsement of contemplation over 
activity (McGinn 1991: 69, 126, 215, 249). According to Weber, however, 
Eckhart finally preferred Martha over Mary.27 Is Weber misunderstanding 
or misusing Eckhart? We have no way of telling. However, Weber suddenly 
speaks of the “echter Mystik” (“true mystic”) and the “genuin mystischen 
Gottesbesitz” (“genuine mystical possession of God”) (Weber 1980: 332, 
365). Has Weber’s interest in asceticism prompted him to devalue mysticism 
again? A few points support this interpretation. One is his interest in action. 
A second is his antipathy towards the irrationality of feeling (see Weber 
1980: 362). A third builds on his three-fold distinction of legitimate domina-
tion: traditional, charismatic and rational (Weber 1980: 122–140). All mysti-
cism and mystery cults believe in the habit of (traditional) rituals, which he 
claims leads one away from rational action (Weber 1980: 322, his italics). 
Furthermore, the mystic’s attraction is charismatic (Weber 1980: 322). Final-
ly, Weber distinguishes between the Western mystic’s conception of the 
world and that of the Eastern mystic; the former believes that it is a created 
“work” whereas the latter believes that it is simply a given for all eternity 
(Weber 1980: 335): In his later work, Weber will make more of the contrast 
between Eastern and Western mysticism. 
The section on “Religionssoziologie” in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft was 
probably written in 1912 or 1913. As Tenbruck has argued, the whole of 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft is problematic and the editors of Max Weber 
Gesamtausgabe are trying to address most of the issues (Tenbruck 1999: 
133–156, Schluchter 1991: 597–598). Nonetheless, Weber’s discussion of 
mysticism seems to be an investigative midpoint between the mild interest 
shown in Protestantische Ethik and the investigations from 1915 onwards 
which are to be found in the three volumes of Religionssoziologie. 
In volume One Weber focuses on the mysticism of Laotse. Like all mys-
tics, Laotse seeks God, or perhaps better, seeks the “godly principle” which 
27 Weber 1980: 334. A reading of Luke 10: 38–42 does not support such an interpretation. 
Nor apparently does Eckhart’s sermon. See Eckhart 1979: 158–164.
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is Tao (Weber 1989: 383, 386). As with other mystics, Laotse is contempla-
tive, which is a point Weber repeatedly stresses (Weber 1989: 107, 383, 385, 
389, 391). As such, Laotse seeks to arrive at Tao through contemplation, and 
not through action. Even if he does not totally reject action, he seeks to min-
imize it (Weber 1989: 384). Like all mystics, he is absolutely indifferent to the 
world (Weber 1989: 380, 390). Thus, he does not even engage in any active 
struggle against the world (Weber 1989: 389). The mystic is utterly indiffer-
ent to the world and its rational social ethics (Weber 1989: 389). Weber quotes 
a German translation of Laotse: “This all is without use for your person.”28 
It is without use because it in no way furthers the “unio mystica.” This 
would be the peacefulness that the mystic seeks (Weber 1989: 379). Weber 
also draws the conclusions that the mystic is indifferent to the everydayness 
of the world and that his interest is really in himself (Weber, 1989: 113). 
In the second volume Weber stresses the self-interest in one’s soul that the 
Brahman possesses (Weber 1996: 271). The Brahman also seeks knowledge, 
specifically a mystical reunification. Once again, Weber stresses that this is 
not knowledge in any ordinary sense, but rather a “Haben” (“having”).29 
And, he also stresses the Indian’s life of thought to the minimization of ac-
tivity (Weber 1996: 282). 
The Buddhist mystic differs from the usual mystic in that he is not neces-
sarily self-absorbed. Instead, he seeks an unlimited feeling for man and an-
imal.30 In this, the mystic seeks to be God-like. Weber again points to the 
difference between man and God: man has a need for, and interest in, activ-
ity. In contrast, rest is Godly (Weber 1996: 530). 
It is in the “Zwischenbetrachtung” (“Intermediate Reflection”) section of 
Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligion that Weber again takes up the issue of 
mysticism. Once more Weber places active asceticism against contemplative 
mysticism (Weber 1989: 481). It is here that he calls the ascetic and the mystic 
“polar concepts.” On the one side there is the God-willed activity of the 
ascetic who considers himself to be God’s tool; on the other side there is the 
contemplation of the mystic who regards himself as God’s vessel. He does 
not do, but rather has possession of the holy (Weber 1989: 482). This oppo-
sition lessens if the ascetic moves towards the mystic by minimizing work 
and maximizing contemplation, just as the mystic moves towards the ascet-
28 “Dies alles ist ohne Nützen für deine Person.” Weber 1989: 386.
29 Weber 1996: 280. Later he writes “The mystical knowledge is not, at least not adequate 
and rational, communicable.” Weber 1996: 529. Compare this with James’ first two points 
about mysticism, above.
30 Weber notes the similarity with Father Zosima from Dostoevsky’s The Brothers Kara-
mazov and with Platon Karataev from Tolstoy’s War and Peace. Weber 1989: 333 and note  4.
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ic by not drawing the world-fleeing conclusion but choosing instead to re-
main within the world’s order. Weber has four categories: 
 Ascetic  Mystic 
(1) innerworldly (2) world-rejecting (3) otherworldly (4) world-fleeing 
The mystic will minimize activity even if he remains within the world, for 
he must not do but must be (Weber 1989: 482–483). The fundamental prin-
ciple for any true mystic is to remain silent, for only then can he hear God 
speak. For the innerworldly ascetic it is through activity that there is godli-
ness, and even while rejecting the world, by acting, the ascetic dominates the 
world. To the mystic, the ascetic seems preoccupied with vain self-justice; to 
the ascetic, the mystic seems preoccupied with pleasurable self-absorption 
(Weber 1989: 483). As Weber makes clear, there are degrees of opposition 
between asceticism and mysticism. 
Weber was never preoccupied with mysticism, although I believe that I 
have demonstrated that he had a growing interest in it. Whether it was kin-
dled by his work on the Russian revolutions, as Schluchter suggested, or by 
Troeltsch’s 1910 paper, as Mitzman believed (Mitzman 1979: 195) or by some 
other cause is not of primary importance. What is of primary importance is 
that Weber had a growing appreciation for mysticism, and not simply from 
a scholar’s point of view. In an often-cited letter to Ferdinand Tönnies writ-
ten in 1909, Weber remarks that in religious matters he is “unmusical.”31 
Weber wrote another letter less than two weeks later in which he discussed 
the historical significance of mysticism. He adds that he does not have the 
psychic capacity to experience such religious feelings, again because he is 
religiously “unmusical.” Perhaps the best support for this comes from Edu-
ard Baumgarten who recounts a story that Marianne Weber told him some-
time around 1918 or 1919. Max and Marianne would often sit in their salon 
before retiring. They would sit there mostly in silence, with Max enjoying a 
cigar. On one occasion he said: 
“Tell me, can you picture yourself to be a mystic?” 
“That would certainly be the last thing that I could think about myself. 
Can you then picture yourself as one?” 
“It could even be that I am one. How much more in my life have I ‘dreamt’ 
than one ought actually to allow oneself, thus I never feel entirely dependa-
bly at home. It is, as I could (and want) just as well as also to withdraw my-
self entirely from everything.”32 
31 The letter is dated 19 February. Weber 1994: 65. 
32 “Sag mal, kannst Du Dir vorstellen, Du seist ein Mystiker?”
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This passage is instructive for what it does say as well as what it does not say. 
First, Weber does not respond directly to Marianne’s assertion that it would 
be the last thing that she could imagine herself to be. Second, he does not 
address her high degree of certainty. Instead, he says that he certainly could 
be a mystic. Third, he speaks of the number of times that he has “dreamt” 
but does not explain what he means-does he mean nightly dreams, daytime 
reveries, or of making the plans? What he does say is that he has done more 
dreaming than one ought to allow oneself. Again, he is silent on what he 
means by this – has he somehow broken some self-regulation or has he en-
gaged in dreaming that is somehow too pleasurable? Fourth, he says that he 
never reliably feels at home-does he mean that he never completely or com-
fortably feel at home? The second possibility is strengthened when one con-
siders “daheim” to be a sense of belonging, a sense of being at ease in one’s 
place or in one’s surrounding. It is a sense of not being alienated, but rather 
feeling at one with the world. Finally, the last sentence is crucial-that he 
could and would withdraw himself from everything. This is a variation of 
the contemplative mystic’s “flight from the world” – he would not flee but 
would deliberately remove himself from it. The passage is fascinating be-
cause it is enigmatic. Finally, we have the enigmatic last words that Weber 
uttered: “The true is the truth.”33 
I have not suggested that Max Weber ever was a mystic, despite Mari-
anne’s story. But I have suggested that Weber developed an interest in mys-
ticism, an interest that seemed to grow in the last five years of his life. Until 
the correspondence from those years is made available and until we have a 
reliable biography of him, we may never really know how he felt about mys-
ticism.
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Chapter Two
Max Weber’s Charisma
Max Weber’s longstanding interest in the notion of authority is well docu-
mented. It is evident in a number of his works but is found especially in his 
Herrschaftssoziologie, which Wolfgang Mommsen has referred to as “the 
monumentally great work” (Mommsen 2001: 303). In Herrschaftssoziologie, 
which is part of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Weber identifies three types of 
legitimate Herrschaft: legal, traditional, and charismatic (Weber 1976: 124). 
His main interest seems to be in bureaucratic authority, which he argues is 
the purest form of legal authority, and this interest apparently stems from 
his continual interest in the rise of Western rationality. It is bureaucratic 
authority that helps bring about the replacement of tradition by rules. For 
Weber, bureaucratic authority has many positive features: it is based upon 
reason, it is impartially implemented by paid trained officials, and its future 
is stable. Weber also has considerable interest in the second type of authori-
ty, that which is traditional. This authority is based upon strong traditional 
rules and has much in common with legal authority. In both types the per-
son in authority is merely the servant: in traditional authority the person 
serves the “community”; in legal authority the person serves in his or her 
capacity for interpreting the rules (Weber 1976: 129–130). Both types have 
to do with this world: the person holding traditional authority is interested 
in power and money, hence Weber’s concern is economic; and the person 
holding bureaucratic authority is interested in power and law, hence Weber’s 
concern is legal.
Certainly the first two types figure prominently in Weber’s early work. 
Weber takes pains to show in the Protestantische Ethik how rationality (bu-
reaucratic authority) replaces tradition (traditional authority) whereas cha-
risma is not even mentioned. When it comes to the third type there is wide-
spread disagreement. Some scholars appear to believe that Weber had little 
interest in the notion of charisma.34 Others suggest that his conception was 
not easy to comprehend because it was multi-faceted, if not inherently con-
34 Wilhelm Hennis provides a representative sampling of a number of German scholars 
who downplay the notion in Weber’s works. See Hennis 1996: 83.
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tradictory. For example, Kurt Becker insists that Weber’s notion of charisma 
contains both power and weakness (Becker 1988: 26). Still other scholars 
have contended that Weber was not necessarily interested in what charisma 
was; rather, he was far more interested in its transformation into something 
permanent and institutionalized. Indeed, Weber himself seems to justify 
this – so S.N. Eisenstadt seems to be correct in his assertion that Weber’s 
concern was charisma and its relationship to institutions (Weber 1968: ix-
lvi). And, of course, there are those who, like Leo Strauss, believe that We-
ber’s notion of charisma paves the way for Hitler (Strauss 1953: 43–43). 
However, others have maintained that Weber’s notion of charisma is intrin-
sically important: Thomas Kroll claimed that it counts as one of the most 
significant discoveries of Weber’s Herrschaftssoziologie (Kroll 2001: 47). But 
even here it seems that its importance stems mostly from its modern wide-
spread usage. Martin Riesebrodt maintained that Weber’s concept of charis-
ma has become so commonplace as to have become almost banal (Riese-
brodt 2001: 151). Others have also pointed this out: in “Charisma Reconsid-
ered” Stephen Turner argues that “The term has been widely appropriated” 
(Turner 2003: 6), noting that it is now a woman’s given name and has been 
adopted by numerous businesses. Christoph R. Hatscher in Charisma und 
Res Publica suggests that for some it has become an empty word and he 
notes that it is commonly used in business – there is even now “charisma 
training” (Hatscher 2000: 19–20). He also quotes from the author of a work 
on charisma training that “everyone knows what it means…but almost no 
one can explain it. You have it or you do not have it” (Hatscher 2000: 20, 
note  7). Despite its general usage and its place in Weber’s work, Riesebrodt 
(Riesebrodt 2001: 151) is correct to complain that neither in the general soci-
ological studies nor in the specific Weber literature has the concept been 
thoroughly explained. It may not be too far-fetched to paraphrase Weber 
and suggest that charisma is a “Schmerzenkind unserer Herrschaftssoziolo-
gie” (“problem child of our ‘Herrschaftssoziologie’”).35 Accordingly, my 
intention here is simply go back to what Weber wrote and try to spell out 
carefully what he took charisma to be. In so doing I will follow Weber him-
self in contrasting what charisma is not.
Originally Weber was not interested in charisma because it was irrational, 
personal, and temporary. For the most part, he was concerned with that 
which was rational, impersonal, and permanent, hence his interest in legal 
35 In “Die ‘Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkentniss” Weber 
wrote: “Werte – jenes Schmerzenkind unserer Disziplin.” Weber 1988: 209–210).
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Herrschaft.36 It is my contention that, partially because of personal concerns 
and partially because of political reasons, the notion of charisma began to 
fascinate Weber. Charisma is extremely personal, it is highly irrational, it is 
very temporary, and above all, it is especially unusual. Unlike the other 
types of Herrschaft, the possessor of charisma is a leader who is “extraordi-
nary.” The charismatic leader is a dämonischer type who appears only in 
chaotic times. He or she is, in the view of Weber’s friend Karl Jaspers, a 
“demonic power” (Jaspers 1919: 166–169). 
In what follows I will begin by trying to establish that Weber’s interest in 
charisma dates from around 1910. Then, in the main part of the article I will 
show how Weber’s notion of charisma differs from his conceptions of tradi-
tional and legal Herrschaft. Next, I will show how Weber thought of the 
“deviant” type of charismatic leader, the “personality.” Finally, before mak-
ing my concluding remarks, I argue that, while Weber endorses the notion 
of the charismatic leader, he is well aware of both the strengths and weak-
nesses inherent in such authority. But first, I briefly want to discuss a few 
terms and concepts in Weber’s Herrschaftssoziologie.
Herrschaft can be rendered as “rule”, “dominion”, “control”, “power”, or 
“sway.” In the first section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, entitled “Soziolo-
gische Grundbegriffe” (“Basic Sociological Concepts”), Weber provides 
definitions of concepts. This part, written in 1919/1920 can be taken as some 
of Weber’s last views on his work.37 Here he writes “‘Herrschaft’ soll heißen 
die Chance einen Befehl bestimmten Inhalts bei angebbaren Personen Ge-
horsam zu finden.” (Weber 1976: 28).38 This could be rendered “‘Herrschaft’ 
should mean the probability that a specific group of people would obey an 
order with a specific content.” This passage clearly indicates that Weber 
connects Herrschaft with Macht (“power”) and Zwang (“compulsion”), and 
that Herrschaft means the power to compel people to obey (Weber 1976: 
28–29). Weber’s interest in all three concepts was life-long. In Politik als 
Beruf, the speech that he gave to the Munich students in late January 1919, 
he quotes with some sense of approval Trotsky’s claim that every state is 
36 Reinhard Bendix underscores the sense of permanence of both bureaucratic and tradi-
tional Herrschaft.Bendix 1977: 299. 
37 For the dating see the general editorial comments to Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Weber 
2001a: xvii.
38 This is more or less repeated on p.  122. The emphasis is on both the order which is given 
and that it is obeyed. Weber defines obedience in a particularly Kantian way – that the person 
who obeys the order makes the content of that order the same as the willing of the maxim of 
one’s own behavior. Weber 1976: 123. Compare with Kant’s various formulations in the 
Grund legung der Metaphysik der Sitten. Kant 1911: 402, 421. 
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founded upon force (Weber 1992b: 158).39 Many years earlier, in 1895, in his 
Inaugural Lecture at Freiburg, he spoke of economic, political, and even 
military domination. And, he specifically spoke of the “herrschenden 
Machthaber und Klassen” (“dominating power possessors and classes”) 
(Weber 1993: 560–562). A Nation, a class, or a person must submit to them 
– even if the nation, the class, or the person would rather not do so. Accord-
ingly, domination appears to be an acceptable translation of Herrschaft. 
However, later in the same part of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Weber writes 
of Herrschaft and immediately adds “Autorität” (“authority”) (Weber 1976: 
122). And, in Politik als Beruf he coupled Herrschaft and “Autorität” in his 
discussion of “‘charismatische’ Herrschaft” (Weber 1992b: 160). Thus, 
“domination” may be perfectly acceptable for both traditional and legal 
Herrschaft; however, because the charismatic person does not, and cannot, 
resort to compulsion, “authority” seems a better choice for charismatic 
Herrschaft.40 But, as I will stress below, there are two points to make clear: 
first, Weber usually speaks of the charismatic person, and, second, he speaks 
not so much of the person claiming authority as of the person claiming lead-
ership. Thus, instead of “domination” or “authority” it is better to refer to 
this as “charismatic leadership.”
There is virtually no argument that one of the greatest preoccupations for 
Weber, if not the greatest, was the rise of Western rationality. It is one of the 
cardinal factors in the Protestantische Ethik, in Wissenschaft als Beruf, as 
well as in the “Vorbemerkung” for the Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions-
soziologie that he had written shortly before his death.41 Anything that 
seemed “irrational” seemed alien to him. Thus, he wrote to Ferdinand Tön-
nies that in religious matters he was “unmusical” (Weber 1994: 65, 70). It 
was also the same regarding poetry. Marianne Weber tells of how, when 
they were living in Freiburg, Weber’s friend and colleague Heinrich Rickert 
39 “‘Jeder Staat wird auf Gewalt gegründet’ sagte seinerzeit Trotzki in Brest-Litowsk. Das 
ist in der tat richtig.” (“‘Every state is founded on force’ said Trotsky in Brest-Litowsk. That 
is in fact correct.”) Weber 1992b: 158. He adds that the state is that which has the “legitimate 
monopoly on physical force”, a claim similar to the one he also makes in the “Zwischenbe-
trach tung”: the state has the claim on the “monopoly [of] legitimate force.” Weber 1989: 491, 
Weber’s emphasis.
In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft he also insists “Alle politische Gebilde sind Gewaltgebilde.” 
(“All political structures are power structures.”) Weber 2001a: 222.
40 See the lengthy discussion of the problems in translating Herrschaft in Economy and 
Society. Weber 1978: 61–62, note  31. H.H. Bruun translates Herrschaft as “authority” and 
notes the connection with “power” and “submission”. He does not seem to differentiate 
among the three types of Herrschaft. See Bruun 1972: 287–288. 
41 My point is that while Weber was interested in rationality for most of his adult life, from 
1910 on he seems to have been interested in irrationality as well. 
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passionately and beautifully read a number of Stefan George’s poems but 
Weber was totally indifferent and remained unmoved. (Weber, Marianne 
1984: 463). She continues, however, and that after recovering from his illness 
it was totally different. In 1910 Weber was impressed with not only Stefan 
George but also Rainer Maria Rilke (Weber, Marianne 1984: 463). Also, 
from this time on a number of Russian writers became important for him, 
especially Dostoevsky and Tolstoy. Paul Honigsheim could not remember a 
single Sunday Jour at Weber’s house on which Dostoevsky’s name was not 
mentioned (Honigsheim 1985: 240–241). In a 1910 letter to his wife Mari-
anne, Weber writes of lying in bed and reading Tolstoy for two hours (We-
ber 1994: 675). He also reported to her in a letter from March 1911 that his 
friend Emil Lask referred to him as Tolstoy’s disciple (Weber 1998: 142). 
Moreover, that summer he wrote to Rickert about an article on Tolstoy that 
he wanted to publish in the journal Logos (Weber 1998: 250), and Tolstoy 
figures in Politik als Beruf and even more so in Wissenschaft als Beruf. I will 
return to this later; for now the point is from 1910 on Weber was capable of 
not only understanding but also appreciating people who held “irrational” 
beliefs and committed “irrational” acts. For him, both Stefan George and 
Tolstoy were charismatic leaders who were “irrational.” It is time to turn to 
what Weber means by the charismatic leader and I begin by discussing the 
other two types.
The first is traditional authority. In Politik als Beruf Weber speaks of the 
different holders of traditional authority, patriarchs and patrimonial lead-
ers, but he is less interested in the holders than he is in the type of authority. 
He suggests that it is often based upon “geheiligte Sitte” (“holy custom”) and 
upon the “Heiligkeit altüberkommener (‘von jeher bestehender’) Ordnun-
gen und Herrengewalten” (“foundation of the holiness from any old tradi-
tional customs [from standing orders] and dominating powers”) (Weber 
1976: 130). In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Weber stresses the difference be-
tween Sitte and Konvention. He notes that the line separating them is fluid 
but it seems clear that he holds the difference to be similar to that between 
physis and nomos, between “nature” and “convention.”42 Several pages later 
he refers to Tönnies’ Die Sitte. There Tönnies discusses the “authority” of 
Sitte, as in “die Sitte erlaubte es, daß die Geschlechter gemeinsam badeten” 
(“Morality permitted the genders to bathe together”) and that he speaks of 
the obligation that we have towards it (Tönnies 1909: 13). There are two 
points here: first, that the Sitte has authority over us and second, this au-
42 Later Weber differentiates between the two by noting that there is no compulsion re-
garding Konvention whereas there is regarding Sitte. Weber 1976: 187, 15.
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thority is based upon the age of the Sitte. Hegel, the authority on Sittlichkeit 
and one of the best commentators on Sophocles’ Antigone, quotes from the 
claim that the Laws of the underworld are eternal:
Nicht etwa jetzt und gestern, sondern immerdar
lebt es, und keiner weiß, von wannen es erschein
(not now and yesterday but rather eternally,
it lives, and no one knows from when it appeared.
    Hegel 1952: 311
Hegel’s point is that the traditional laws are permanent, a point he makes 
explicit in his lectures on Rechtsphilosophie in Heidelberg in 1817. There he 
speaks of the Gesetz as eternal. While Antigone complains about her destiny 
in being compelled to obey the power of law, still she knows that her com-
plaint is unjustified (Hegel 1983: 90–91). As Hegel put it in the Phänomeno-
logie des Geistes: “Sie sind” (“They are”) (Hegel 1952: 311). Weber makes a 
similar point when he speaks of this authority as stemming from the “ewig 
Gestrigen” (“the eternal yesterdays”) (Weber 1992b: 160). These laws and 
customs transcend time, and the people who claim traditional authority can 
issue new laws only when these are in accordance with the old laws. In this 
sense, traditional authority has no regard for persons.
Something similar can be said with respect to legal authority, the person 
cannot have regard for individual people. But, rather than being based upon 
age-old traditions, the holder of bureaucratic authority has been trained to 
act impartially according to the rules governing his or her office.43 He or she 
must be impartial; nothing about the person can in any way influence his or 
her decision. Weber insists that the holder of legal authority must act with-
out “hate” or “passion”, without “love” or “enthusiasm”. The person must 
act “ohne Ansehen der Person” (“without regard for the person”). That is 
why Weber emphasizes that the person must act “sine ira et studio” (“with-
out hate and without love”).44 
Permanence, rules, and impartiality are three of the basic factors of both 
traditional and bureaucratic authority. Traditional authority lacks the ra-
tionality and the competence that is found in bureaucratic authority, so 
43 See Weber’s extensive treatment of the holder of bureaucratic authority. Weber 1976: 
esp.  126–131. Also see Wolfgang Schluchter’s wide-ranging discussion of this subject. Schluch-
ter 1989: 315–319.
44 These are phrases that Weber uses repeatedly. They are found a number of times in 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Weber 1976: 129, 562, see also Weber 2001b: 400–401, 429. They 
are also found in “Die drei reinen Typen der ligitimen Herrschaft”. Weber 1988: 476 and they 
are present in his Wirtschaftsethik as well as in Politik als Beruf. Weber 1989: 491; Weber 
1992b: 190. In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft he also used the formulation “sine ira ac (et) studio”. 
Weber 1976: 563. The phrase stems from Tacitus. 
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where as the former can be described as “routine”, the latter is better de-
scribed as “rationally routine” (Weber 1988: 476, 478 and Weber 1976: 126). 
In both cases, however, the emphasis is on “routine” or better “everyday-
ness, as in Alltäglichkeit. This leads to the biggest differentiation between 
traditional and bureaucratic domination and charismatic leadership – the 
notion of Außeralltäglichkeit.
In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Weber insists that, while bureaucratic and 
traditional Herrschaft are often in contrast with each other, they are abso-
lutely one in the sense of having “Stetigkeit” (“continuity”, “permanence”) 
(Weber 1976: 654).45 He also refers to this as “Dauergebilde” (“permanent 
structure”) and “Alltagsgebilde”; that is, it occurs in the “Alltag” (“every-
day”). Earlier, he maintained that both traditional and bureaucratic Herr-
schaft are specific “Alltagsformen” of Herrschaft (Weber 1976: 141). He also 
emphasized that this sense of permanence is indispensible for economic 
growth in general and for capitalism in particular (Weber 1976: 654, 659). 
Indeed, he refers to it as “Alltagskapitalismus.” In order for capitalism to 
function there must be rules and order, a point that he had made much ear-
lier in the Protestantische Ethik. (see Weber 1992a: 12–16, 24–27). However, 
Weber makes a larger point when he notes that the sense of “everydayness” 
is important in many spheres. Thus, he speaks of “Alltagsordnung” (“every-
day order”), the “familiengebundene Alltagshandeln” (“family-bound 
everyday actions”), “Alltagsinteressen” (“everyday interests”), “All tags-
christen” (“everyday Christians”), and even of the “Alltagsmenschen” 
(“everyday men”) who practice “Alltagslebensführung” (“everyday con-
duct”) in the “Alltagswelt” (“everyday world) (Weber 2001b: 368, 371, 314, 
323, 319, 314–315). The emphasis here is on “routine”, and life under the 
conditions of traditional or bureaucratic Herrschaft is, and must be, routine. 
It matters not whether this sense of routine is founded on old ways of think-
ing or on recently implemented rules. It is the world of Alltag. 
In contrast, the charismatic leader is “spezifisch außeralltäglich” (“specif-
ically extraordinary”) (Weber 1976: 140).46 On the next page he specifically 
contrasts charisma with the other two forms of Herrschaft and stresses that 
it is “außeralltäglich.” In “Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft” 
he repeats this with the same emphasis, but adds that this is a “rein persön-
45 One of the differences between bureaucratic and traditional Herrschaft, if not the key 
one is that the former is based upon the concept of “competence”, which is lacking in the latter. 
See Weber 1988: 478, 482. In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Weber also includes “Kompetenz” as 
one of the marks of that seems to be lacking in traditional Herrschaft. Weber 1976: 131. Also 
in that work Weber maintains that “Wissen” (“knowledge”) or rationality is the fundamental 
character of bureaucratic Herrschaft. Weber 1976: 129.
46 “Alltäglich” means both “ordinary” and “everyday.”
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liche soziale Beziehung” (“pure personal social relation”) (Weber 1988: 485). 
Earlier he had stressed that the relationship between the “Führer” (“leader”) 
and the “Junger” (“disciple”) was a personal one in which the disciple has a 
personal devotion to the leader (Weber 1988: 482). Again, he contrasts this 
with the other two types: this relationship is not one based upon a discipline 
or a class, or on any household or similar relationship.
The sections of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft which are devoted to the no-
tion of charisma are exceedingly helpful in clarifying the “extraordinari-
ness” of the charismatic leader. The “Anhänger” (“followers”) have an en-
tirely personal devotion to their leader. And, this devotion is brought forth 
by the “leader’s” ability to seem to be able to perform “miracles” or to per-
form heroic acts (Weber 1976: 140). Later, Weber insists that anyone who 
wishes to become some sort of leader must perform miracles.47 The follow-
ers recognize and acknowledge the personal qualification and characteris-
tics of the possessor of charisma (Weber 1976: 655). It is the sense that the 
leader has been chosen, that he (or she) belongs to God’s grace (Weber 1976: 
140). So, it seems as if the charismatic leader possesses the power and holds 
sway over his followers. However, Weber insists that the charismatic leader 
is dependent upon the followers for recognition.48 In a similar way, while it 
seems as if by acting religiously the charismatic leader is a servant of God, 
he (or she) is instead compelling God to do certain acts. Weber clarifies this 
in the section on “Religiöse Gemeinschaften” in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 
a section that is just as helpful for Weber’s conception of charisma as those 
sections devoted specifically to it (Weber 2001b: 154). There he writes of the 
priest and the magician, but notes that the line that divides them is fluid. He 
writes: “Der Gegensatz ist in der Realität durchaus flüssig, wie fast alle sozi-
ologischen Erscheinungen” (“The opposition is in reality thoroughly fluid, 
as [are] almost all sociological appearances” (Weber 2001b: 157, also see 158). 
Weber continuously connects magic and charisma; he often writes of “mag-
ical charisma” (Weber 2001b: 161, 178–179, 242, 305, 318).
Weber acknowledges that his source for charisma was Rudolf Sohm and 
his studies about early Christianity, so it is not hard to consider Weber’s 
notion of “magical charisma” applying to Jesus (Weber 1976: 124; see Turner 
and Factor 1994: 110–116).49 Weber’s interest is not so much in Jesus as in the 
47 “Er muß Wunder tun, wenn er ein Prophet, Heldentaten, wenn er ein Kriegsführer sein 
will.” Weber 1976: 656.
48 “Kein Prophet hat seine Qualität als abhängig von der Meinung der Menge über ihn 
angesehen”. Literally: “No prophet has his quality recognized as dependent from the opinion 
of the crowds about him.”
49 Alan Sica is right to express surprise at Talcott Parson’s claim: “Charisma is a sociolog-
ical term coined by Weber himself.” Weber 1992a: 281, note  105; see Sica 1988: 171.
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role of the prophet. A prophet, as Weber defines one, is a “personal charisma 
carrier.”50 Whereas a priest may not have a personal “Beruf” (“calling”), the 
prophet necessarily has one (Weber 2001b: 178). Weber does not mean that 
the priest cannot have charisma; he may, but he is a member of a particular 
society and derives his authority from his position in that society. In con-
trast, the prophet as well as the charismatic magician derive their power 
simply from their personal gifts (Weber 2001b: 178, see also 333 and 447). 
Weber appears to place Jesus within the tradition of the Old Testament 
prophets when he discusses how tenuous their authority was, and he re-
minds us of Jesus’ insistence that “I am the way, and the truth, and the life; 
no one comes to the Father, but by me” (John 14: 6–7; Weber 2001b: 179). 
Weber looks to the New Testament, where faith is placed in the “Seelen-
hirten” (“shepherds of the soul”) who have a “specific charisma” of the ex-
traordinary trust given to them by God. He adds that faith is a surrogate to 
magical capability (Weber 2001b: 355). In any case, the prophet is a specially 
chosen one who has a particular relationship to God.
This brings up the question of the relationship between the charismatic 
leader (prophet) and asceticism and mysticism. At first glance it would seem 
as if the charismatic leader would fit into Weber’s notion of the ascetic – he 
certainly appears to be an ascetic. He appears to be the active “Werkzeug” 
(“tool” or “instrument”) of God (Weber 2001b: 320). However, Weber takes 
pains to emphasize the irrationality of both the mystic and the charismatic 
leader (Weber 2001b: 323). In fact, Weber refers to irrationality as “anti-ra-
tional” and stresses that the charismatic leader believes and is believed in 
especially because it goes against what we know (Weber 2001b: 355–356; see 
esp.  365, note  65). In the “Zwischenbetrachtung” Weber insists on the irra-
tionality of the world and he connects the charismatic leader with the sense 
of “Außeralltäglichkeit”. (Weber 1989: 482–485).
These points can be clarified by briefly setting out the opposition between 
the mystic and the ascetic.51 The ascetic differs from the mystic in a number 
of ways. First, the ascetic is God’s instrument and actively seeks to work in 
the world, whereas, in opposition, the mystic believes that he is a “Gefäß” 
(“vessel”) and proclaims that it is his duty to be passive.52 Weber stresses that 
50 “Wir wollen hier unter einem ‘Propheten’ verstehen einen rein personalischen Charis-
maträger, der Kraft seiner Mission eine religiöse Lehre oder einen göttlichen Befehl verkün-
det”, “We want here to understand by ‘prophet’ a pure personal charisma carrier, whose pow-
er of his mission is to announce a religious teaching or a holy command”. Weber 2001b: 177.
51 For a discussion of Weber’s notions of asceticism and mysticism, see Adair-Toteff 2002.
52 This is Weber’s thesis in the Protestantische Ethik. The Calvinist worked intensively for 
the greater glory for God, but also to seek to have some sign that he is a member of the elect. 
See especially Weber 1996: 61–63, 69–71. There, Weber appears to contrast the active “inner-
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it is the fundamental maxim of the mystic to be silent so that God can speak 
(Weber 1989: 482). So, the ascetic accepts the everydayness of the world 
while both the mystic and the charismatic leader reject it. As Weber puts it: 
“Die Kontemplation bedarf, um zu ihrem Ziel zu gelangen, stets die Aus-
schaltung des Alltagsinteressen” (“Contemplation demands that in order to 
reach one’s goal [one must] always shut out the everyday interests” (Weber 
2001b: 323). In addition, and more importantly, Weber himself draws the 
connection between the mystic and charisma: “Die Disposition zur Mystik 
aber ist ein individuelles Charisma” (“The disposition to mysticism, howev-
er, is an individual [type of] charisma”) (Weber 2001b: 307). Furthermore, it 
is the responsibility of the prophet and the mystic to close the eternal gap 
between this world and the other world. But, Weber insists that this demand 
is not based upon any rational foundation, but stems entirely from the per-
son’s own charisma. In this sense, the prophet, mystic, and holy man are one 
(Weber 1989: 498). Again, the point that needs to be stressed is that the 
prophet, the charismatic leader, and the mystic reject the everydayness of 
the world.
This rejection is underscored by the rejection of economic gain. Again, 
the opposition between the traditional and bureaucratic Herrschaft, on the 
one hand, and the charismatic leadership, on the other, is clear. The former 
are obviously interested in wealth, even if it is more important in bureaucra-
cy.53 Weber stresses the opposition between “Alltagskapitalismus” and cha-
risma (Weber 1976: 659). Earlier, he had written: “Reines Charisma is spezi-
fisch wirtschaftsfremd.” (“Pure charisma is specifically economically alien.”) 
(Weber 1976: 142). He continues by allowing that all types of charismatic 
leaders do accept money that is either given or appropriated; but, he insists 
that they reject anything along the lines of a traditional or rational “All tags-
wirts chaft”: that is, they reject any type of everyday routine and regulated 
economy (Weber 1976: 142, 146). Part of this is because of the charismatic 
leader’s belief in his (or her) given task or personal “Beruf” (Weber 1976: 
worldly asceticism” of Calvin with the passive “otherworldly mysticism” of Luther. For the 
Lutheran the highest religious experience is the “unio mystica” with God. Weber 1996: 71–72. 
Weber continued to hold this view of the Lutherans’ exultation of the “unio mystica”. Weber 
2001b: 331. For passive “unio mystica” and the sense of the mystic’s “Weltflucht” (“world 
flight”) in contrast to the active “Weltablehnung” (“world rejection”) of the ascetic, see also 
Weber 2001b: 324. Weber also claims that not acting is also not thinking. But, he adds that the 
contrast between the ascetic and the mystic is fluid. Weber 2001b: 325. For more of the oppo-
sition between the mystic and the ascetic, see Weber 1989: 482; Weber 2001b: 320–221, 326, 
329; also see Adair-Toteff 2002.
53 See for example, his notions of the connection of the traditional Herrschaft with eco-
nomics (Weber 1976: 133, 136) and the connections between traditional and bureaucratic 
Herrschaft and economic Alltag. Weber 1976: 654.
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142). But, part of this is because of the charismatic leader’s rejection of any-
thing impersonal. And, Weber insists that money is the most abstract and 
impersonal object in human life. 54 It is evident that the charismatic leader 
whose leadership is predicated on his personal qualities would reject some-
thing as impersonal as money and economy.
As the charismatic leader rejects money, so too he (or she) rejects politics, 
or at least there is a major antagonism between wishing to be political and 
wishing to be apolitical (Weber 2001b: 390–392). Taking Jesus as the embod-
iment of this internal conflict, consider his demands that one should turn 
one’s cheek with the claim that he has come to bring not peace but a sword 
(Matthew 5: 38 ff.).
Because Weber’s great love was politics, it comes as no surprise that much 
of his interest in the charismatic leader centers on the charismatic political 
leader. Besides the prophet and the warrior hero there is the great dema-
gogue, and he lists Cleon and Napoleon as examples (Weber 1988: 481, 483). 
But, it is Pericles who appears to hold the greatest interest for Weber. After 
claiming that the demagogue has been the leading type of politician (since 
the beginning of democracy), he reminds us that when we have a particular 
distaste for that word we need to remember that it was first applied to Peri-
cles (Weber 1976: 829). Weber makes the identical point in Politik als Beruf 
(Weber 1992b: 191). There, he adds that the followers are moved by his words 
and recognize his greatness (Weber 1992b: 211). The charismatic leader does 
not “live from” politics as many politicians do; rather, he “lives for” poli-
tics.55 And, because he “lives for” politics, he moves his followers not by any 
abstract program but simply through their personal devotion (Weber 1992b: 
204). But, along with honor comes, or must come, the charismatic leader’s 
recognition of his “Eigenverantwortung” (“self- responsibility”) (Weber 
1992b: 180). Weber lists the three qualities that the true political leader must 
have: “Leidenschaft”, Verantwortungsgefühl”, and “Augenmaß” (Weber 
1992b: 227). All three are important: “Leidenschaft” is “passion”; “Augen-
maß” is literally “eye-measure”, but it means to have the appropriate dis-
tance to be able to assess people and situations; and “Verantwortungsgefühl” 
is a “sense of responsibility.” It is this sense of responsibility that sets the 
true political leader apart from the mere “dilettante” (Weber 1992b: 228). 
54 “Geld ist das Abstrakteste und ‘Unpersönlichste’ was es im Menschenleben gibt.” 
(“Money is the most abstract and “impersonal” thing at is found in human life.”) Weber 1989: 
488.
55 Weber makes the distinction in Politik als Beruf and notes that the opposition is in no 
way exclusive. Weber 1992b: 169. However, it would seem that the charismatic leader is the 
least likely to be moved by financial or other material rewards.
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What Weber has in mind are the “dictators of the street”, meaning people 
like Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg (Weber 1992b: 223 and note  104). 
These types suffer from the deadly political sin of vanity. They are the ones 
who are making the revolution merely a “Karneval” (Weber 1992b: 227). 
While Weber does not make this explicit, it seems that they lacked the sense 
of responsibility. It is no coincidence that in Wissenschaft als Beruf Weber 
included the feeling of responsibility as one of the three “wissenschaftliche” 
“virtues” (Weber 1992b: 104). Those professors who brought politics into 
the classroom lacked a sense of intellectual integrity; they lacked a sense of 
responsibility. He tells those professors to do their work, that is, to analyze 
facts scientifically and to refrain from pushing personal values. He tells 
them to be professors and not leaders (Weber 1992b: 101). If they wish to be 
leaders, then they need to leave the classroom, where there is no place for 
criticism (Weber 1992b: 95). If they wish to be “prophets” and “dema-
gogues”, then they need to go into the streets and speak publicly, because 
that is where criticism is possible (Weber 1992b: 97). 
The notion of responsibility, while a key concern for Weber, was not as 
straightforward as it seems, especially regarding the charismatic leader. The 
true charismatic leader is often held to a type of ethics that Weber referred 
to as Gesinnungsethik, or the “ethics of conviction.” Unlike the person who 
held to Verantwortungsethik, the “ethics of responsibility”, the holder of 
Gesinnungsethik did not care about any possible (foreseeable) results of his 
or her action or even non-action (Weber 1992b: 237). The ethics of convic-
tion is totally unconditional – Weber’s example is the Sermon on the Mount 
with its unconditional demand for peace (Weber 1992b: 234–236, 244). We-
ber believed that Jesus and Luther were adherents to such an ethic, and We-
ber quotes Luther’s refusal to change his mind “ich kann nicht anders, hier 
stehe ich” (Weber 1992b: 250). Weber includes Dostoevsky’s holy men and 
Platon Karatejev from Tolstoy’s War and Peace along with Jesus and Francis 
of Assisi as being “not of this world” (Weber 1992b: 247). But, as much as he 
admired these people and their beliefs, he held that the politician needed to 
look at the “realities of life” and employ power and force when and where it 
was necessary (Weber 1992b: 241, 249).56 
Karl Loewenstein suggested that Weber spent his entire life fighting 
against what he called “political enemy number one” which was the “uncon-
56 See also his comments in his 1916 piece “Zwischen zwei Gesetzen” and his lecture “So-
zialismus” given to a large number of Austrian officers in Vienna in 1918. Weber 1984: 95–98, 
624–627. 
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trollable, limitless domination by bureaucracy” (Loewenstein 1965: 37, 39).57 
In Politik als Beruf, Weber offers the opinion that there are only two  choices: 
one choice is the democratic domination by bureaucrats, or what Weber 
calls the “Berufspolitiker” who lacks his or her “Beruf”; the other choice is 
the “Führerdemokratie mit ‘Machine’” – in other words, the charismatic 
leader (Weber 1992b: 224). The question of which he endorses is a matter of 
dispute, but it is of no real concern here. However, it does seem as if he en-
dorses the latter, but with significant reservations.
The effects of the war, the German revolutions of 1918–1919, and their 
aftermath prompted Weber to have new issues. He was concerned that the 
younger generation was being too greatly influenced by the new dema-
gogues with their charisma. He was convinced that they were bowing down 
before two idols: “personalities” and “Erleben” (“experience” or “lived ex-
perience”) (Weber 1992b: 84).58 He was afraid that the younger generation 
was avoiding making the hard decisions required by life. That is why he 
ends Wissenschaft als Beruf with the insistence that they live up to the “de-
mands of the day” by listening and following their own “Dämon” (Weber 
1992b: 111; see also Weber 1984: 98). And, that is why he concluded Politik 
als Beruf with the insistence that only those with great patience and great 
understanding have the political “Beruf.” The charismatic leader should and 
often does have these traits. But, Weber was keenly aware of the revolution-
ary nature of charisma.59 The charismatic leader appears in revolutionary 
times (see Weber 1992b: 172). Furthermore, Weber knew that the leader kept 
his charismatic appeal only as long as he was or at least seemed to be success-
ful (Weber 1988: 483).60 The charismatic leader was extraordinary; he was 
57 J.P. Mayer calls attention to its importance by translating Weber’s remarks from 1909 
warning against bureaucratization. Mayer 1944: 94–95.
58 There are true personalities but these are rare – he names Goethe. But, Weber’s concern 
is about the false “personalities”, hence the term “idol”. For Weber’s concerns about “person-
alities” see the Editors’ Introduction. Weber 1992b: 29–42. “Erlebnis” here is not simply “ex-
perience” but a heightened if not artificial experience. Weber claims that previously this was 
called “Sensation.”
59 Bendix believes that charisma occurs most frequently during emergencies. Bendix 1977: 
300. Mommsen holds that the pure form of charisma always depends on something abnormal. 
Mommsen 1974: 59. Schluchter maintains that when everyday life is radically torn apart, then 
the situation is ripe for people to seek the charismatic leader, the person with extraordinary 
capacities or competencies. Schluchter 1988: 538. 
60 Consider what he says in another work: “Die einfachste Frage: ob man einen be stimm-
ten Gott oder Dämon überhaupt durch Zwang oder Bitte zu beeinflussen versuchen soll, ist 
zunächst lediglich eine Frage des Erfolgs. Wie der Zauberer sein Charisma, so hat der Gott 
seine Macht zu bewähren.” (“The simplest question: if one should seek to influence a specific 
God or Dämon in general through compulsion or pleading, is first of all simply a question of 
success”). Weber 2001b: 161.
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“das ewig Neue” (“the eternally new”) (Weber 1988: 481). And, he was fated 
to lose his charismatic power. In a passage that ranks along with a number 
of other masterful passages in his work, Weber writes:
Auf diesem Wege von einem stürmischen-emotionalen wirtschaftsfremden Leben 
zum langsamen Erstickungstode unter der Wucht materiallen Interessen befindet sich 
aber jedes Charisma in jeder Stunde seines Daseins, und zwar mit jeder weiteren 
Stunde in steigendem Maß.
(Each charisma finds itself on this way from a stormy-emotional economic-alien 
life to a slow suffocating death under the weight of material interests in each hour of 
its life and indeed with each growing hour in increasing measure.)
     Weber 1976: 661 61 
Because of the personal, revolutionary, and temporary qualities of the char-
ismatic leader, Weber became increasingly aware of and concerned for the 
power of the contemporary political leader. Unlike the traditional domina-
tion, which in the West had mostly passed away, and unlike the bureaucrat-
ic domination, which generally was very predictable, the charismatic leader 
was by his or her very nature “extraordinary” – hence the difficulties in 
foreseeing the duration and future consequences of charismatic domina-
tion/leadership.
One could speculate why Weber’s interest in the notion of charisma in-
creased later in life, but it may have grown along with his greater recognition 
of and appreciation for life’s irrationalities. What is important, however, is 
to note  that when he recognized its contemporary sociological importance 
and its future political implications, he discussed its essence and its effects in 
considerable detail. Although he preferred to discuss “ideal types”, he was 
also enough of an historian and realist to see the ramifications of the charis-
matic leader in religious circles, in social settings, as well as in political 
groups. Many of his ideas have received the recognition that they deserve 
and have become part of classical sociology. Weber’s carefully nuanced dis-
cussions of charisma should also be evaluated as another of his major contri-
butions. 
61 Although Weber wrote extensively on the problem of succession and evolution of cha-
risma into bureaucratic or traditional Herrschaft, it is beyond the scope of this paper to take 
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Max Weber’s Pericles – The Political Demagogue
Much has been written about Max Weber’s political thinking in general and 
about his notion of “Herrschaft” in particular.62 There have been continu-
ous debates regarding his nationalism as well as wide-ranging discussions 
over his legacy. Scholars have noted the affinities between Weber and 
Machia velli and they have shown the similarities between Weber and 
Nietzsche. However, few scholars have examined the part that the Greeks 
play in Weber’s political thought. While Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle play 
small but crucial roles in Weber’s work, the particular Greek that I will fo-
cus on is Pericles. At first glance it seems that Pericles has little impact on 
Weber’s thinking, or, to put it differently, Weber scholars have been almost 
totally silent about Pericles.63 But, I think that Pericles is especially impor-
tant for Weber as the best type of political demagogue. Before attempting to 
justify this claim, I need to address two connected and interrelated possible 
problems. First, Weber appears to deny that Pericles posses any legitimacy. 
In one passage Weber specifically calls Pericles’ “authority” “illegitimate” 
and even “not legal.” Second, as a “political demagogue” Pericles fits some-
what awkwardly in Weber’s discussions of charisma. In Weber’s opinion, 
Pericles’ “authority” derives neither from performing miracles nor from 
winning battles. Instead, it stems primarily from his ability to make speech-
es. I think that these two problems of Pericles the political demagogue can 
be resolved. Moreover, I think that Weber came to appreciate Pericles and to 
consider him an “ideal type” of the consummate realist who is committed to 
political and cultural ideals. Before discussing these issues, it will be benefi-
cial to set out briefly the part that the Greeks played in Weber’s life and then 
his conceptions of Greek philosophy and Greek politics. 
62 “Herrrschaft” means “domination”, “rule”, or “authority.” In Pericles’ case “authority” 
seems preferable.
63 There are a few exceptions. Wolfgang Mommsen quotes Weber’s mention of him. 
Mommsen 1974: 202. Wilhelm Hennis refers to Fritz Baumgarten and two of Nietzsche’s 
references. Hennis 2003: 27 and 34–35. Wilfried Nipple briefly discusses Pericles in relation to 
the city. Nippel 2001: 196–201.
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Weber and the Greeks
Weber was trained in Roman law, he wrote extensively on Roman agrarian 
problems, and he often cited Roman writers. He wrote on ancient Judaism, 
ancient Christianity, and ancient Eastern religions. In contrast, Weber’s 
writings on the ancient Greeks pale in comparison. In light of this, it is legit-
imate to ask: What did Weber know and think about the Greeks? We know 
from Marianne Weber that Helene, Max Weber’s mother, was introduced to 
Homer early in her life and that his influence stayed with her into old age 
(Weber 1989: 513–514) and it appears that her interest in Homer was passed 
on to her son. In his early letters, Weber contrasts his favorable image of 
Greek authors with Roman writers. The fourteen year-old Weber wrote to 
his cousin Fritz Baumgarten that he prefers Homer to Virgil (Weber 1935: 
10). He comments that of all of the writers that he has read, Homer is the 
best. While he concedes that it is not easy to establish why, he does suggest 
that it is Homer’s great naturalness in describing heroic and tragic deeds 
(Weber 1935: 9). Weber also expresses a keen interest in Greek history. He 
notes that although Livy wrote four hundred years after Herodotus, they 
make the same mistakes but that Livy lacks the advantages that Herodotus 
has (Weber 1935: 11). Towards the end of the year Weber writes again to 
Fritz about his interests, indicating once more his fascination with Greek 
history – having waded through Curtius’ three-volume Griechische 
Geschichte.64 
If Weber had virtually unreserved admiration for Homer and Herodotus, 
he had rather mixed responses to Socrates and Plato. He contends that 
Socrates gave the West one of the greatest gifts of knowledge – the concept 
(Weber 1992: 89). And, he draws attention to Plato’s doctrine of the cave for 
its setting out of knowledge of “actual reality” in contrast to the play of 
shadows on the cave wall (Weber 1992: 88). But, in the same breath Weber 
claims that Plato’s search for the “eternal truth” and “true being” was noth-
ing more than the search that resulted in illusions (Weber 1992: 89). Because 
Plato’s search was the first in a two thousand year-long search for various 
true entities (art, science, etc.), we can surmise that Weber not only holds 
Plato responsible for his own illusions (Weber 1992: 90–93). However, it is 
not Plato’s cold truth that interests Weber as much as it is his less rational 
side. Weber speaks of the parable of the cave as a “wonderful picture” and he 
64 Weber 1935: 17. Hennis writes that Weber hurriedly read through the 2511 page work. 
This number is somewhat incorrect because it appears to refer to a later edition. However, the 
earlier edition is only slightly shorter. Hennis quotes Weber’s letter to Fritz from 19 January 
1879 where he referred to it as a “solid” book. Hennis 2003: 22.
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draws attention to the “passionate enthusiasm” of the Republic (Weber 1992: 
88–89). And, he insists that cool calculation alone is insufficient for results; 
it must be coupled with “intoxication” – Plato’s sense of “mania” (Weber 
1992: 83). Weber has a more single-minded opinion of Aristotle: while Indi-
ans attempted to discover logic and in all of the Asian countries there were 
doctrines of states, it was Aristotle who conceptualized and systematized 
political philosophy (Weber 1920: 2 and Weber 1992: 89). As for Thucy-
dides, in the “Vorbemerkung” to the Gesammelte Schriften zur Religions-
soziologie Weber maintains that it was Thucydides’ “pragmatic” approach to 
history that separated his work from all other attempts at history writing.
Weber, Thucydides, and History
While Weber had considerable interest in historical issues, he did not write 
simple histories.65 Instead, he provided historical analyses as well as philo-
sophy of history. He was more like Georg Simmel and Heinrich Rickert 
than Leopold von Ranke or Jacob Burckhardt. While Weber was always 
interested in history, it was never just for history’s sake; but rather, it was for 
what history could teach us. Thucydides, too, was not interested in history 
for merely history’s sake; he wished to discuss what it could teach the hu-
man race. Not only was he one of the “first” historians, but he was the first 
philosopher of history. Thucydides diminishes the impact of the Persian war 
by claiming that the Peloponnesian war, the one he is writing about, was the 
greatest of all wars (I: 1).66 Not only does he discount the Persian war, he 
also dismisses Herodotus’ account of it. Whereas Herodotus was more in-
terested in providing a poetic account, Thucydides insists that he is provid-
ing a true account (I: 20–21). Furthermore, he claims that his account will be 
useful for all time (I: 22). The question arises: does Herodotus offer an “ar-
tistic” story and Thucydides provides a “scientific account”? To give We-
ber’s response we should look at Wissenschaft als Beruf. There, Weber argues 
that there is a fundamental difference between art and science and this dif-
ference is based upon the notion of progress (Weber 1992: 85). In art there is 
no progress. Weber would not deny that there are artistic trends but he 
would deny that a Picasso is progressively better than a Rembrandt. In sci-
65 This remark is not meant to denigrate Weber’s historical acumen. I only wish to point 
out that Weber’s interest was not merely historical but was broader. His two dissertations 
were legal histories, his early agrarian writings and his later Munich lectures were primarily 
economic.
66 References to Thucydides are cited by conventional book and chapter.
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ence there is progress. It is the nature of research to be “old” in fifty, twenty, 
or even five years. In this light Herodotus may provide the artistic story; but 
Thucydides’ work is neither art nor science. Furthermore, there are ques-
tions about whether Thucydides’ work intended to provide us with a discus-
sion of the “causes” of the war. This is not the place to discuss whether he 
did or did not; but, it is the place to point out that F.M. Cornford is un-
doubtedly right to argue that we err if we try to impose our notion of “his-
tory writing” on Thucydides: “The time for investigating causes, and mak-
ing hypothetical constructions was not yet” (Cornford: 1971: 76). What 
Thucydides did do was to discuss human nature and power in the war be-
tween the Athenians and the Spartans. Leo Strauss suggested that Thucy-
dides studied “war writ large” and provided an account of “the eternal or 
permanent character of political life as such” (Strauss 1989: 81, 76). And, 
Thucydides discussed these issues both in terms of speeches (“logoi”) and 
events (“erga”).67 We know from his account that he mostly refrained from 
making value judgments. However, we can tell that he thought that some 
events were good and some bad, and that some leaders were better than oth-
ers (Strauss 1989: 85). To give a few examples: he condemned the Athenians’ 
Sicilian expedition and the destruction of Mytilene, but he supported the 
Athenian defense and goals.68 He certainly disapproved of Cleon and large-
ly disliked Alcibiades, but he had almost unconditional approval for Peri-
cles.69 As I will show later, Weber approved of Pericles for many of the same 
reaons that Thucydides did.
Weber, Pericles, and “Non-legitimate Authority”70
The first difficulty to address is Weber’s remark about Pericles and non-le-
gitimate authority. The passage in question runs as follows:
67 Cornford 1971: 14 and 53. Beginning with Homer the Greeks tried to combine words 
and deeds. See Gomme 1945: II, 123.
68 In almost all cases I write of the Athenians and the Spartans. I follow M.I. Finley who 
does not speak of Athens and Sparta but of people. His argument is that the polis was not a 
territory but was a people, a community. Finley 1982: 3–4.
69 See Erbse 1989: 88–89 and 115. Many commentators contrast Pericles and Cleon but a 
number also contrast Pericles and Alcibiades. Balot argues Thucydides insists that Nicias 
possessed Pericles’ “forethought” but lacked Pericles’ other virtues while Alcibiades “has cha-
risma but lacks foresight”. Balot 2001: 164–165. It would be interesting to know what Weber’s 
views of Alcibiades were. The two references to him in Die Stadt are non-committal.
70 “Non-legitimate authority” is a difficult concept. Here it means “no formal belief” in 
the right to rule; but it is still “authority.” 
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The actual political leader who was created by the actualized democracy, the dema-
gogue, was in formal Periclean Athens routinely the leading military official. Howev-
er, his real position of power rested not on law or office; but rather, thoroughly on 
personal influence and trust of the Demos. It was, therefore, not only not legitimate; 
but rather, not even legal (Sie war also nicht nur nicht legitim, sondern nicht einmal 
legal….). Weber 1999: 219.
Several initial points need to be made here. First, the “Sie” (feminine) [“It”] 
does not refer to Pericles or to the demagogue; but rather, to “the position of 
power” (“die Machstellung”) (feminine). Second, the English translation 
given in the Roth and Wittich edition of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft skews 
the sense by placing “legitimate” and “legal” in quotation marks (Weber 
1978: 1314). They were probably inclined to do this because the context 
makes clear that Weber’s issue is with legality and not with personality.
In the previous two paragraphs Weber writes about the ancient “func-
tionary” but concedes that this “official” is not an “official” in the modern 
sense of the word (Weber 1999: 219). He does not spell out what a modern 
“official” is here but he does so in several other places. The briefest is in 
Politik als Beruf where he describes the “legal” authority of competent offi-
cials who enforce rationally based rules (Weber 1992: 160). Weber repeats 
this in “Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft” but adds several 
points. The official is duty-bound to follow the legitimate rules and to apply 
them equally – “without regard for the person” and “without prejudice for 
or against” (Weber 1988a: 476). But, it is in two sections of Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft that Weber really expands upon “legal authority.” Early in the 
work Weber stresses both the modernity and the rationality of legal rules 
(Weber 1976: 124). He adds that these rules are “impersonal” and are to be 
applied by “professionals.” These are highly trained and specialized individ-
uals who serve in a specific hierarchy (Weber 1976: 126–127). Strict control 
and discipline are particular marks of legal authority (Weber 1976: 127). Lat-
er, Weber stresses the notion of the official’s “calling” and how he, or she, 
can expect to be promoted based upon fair and open criteria (Weber 1976: 
566). And, he stresses that “legal authority” is equality, rationality, and tech-
nicality (Weber 1976: 555, 569). Furthermore, the rules are relatively fixed 
and learnable (Weber 1976: 552). Weber clarifies that these rules are either an 
“administrative ordinance” (“Verwaltungsreglement”) or “laws” (“Geset-
ze”) (Weber 1976: 551). In either case, they are binding on all because of their 
rationality and their impartiality of the office holder.
Weber apparently thinks that he is entitled to hold the Greeks to his mod-
ern conception of law. On the one hand, he speaks of “general rules” and 
“laws”, but also allows that the laws are not always made by a legal group. 
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Rather, they are imposed by an individual (Weber 1999: 218). But, he also 
says that a “law” (“Gesetz”) is a “nomos.” While there is much to support 
this interpretation, it also overlooks the sense of “custom” or “usage” that 
“nomos” has.71 In this sense “nomos” is closer to Weber’s notion of “tradi-
tional” authority, especially when in Politik als Beruf he speaks of “eternal 
laws” (“ewige Gestrigen”).72
To summarize, Weber appears to claim that Pericles was not only not le-
gitimate, but also not legal because of several factors. One, Greek “laws” 
lack the modern standards of rationality, impartiality, and equality and the 
position of power itself is neither legitimate nor legal. Second, Pericles’ au-
thority is neither based upon laws or traditions, but is charismatic. Howev-
er, each of these points can be addressed. If Weber did attempt to judge 
Pericles by modern legal theory, he was wrong to do so. Second, Weber’s 
remarks are not to be taken as his final words on Pericles. Die Stadt was 
published after Weber’s death in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und So-
zialpolitik (See Weber 1999: 45). More importantly, it appears to have been 
composed sometime between 1911 and 1913. During this time Weber’s inter-
est in charisma was relatively minor. However, his interest in charisma grew 
later, and especially after the war, with respect to Pericles.
Weber, Charisma, and Pericles
Weber’s interest in charisma stems from his interest in “Herrschaft.” But, 
for the most part, his concern is not with political charisma but primarily 
with religious charisma. In the “Zwischenbetrachtung” section of the 
Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen, where Weber differentiates between 
the ascetic and the mystic and he stresses the rationality of the former and 
the irrationality of the latter, he speaks of the charismatic qualities that the 
religious leader might possess.73 Later, he writes of “holy charisma”, “reli-
71 Liddel and Scott 1968: 1180 and Finley 1982: 18.
72 Weber 1992: 160. The sense of “custom” is also found in Tönnies’ Die Sitte. Tönnies 
1909. The notion of “eternal laws” is found in Antigone, 450–460. Cornford notes the similar-
ity with the Athenians’ speech to the Melians. Cornford 1971: 182. Gomme discusses the 
“nomos” of the Athenians burying their dead. For Sophocles, the “unwritten laws” were 
“universal” and “divine”; but, for Thucydides they were Athenian customs. Gomme 1945: II, 
113. Ehrenberg claims that for Sophocles the “unwritten laws” were divine and that they were 
“essential, fundamental, and universal”. For Pericles, they were not. Ehrenberg stresses Peri-
cles’ rationality but insists that he is midway between the older generation’s religiosity and the 
Sophists’ amorality. Ehrenberg 1954: 31–32 and 41.
73 Weber 1989: 483. But, he tends to assign charisma to the mystic rather than the ascetic. 
Weber 1989: 499.
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gious charisma”, and the “absolute charisma of the virtuous religiosity” 
(Weber 1989: 493, 495–497 and Weber 2001b: 319). Weber lists a number of 
charismatic religious leaders: Buddha, Jesus, St. Francis (Weber 1989: 521). 
In particular, he emphasizes the “extraordinary” charisma of the New Tes-
tament “shepherds of the soul” (“Seelenhirten”) of which Jesus would be the 
most important (Weber 2001b: 355). In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft he also 
includes the prophets (Weber 2001b: 247). In other works Weber adds that 
there is also “magical charisma” (Weber 1999: 500; Weber 2001a: 217; Weber 
2001b: 122, 124, 318). Furthermore, Weber connects “speech charisma” of 
the sermon not just to the “magical” religions of China, but also to Western 
religions (Weber 2001b: 215). Granted, Weber’s interest is primarily in reli-
gious charisma; still, it is odd that Weber does not include Pericles in the list 
of charismatic speakers. It is also peculiar that in the few passages where 
Weber writes of charisma of the “warrior class” he does not include Pericles 
(Weber 2001a: 277). However, in a passage on charisma near the end of 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, Weber expressly writes of Pericles, claiming 
that his demagogic “Herrschaft” stems from the “charisma of spirit and 
speech,”74 and there is the passage in Poltik als Beruf where Weber again 
names Pericles as (charismatic) demagogue. But, before discussing that, we 
will examine some of the sources of Weber’s knowledge of Pericles.
Weber’s Knowledge of Pericles
As Wolfgang Will writes in Thukydides und Pericles: “the way to Pericles is 
through Thucydides” (Will 2003: V). We know for certain that Weber’s 
knowledge of Thucydides and especially of Pericles comes from at least two 
sources: his reading of Curtius’ Griechische Geschichte and from Eduard 
Meyer’s Geschichte des Altertums. We know about Curtius from Weber’s 
early correspondence as noted above. We know about Meyer from Weber’s 
numerous citations from this work in Die Stadt. Someone might mention 
Weber’s disappointment with Meyer in the section “Zur Auseinander set-
zung mit Eduard Meyer” from “Kritische Studien auf dem Gebiet der Kul-
turwissenschaftlichen Logik” and suggest that Meyer was not a good 
source. However, Weber makes it clear in the article that his disagreement is 
with Meyer’s historical methodology and not with his history. Weber’s 
74 “Charisma von Geist und Rede.” Weber 1976: 665. “Rede” can be translated as “rheto-
ric” but not here for two reasons. Rhetoric is Aristotelian so post-dates Pericles; but also 
“logos” is “speech”, “word”, or “account.”
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multiple references to him in Die Stadt support this (Also see Tenbruck 
1989: 234–257).
Curtius’ Griechische Geschichte has many interesting qualities. It is full of 
facts and some figures, but it is written more as a story than as an account. 
Curtius’ description of the war is accurate – the “bloody struggle” between 
the Athenians and the Spartans, but it is told as a narrative (Curtius 1888: II, 
371). His account of the Athenian plague is similarly vivid (Curtius 1888: II, 
409- 411). But, we do not seem to learn very much about Pericles. However, 
we do learn from Curtius that while Pericles wanted peace, he also wanted 
the war (Curtius 1888: II, 390, 397). And, we learn that he had the Atheni-
ans’ greatness as his goal (Curtius 1888: II, 419). But, how or why the Athe-
nians followed him is not very clear from Curtius’ history.
In contrast to Curtius, Eduard Meyer provided Weber not only with the 
history of the Peloponnesian war but also with a clear and compelling por-
trait of Pericles. Meyer’s portrait of him would have been appealing to We-
ber: Pericles is depicted as being intelligent, intellectually curious, and re-
sourceful.75 He is portrayed as totally concerned with the twin issues of the 
Athenians’ safety and prosperity. He is shown as being relatively indifferent 
to his own problems and concerns; and he is always regarded as having an 
incorruptible character (Gomme 1945: I, 67–68). He spent considerable ef-
fort to defend Athens by expanding its fortified walls and he spent consid-
erable funds on building the Athenians’ great treasures.76 He was aristocrat-
ic by birth and cultured by inclination, but he was dedicated to the expan-
sion of people’s rights and to the strengthening of Athenian culture. He was 
noble in intentions, idealistic in outlook, yet fundamentally a realist (Meyer 
1901: IV, 48–50). Overall, he was passionately committed to the greatness of 
the Athenians (Meyer 1901: IV, 8–9, and 51).
Weber and Pericles
Will argues that although Pericles died in the third year of the war, Pericles 
is the “true protagonist” of Thucydides’ History as well as its center (Will 
2003: 101, 183). The contradictory traits that endeared him to Thucydides 
are the same ones that Weber endorsed with respect to power: rationality, 
75 Pericles was on good terms with a number of playwrights and philosophers, especially 
Sophocles and Anaxagoras. Meyer 1901: IV, 48.; Hammond and Scullard 1970: 801.
76 Meyer writes of Pericles’ efforts to expand Cimon’s walls. Meyer’s detailed analysis of 
Pericles’ economic programs would have intrigued Weber. Meyer 1901: IV, 21, 35–36 and 28, 
34, and 38–39. 
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passion, moderation, ambition, self-control, realism, and idealism. Balot in 
particular emphasizes Pericles’ virtues of rational judgment and courage as 
well as his sense of moderation (Balot 2001: 146–148, 153, 172–175). Howev-
er, Weber is often of two minds about Pericles, and this is confirmed by 
those instances where he links Pericles and Cleon (Weber 1976: 665, and 
possibly Weber 1999: 298). But, in that important passage from Politik als 
Beruf Weber separates the two demagogues: 
Since the time of the constitutional state and even since the time of democracy the 
leading politician is the “demagogue.” The unpleasant taste of the word should not 
allow us to forget that it was not Cleon who first carried this name; but rather, Pericles. 
(Weber 1992: 191).
Weber did not explain what he meant to his audience; he may have assumed 
that they were familiar with Cleon’s reputation. But, in order to help expli-
cate Pericles, it is worth while briefly to contrast Pericles’ antipode.
In Thucydides’ opinion, Cleon is irresponsible in regard to power. He is 
all-consumed with power. He is despotic, ruthless, and violent. He is vulgar 
and self-serving (Hammond and Scullard 1970: 251). Cleon did not want 
peace because the war would give him the fame and honor that he so selfish-
ly needs (V, 16). Cleon did win backing from the lower classes because of his 
negative treatment of the nobility, but at the same time he seemed to despise 
those same lower class supporters (see Meyer 1901: IV, 327–329). While con-
cerned with being a concerned political leader; he was, in fact, almost a des-
pot. Not only did he mislead the Athenians regarding domestic issues, he 
tried to mislead the Athenians in foreign matters. There is no clearer evi-
dence of this than his speech regarding the Mytilenians. Cleon originally 
insisted that the Athenians must kill the men and sell the women and chil-
dren into slavery (III, 36). Out of a hasty sense of revenge the assembly 
agreed; but then they had second thoughts. Cleon spoke again but this time 
he argued that it would be best to slaughter all the women and children as 
well as all of the men (III, 37–40). He insisted that the Mytileneans were the 
most dangerous type of enemy because of their audacity; that Athens as the 
despotic empire that she was, needed to deal with them accordingly. And, 
this sort of vacillation showed why democracy was ineffective. Finally, the 
Athenians should not be moved by the terrible emotions of pity, sentimen-
tality, and indulgence. For Cleon, this was simply a matter of the ruthless 
use of power. It is with reason that Thucydides names him the most violent 
man of Athens.77 Given Thucydides’ unflattering portrait of Cleon we are 
left wondering how it was that he managed to become the leader of the 
77 Hobbes refers to him as “a most violent sycophant in those times.” Schlatter 1975: 15.
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Greeks (Will 2003: 81). But, Will also points out that maybe the differences 
between Cleon and Pericles may not have been as great as Thucydides would 
have liked to have believed (Will 2003: 86). This is not the place to argue how 
correct Thucydides’ opinion of Cleon was, but it does seem accurate enough 
that we can assume that most all of Cleon’s traits were the opposites of Per-
icles (and Weber’s).
Thucydides sets out many of Pericles’ positive traits concerning power 
and domination. Pericles is shown as being fair and objective, idealistic and 
realistic, and that he was totally concerned with the Athenians. To consider 
each one: Curtius notes that Pericles was clear-sighted about the war and 
that he fully recognized the importance of not overestimating the Atheni-
ans’ strength or overestimating the Spartans’ weaknesses (Curtius 1888: II, 
383). His fairness is evident in his speech in response to the displeasure of 
the Athenians. There, he is willing to accept blame for some of the mistakes 
and misfortunes; but, he reminds the Athenians that they agreed that, since 
war was inevitable, they needed to fight. And, while he refuses to be held 
accountable for the plague that had ravished the city, he admits that some of 
his choices may not have been the best (II, 60–64). For Weber, the lack of 
responsibility ranked among the chief political sins. In particular, he ac-
cused both the German political leaders as well as the German revolution-
aries of being dilettantes. And, he accused both of not taking their tasks 
seriously and accepting the responsibility that goes with their decisions.78 
In contrast, Pericles had taken responsibility for his decisions, even when 
they led to unfortunate results. For Weber, the “deadly enemy” of all polit-
ical leaders is vanity, the lack of distance to one’s self and to the cause (We-
ber 1992: 228). In the same speech, Pericles appealed to the Athenians’ sense 
of patriotism, reminding them both of the greatness of the city as well as 
their duty to it. For Thucydides and others, there was no question that Per-
icles was totally devoted to the Athenians’ welfare and safety (Curtius 1888: 
II, 397). 
Weber’s speeches contain a number of striking similarities to Pericles’ 
“funeral speech”, both in style and substance. Like Pericles, Weber begins 
both Wissenschaft als Beruf and Politik als Beruf by asserting that the speech 
is bound to disappoint. In Pericles’ case, he maintains that the heroes’ deaths 
confer sufficient honor on them. But, he also insists that one man’s words 
78 Weber 1992: 227–229. Consider Weber’s claim about the “horrible incapacity” of the 
German diplomats and the “hysterical vanity of the monarchy”. Weber 1921: 458 and 467. 
Weber calls the monarchy “crowned dilettantes” and he refers to the “Leibknechtian band” as 
“mob rule” (“Ochlocraty”). Weber 1921: 470 and 482. Consider also his warnings about the 
recklessness in increasing submarine warfare. Weber 1984: 115–125.
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can never fully convey the sense of sacrifice and honor that they deserve (II, 
35). In Weber’s two speeches, he intends to disappoint the audience by inten-
tionally refusing to speak about the current “scientific” and especially “po-
litical” situations (Weber 1992: 71, especially 157). Pericles believed in Ath-
ens’ greatness and he attributes much of this to its democracy, the rule of the 
many. He emphasized the Athenians’ freedom, with people having the op-
portunity to hold office regardless of their lack of wealth. And, he stressed 
the Athenians’ freedom in their private lives where each is able to live as he 
chooses. This freedom, however, is not license any more than democracy is 
anarchy. Rather, Athenians not only obey the magistrates and the written 
laws, but the unwritten laws as well (II, 37–38). Further, Athenians possess 
the right sense of balance and this manifests itself in several ways. Athenians 
spend the proper proportions of effort on business as well as on leisure. 
Athenians possess great wealth; however, it is for use and not for show. And, 
Athenians are noted for great generosity, but this originates in liberality 
rather than from expediency (II, 40). Proper balance shows too, in the Athe-
nians’ approach to education and culture; it is neither too “feminine” nor is 
it too “masculine.” Unlike the Spartans, who devote all of their education to 
instilling courage, the Athenians do not need to do so, because, as Pericles 
maintains, Athenians are by “nature” (“physis”) courageous (II, 39). It is, 
however, in the use of power that the Athenians show their greatest sense of 
balance. While they may act with daring, they act at the same time out of 
deliberation (II, 40). Pericles acknowledged the laws of nature and spoke of 
the possible decline of Athens; nonetheless, he acknowledged and accepted 
that Athens was a great power and as such must use her power wisely. Weber 
also had a sense and an appreciation of the central role that Germany must 
play in world politics. In “Zwischen zwei Gesetzen” Weber differentiates 
Germany from the smaller countries like Switzerland and Denmark. They 
do not have the same responsibility towards the future that Germany has 
(Weber 1984: 195–196). Weber claims that like Greece, Germany is a “Macht-
staat” (Weber 1984: 163, 192), but this does not mean that Greece (or Germa-
ny) would advocate the indiscriminate or ruthless use of power that Cleon 
endorses. If Cleon was calculating, it was only to see what he could get for 
himself, to satisfy his vanity. Pericles is the opposite in this regard. He had 
what Weber would consider the proper “coolness” (or “distance”) to the 
situation. This is Pericles’ ability to see the issue clearly and objectively, re-
gardless whether it is his own city or his enemies’. Thucydides himself was 
a “rationalist” and he appreciated Pericles’ ability to reason. Because of Ath-
ens’ greatness under Pericles, she was a “school” for all of Greece (II, 41). In 
summing up Pericles’ rule, Thucydides praises it for its wisdom and its jus-
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tice (II, 65). In commenting on this speech, Busolt maintained that “Thucy-
dides-Pericles” has set out the “essence” of the Athenian state, had charac-
terized its intellectual and moral freedom, and all in all, painted an ideal 
picture (Busolt 1967: III, 939). For Weber, there cannot be any “essence” of 
a state any more than there can be one of a “people.” But, unlike Pericles, 
Weber clearly questioned the relationship between politics and morality. 
Then, as in Politik als Beruf, Weber offered a compelling ideal picture of the 
true political leader. Thucydides intended to represent the ideal political 
leader in the person of Pericles, Weber intended to conceptualize the ideal 
political person in Politik als Beruf.
Thucydides’ portrait of Pericles is as flattering as that of Cleon is unflat-
tering. But, Curtius also points out that Pericles was by no means universal-
ly loved. The property-holders felt that Pericles threatened their wealth; the 
priests felt that Pericles threatened their power with his emphasis on 
free-thinking; and the aristocrats felt that Pericles threatened their existence 
by his efforts to expand democracy (Curtius 1888: II, 389). Pericles’ enemies 
first attacked him indirectly, going after his philosopher and artist friends as 
well as after Aspasia. But, then they accused him of misusing state money 
and finally they convinced the Athenians to hold him accountable for all of 
their misfortunes. But, Pericles was able to perservere, in large measure be-
cause of his positive qualities. 
Conclusion
We know that the second half of the nineteenth century saw a great resur-
gence of interest in ancient Greece. And, we know directly from Weber 
himself that the Greeks played a small, but important, role in his thinking. 
Unfortunately, until there is a definitive biography we will not know how 
much Pericles influenced Weber. However, I think that Weber’s later refer-
ences suggest that he viewed the importance of the state and the role of the 
statesman in much the same way as Pericles did. Weber’s reactions to the loss 
of the war and the ensuing revolutions prompted him to reevaluate the role 
of the charismatic/demagogic leader. Because there were too many dilet-
tantes pretending to be political leaders, Weber called for sober and respon-
sible people to step forward to become the new leaders. In the last several 
years of Weber’s life, the portrait of Pericles came to be one of the portraits 
of the real and positive political demagogue. Hobbes found in Thucydides 
someone who helped him become one of the great political philosophers; 
maybe it is not too much to claim that Weber found in Pericles someone who 
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helped him to become one of the great political thinkers (Schlatter 1975: xi, 
xxvii-xxviii). 
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Max Weber’s Notion of Asceticism
The notion of asceticism is one of the key concepts in Max Weber’s The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. However, in neither the 1904–
1905 articles nor in the 1920 version of this work did Weber offer anything 
constituting a full account of what he specifically meant by the notion of 
asceticism. Furthermore, he never provided a complete or a definitive ac-
count of asceticism in any other work. Instead, Weber offers us a contrast 
between asceticism and mysticism; first, in Economic Ethics of World Reli-
gions and second, in Economy and Society. Given the importance that the 
notion of asceticism plays throughout many of Weber’s writings, at first 
glance it seems surprising so little attention has been devoted to it. But, upon 
further reflection, this lack of attention is not so puzzling. First, Weber’s 
account is neither conceptually complete, nor is it historically accurate. Sec-
ond, he places importance on the theological aspects of the notion of asceti-
cism; and Weber scholars seem hesitant to address the theology in his works. 
In what follows I hope to rectify this situation by examining what Weber 
means by the notion of asceticism and by considering the role that it plays in 
his thinking. 
First, I discuss Weber’s initial and rather marked contrast between ascet-
icism and mysticism. Second, I provide a brief history of the notion of ascet-
icism from its practice by the early Christian ascetics to that of the early 
medieval monks. In so doing I will show how much Weber’s concept of as-
ceticism conforms to, and departs from, the accounts offered by his theolog-
ical contemporaries. Third, I explain how Weber, in discussing a number of 
critical reform movements, moves away from his original distinction be-
tween the “inner-wordly” ascetic and “world-fleeing” mystic. Finally, I 
conclude with a discussion concerning Weber’s views regarding his Luther-
an background and his Calvinist inclinations and I link them to his political 
and private views of asceticism. 
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Asceticism
In the Protestant Ethic Weber emphasizes the importance that the role of 
asceticism plays in the rise of Western capitalism. But, its importance is not 
limited just to the economic sphere. For Weber, not only modern capitalism, 
but all of modern culture was founded on the notion of “rational life-con-
duct” (“rationale Lebensführung”). This “rational life-conduct” is based 
upon the “idea of ‘calling’” (‘Berufsidee’) which, in turn, was “born out of 
the spirit of Christian asceticism.”79 Given its importance, it is surprising 
that in the Protestant Ethic Weber does not offer an account of asceticism. 
And, just as surprising, scholars have not devoted a great deal of attention to 
Weber’s notion of asceticism.80 Instead, they have asked whether Weber’s 
thesis that modern capitalism can be traced back to early Protestantism is 
correct. I will not enter into this lengthy debate. Instead, I will focus solely 
on the notion of asceticism and on what Weber meant by it. 
“Asceticism” is not easy to define so it is unsurprising that Weber does 
not attempt to provide a specific definition of it. (Seeberg, 1897: 139–140 and 
Lohse, 1969: 11–13). Rather, what Weber does provide is a contrast between 
asceticism and mysticism.81 This distinction is merely suggested in the first 
edition of the Protestant Ethic. However, in the second edition Weber em-
phasizes its complete opposition. “Either” it is the mystic’s feeling that he is 
a ‘vessel’ in which he receives God; “or” it is the ascetic’s feeling that he is a 
“tool” of God’s power.82 The mystic seeks the peace of contemplation in 
order to receive God into one’s soul and to find the “unio mystica” – that is, 
the “union with God” (Weber, 1991: 129). The defining trait of the mystic is 
passivity. In contrast, the defining trait of the ascetic is activity (Weber, 
1991: 130). Weber points to Luther’s “passivity” and contrasts that with Cal-
vin’s relentless “activity” (Weber, 1991: 130). However, Weber’s more exten-
sive treatments of the contrast between asceticism and mysticism are found 
in the section “Religious Communities” in Economy and Society and in the 
“Intermediate Reflection” (“Zwischenbetrachtung”) section of The Eco-
nomic Ethics of the World Religions. In the second work, Weber refers to 
them “as polar concepts” (“als polare Begriffe”) (Weber, 1989: 482). He uses 
79 “– geboren aus dem Geist der christlichen Askese”. Weber, 1991. Weber’s emphasis. 
80 Two major exceptions are Hubert Trieber and Lutz Kaelber. But, neither Treiber nor 
Kaelber focus on asceticism per se. See Treiber, 2001 and Treiber, 2005: 124–129; and Kael-
ber,1998.
81 Weber’s treatment of mysticism has gone unnoticed as much if not more so than his 
discussion of asceticism. The two exceptions are Krech, 2001 and Adair-Toteff, 2002.
82 Weber, 1905 and Weber, 1991: 130. “Werkzeug” can mean “tool’ or “instrument”. The 
emphasis on either/or is Weber’s. 
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these concepts as ideal types in order to set out the differences as clearly as 
possible. However, he immediately backs away from this stark contrast first, 
by asking us to regard them “as” polar concepts and second, by placing both 
“ascetic” and “mystic” in quotation marks. Weber is not concerned with all 
types of the ascetic; rather, he focuses on what he refers to as the “in-
ner-world ascetic”. This distinction is critical but for now we can concen-
trate specifically on the traits of this type of ascetic. As he did in the second 
edition of the Protestant Ethic, so in the “Zwischenbetrachtung” and in the 
“Religiöse Gemeinschaften” Weber maintains that the ascetic feels himself 
to be God’s “tool” (Weber, 1989: 482 and Weber, 2001: 326). But, here Weber 
expands on this: the ascetic does not act of his own choosing; rather, he acts 
with the “consciousness that God directs his action” (Weber, 2001: 320, see 
also 323). As he acts according to God’s commands, he is convinced that he 
is “God’s warrior” (“Gotteskämpfer”) (Weber, 1989: 494; see also Weber, 
2001: 329). And, the ascetic believes that his actions are in accordance with 
God’s inscrutable plan. Furthermore, since he is acting according to God’s 
wishes, the consequences of his actions are not his own but are those of 
God. Weber quotes: “the Christian does right and leaves the consequences 
to God” (Weber, 1989: 498–499 and Weber, 2001: 328). And, for this type of 
ascetic, there is no issue regarding the possibility of conflict between earth-
ly or heavenly powers because “man must obey God more than men” (We-
ber, 1989: 498, also 495). Finally, the ascetic sees every struggle as a means of 
gaining assurance of God’s grace (Weber, 2001: 324). 
In contrast, the mystic does not believe that he was put upon earth to do 
battle for God. Instead, he seeks to minimize the world’s impact on his life; 
he attempts to divest himself from everything that reminds him of the 
world. As Weber explains, it is “the absolute minimization of all inner and 
outward activity” to seek God (Weber, 2001: 323). The mystic does not wish 
to do, but to think; he does not want to act, but to contemplate. But, even 
this is too much; as Weber says the mystic does not even want to engage in 
contemplation. Instead, the mystic wants to achieve absolute stillness. The 
mystic believes that he must be absolutely quiet so as to hear God (Weber, 
1989: 482 and Weber, 2001: 323). 
Weber’s primary concern is with the “inner-wordly” ascetic and not with 
the “other-worldly” mystic. Weber sets out this contrast between the former 
who is “world-rejecting” and the latter who is “world-fleeing.” “World-re-
jection” (“Weltablehnung”) is, as Stefan Breuer rightly notes, a key concept 
(Breuer, 2001: 227). It is, however, a concept that is difficult to grasp. Weber 
places most of his emphasis on the activity of the “world-rejecting” ascetic 
and how he looks forward to the “always new victory” (Weber, 2001: 324). 
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Weber also emphasizes the purposefulness of the “world-rejecting” ascetic 
and contrasts that with the “world-fleeing” contemplative mystic. Weber 
further underscores the “radical opposition” by pointing to the work that 
the “inner-worldly” ascetic does in accordance with his “worldly calling” 
(Weber, 1989: 482). However, as Breuer suggests the proper contrast should 
be between “world-affirming” and “world-denying” and he directs us to the 
article on the topic in the first edition of Die Religion in Geschichte und 
Gegenwart (Breuer, 2001: 238, note  28). There, Hermann Mulert contrasts 
the “innocent enjoyment” of the richness and fullness of the world with the 
denial and the rejection of it (Mulert, 1913: 1914). The “world-rejecting” as-
cetic refuses to enjoy the richness of the world and instead focuses his atten-
tion on his divinely-assigned task. Furthermore, the “inner-worldly” ascet-
ic does not totally reject human drives; rather, he recognizes them as part of 
God’s plan. Thus, he sees the problem with sexual lust, but recognizes that 
“sober” procreation is God-ordained. And, while one must not enjoy the 
pleasures that come from wealth, one can appreciate it as a sign of God’s 
blessing and as an indication that one is a member of the elect (Weber, 2001: 
322). But, Weber notes that the mystic objects to this “vain self-righteous-
ness” – and in turn the ascetic accuses the mystic of “self-enjoyment” (We-
ber, 2001: 483). Yet, Weber himself notes that the stark contrast between the 
“world-rejecting” ascetic and the “world-fleeing” mystic begins to melt 
when one considers the “world-fleeing” ascetic (Weber, 1989: 482). Perhaps 
more importantly, in his reply to his critic Felix Rachfahl, Weber tried to 
defend his specific notion of asceticism and to spell out the differences be-
tween the Catholic and Protestant ascetics. Weber appeared to realize that 
his discussion about the ascetic Protestant was somewhat unconventional 
and as a result he repeatedly insisted that he was using the term “in my 
sense” (Weber, 1987: 154, 160, 314,315). Furthermore, he agreed that there 
were similarities between the Catholic monk and the Protestant ascetic: 
both “practiced” the strict delineation of time, the emphasis on work, and 
the rejection of that which binds humans together, i.e. friendships. But, We-
ber also maintained that the differences between the Catholic monk and the 
Protestant ascetic were easy to set out. The monk practices chastity but the 
Protestant ascetic also practices it in marriage. By this Weber insists that all 
desires are suppressed and sexual relations are restricted solely to the “ra-
tional natural purpose” of producing offspring (Weber, 1987: 314). Finally, 
Weber claims that there are three fundamental differences between the 
“world-fleeing” Catholic monk and the “world-rejecting” Protestant ascet-
ic: the latter rejects the former’s inclination to irrational ascetic means, the 
latter rejects the desire for contemplation, and above all, the latter turns “in-
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ner-wordly”, that is, to one’s family and one’s vocation (Weber, 1987: 315). 
To understand Weber’s own notion of Protestant asceticism it is helpful to 
look at origins and its history.
History of Asceticism 
Although Weber is credited with the discussion concerning the “in-
ner-worldly” ascetic it was his friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch who 
devoted considerable effort to uncovering the origins of the term “ascetic.” 
Troeltsch was correct to note  that the role that asceticism played in the 
Church was important and long lasting. However, his claim that its origins 
are found in the philosophies of the Cynics and Stoics is somewhat ques-
tionable (Troeltsch, 1925: 96–97). While it is true that the Cynics “saw rig-
orous self-denial” as a pathway to happiness; its origins are found elsewhere 
(Ware, 1995: 3–4). Its origins were also noted in an article “Askese” by Re-
inhold Seeberg, which Weber cited in the Protestant Ethic (Weber, 1905: 
28–29, note  56 and Weber, 1990: 215, note  78). In this article that is included 
in the third edition of the Realencyklopädie für Protestantische Theologie 
und Kirche Seeberg states that the philosophical use of the term was based 
upon the athletic term for “practice” (Seeberg, 1897: 134). This notion is 
found earlier; in his Kritische Geschichte der Askese (1863) Otto Zöckler 
translated “askesis” as “Uebung” (“practice”).83 And, this claim was echoed 
by Karl Heussi, one of the greatest German authorities on “asceticism.”84 In 
his article “Askese: II. Kirchengeschichtlich” for the first edition of Die Re-
ligion in Geschichte und Gegenwart Heussi wrote that it originally meant 
the athletes’ practice of preparation for competition.85 
Weber was following his theological contemporaries when he emphasized 
the practice of asceticism. However, when he associated asceticism with the 
Calvinists he no longer appeared to follow them; because they linked it to 
the early Christian monks.86 The origin of the monks is a much disputed 
83 The Oxford Greek-English Lexicon defines “askesis” as “exercise, training, practice”. 
Liddell-Scott, 1978: 267. Also see Derrett, 1995: 88.
84 Heussi (1877- 1961) was Professor of Church History at Jena (1924–1953). His writings 
on monks and asceticism include Heussi 1908, 1912, 1927, 1930, and 1936. His Kompendium 
which was first published in 1909 had, by 1981, gone through sixteen editions. 
85 Heussi, 1908: 727. This emphasis on athletic preparation is also found later in the article 
on asceticism in the second edition of Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Pfister, 
1927: 520).
86 Zöckler, 1863: 4, 56; Seeberg, 1897: 136–137; and Mulert, 1913: 1915. Troeltsch wrote 
approvingly of Zöckler’s book. Troeltsch, 1912: 98, note  46. 
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topic, as Heussi admitted (Heussi, 1933: 104). And, it is a complex topic be-
cause there are two fundamentally different types. First, there are the “an-
chorites” who lived alone. The German word “Mönch” and the English 
word “monk” are both derived from the Latin word “monachus” – meaning 
“alone” (Bertholet,1930: 130, Heussi, 1936: 54). These monks were referred 
to as either “hermits” or “anchorites” – i.e., the ones who “withdrew” from 
the world. These “anchorites” were the most “radical” of the monks (Heus-
si, 1933: 103). They regarded the human world as a place of temptation and 
human desire as something to be overcome. They were the ones who fled the 
human world in order to create a “special world” ( Heussi, 1912: 427 and 
Heussi, 1936: 40, 53, 55). This was not just Heussi’s contention; the famous 
Protestant theologian (and Weber’s friend) Adolf Harnack referred to this in 
his “Das Mönchtum, seine Ideale und seine Geschichte”.87 Heussi, Harnack, 
and others described how the early monks went out and lived their ascetic 
lives in the deserts of Egypt (Heussi, 1933: 103, Heussi, 1936: 111, Harnack, 
1904: 97, Völter, 1900: 28, and Grützmacher, 1903: 228–231). They rejected 
everything worldly – possessions, marriage, personal honor, and even their 
personal will – in order to live a life in the service of God (Völter, 1900: 9, 
Harnack, 1904: 83; and see Grützmacher, 1903: 215). These ascetics were 
called “desert wanders” or “desert ascetics” (Heussi, 1936: 207–208). They 
withdrew from the human world into the desert and into their own “special 
world”. This reflected their belief in different types of dualism: the “world 
of Satan” versus the “world of the Father”, spirit versus flesh and light versus 
darkness (Völter, 1900: 31; Harnack, 1904: 90, and Pfister, 1927: 571). In par-
ticular, they believed that they were in a fundamental struggle with their 
own bodies; for the body was regarded as an enemy to the “seeker of God” 
(Zöckler, 1863: 17 and Pfister, 1927: 571). Seeberg referred to this as a “moral 
struggle to overcome the flesh” (Seeberg, 1897: 135–136). This moral  struggle 
was really with Satan and his demons (Heussi, 1936: 46, 111). They were the 
tyrants who plagued the ascetics and drove them to do things against their 
will (Weiß, 1898: 411). Accordingly, the early ascetic needed to do two 
things: “to meet God and to fight the demons” (Ware, 1995: 7, 14, note  30). 
Weber’s account departs from his theological contemporaries when he in-
sists that it is not the ascetic but the mystic who desires the union with God. 
And, his account also breaks from those of Seeberg, Heussi, and other ex-
87 Harnack first published this work in 1880 and then republished it in his 1904 collection 
Reden und Aufsätze (1904), 1904: 99. Troeltsch cites Harnack’s article a number of times. 
Troeltsch, 1912: 96, note  46a, 231, note  106, and 238, note  110. Daniel Völter and Karl Müller 
also call it a “Sonderwelt”. Völter, 1900: 31 and 128; Müller, 1906: 205. 
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perts in that Weber ignores the ascetic’s struggles with the devil and his 
minions. 
Adolf Harnack, in his Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in den 
ersten drei Jahrhunderten, gave one of the best accounts of the ascetics and 
their struggles against demons.88 Although demons and temptation are 
found in the Old and New Testaments, the belief in them spread in the first 
three centuries (Harnack, 1906: 108). The belief in the existence of demons 
was extensive and the recognition of their great powers was widespread. The 
power of the demons was the power of darkness (Harnack, 1906: 110–111, 
Weinel, 1899: 2, 22–24). Even if God was responsible for the creation of the 
world, it has become hell and is filled with demons (Harnack, 1906: 113). To 
fight these demons demanded extreme vigilance and unwavering faith in 
God (Weinel, 1899: 15). This involved fasting and praying as well as walking 
naked or barefoot in the wilderness (Seeberg, 1897: 136–137). Völter empha-
sized the powerful individuality of these early ascetics; they followed no 
rules and belonged to no church (Völter, 1900: 9). 
Around the end of the second century and the beginning of the third, 
these ascetics began to stop their desert wanderings (Völter, 1900: 4, 17, 30, 
Harnack, 1904: 100–101, Heussi, 1933: 103). More importantly, rather than 
living alone (“kata monas”) or in small colonies in the desert, these ascetics 
began to live together within walled communities (Heussi, 1930: 135). By 
the beginning of the fourth century monks lived the communal life (“koinos 
bios”) (Heussi, 1936: 115). Thus, the name for the second and later type of 
monks was “cenobite.” But, it is misleading to think that the monks were 
living together as part of the community of the Church. As Harnack noted, 
the monks continued to “flee the world”; but they also fled the increasingly 
powerful “world-Church” (Harnack, 1904: 101). The new monks still de-
spised the world, but they were becoming increasingly distrustful of the 
Church’s growing institutional power (Grützmann, 1903: 226). Moreover, 
they believed that the Church’s increasing reliance on dogma conflicted 
with the highest goal of the Gospel: to have a “perception” (“Anschauung”) 
of God (Harnack, 1904: 102). Seeberg emphasized that this desire to be close 
to God was closely connected with the ascetic practices of Christian activity 
(Seeberg, 1897: 139–140). And, what Seeberg also stressed was the growing 
“regulation” governing the Christian activities of fasting, waking, and pray-
ing (Seeberg, 1897: 139). Meditation, sacraments, and prayer were not insti-
tutional but individual; nonetheless the new monks strove towards an ascet-
88 Weber was well aware of Harnack’s book; his letter from 1906 was to thank Harnack for 
it. Weber, 1990: 34.
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ic life that “functioned more steadily, healthily, and regularly” (Seeberg, 
1897: 141, 142). It was necessary to establish some order because the ascetics 
no longer lived independent lives in the wilderness, but were now beginning 
to live together (Grützmacher, 1903: 215). Between the fourth and seventh 
centuries some 30 books were written on how to govern and how to act in 
monasteries (Prinz, 1980: 35, McGinn, 1999: 27). But, it was Benedict of 
Nursia who in the sixth century provided the monks with his Regula (Rule). 
And, it was Benedict who emphasized that the monks should not, and could 
not, devote their entire day to prayer. Instead, Benedict insisted that it was 
the monks’ duty to work. Heussi had insisted that from the time that the 
ascetic monks left the desert and moved into monasteries, they combined 
the life of contemplation with the life of work. While the monk was sup-
posed to pray, he was also supposed to work with his hands (Heussi, 1936: 
214–220). Whereas Weber insisted that the mystic lived only the life of con-
templation, Heussi and others showed that the vast majority of the medieval 
monks not only lived the “vita contemplativa” but also lived the “vita activa” 
– the active life of work (Heussi, 1936: 214). It was Benedict who codified 
this dual life and helped begin the first of the four major reform movements 
that Weber mentions in the Protestant Ethic.
Reform Movements
The four major reform movements that Weber mentions are the Benedictine, 
the Cluniac, the Franciscan, and the Jesuit. Weber briefly discusses three of 
them in a crucial passage in the Protestant Ethic. Because of the importance 
of this passage it is worth quoting in full: 
In the Middle Ages the Christian ascetic already displays its rational characteristic in 
its highest form of appearance. The world historical significance of the monastic way 
of life in the Occident in opposition to the Oriental monasticism rests on this. In prin-
ciple, its significance is already present in the Rule of Saint Benedict, still more by the 
Cluniac and Cistersien, and finally most specifically in the Jesuits who were emanci-
pated from the aimless world-flight and the virtuoso self mortification.89
89 “Die christliche Askese trägt ja in ihren höchsten Erscheinungsformen bereits im Mit-
telalter durchaus diesen rationale Charakter. Die welthistorische Bedeutung der mönchischen 
Lebensführung im Occident in ihrem Gegensatz zum orientalischen Mönchtum beruht auf 
ihm. Sie ist im Prinzip schon in der Regel des heiligen Benedikt, noch mehr bei den Clunia-
zensern und Cisterziensern, am entscheidensten endlich bei den Jesuiten, emanzipiert von 
planloser Weltflucht und virtuosenhafter Selbstquälerei.” Weber, 1905: 28. The changes that 
Weber made for the 1920 version are minimal; the most significant perhaps being that this was 
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Weber then adds the fourth: St. Francis and the Tertiary Order (Weber, 
1905:30; Weber, 1991:136). This reciting of the Benedictine, Cluniac, Fran-
ciscan, and Jesuit reform movements is repeated in the “Religiöse Gemein-
schaften” section of Economy and Society (Weber, 2001: 337–338). That this 
is found in both his earliest writings on medieval Christianity as well as his 
later ones, leads one to believe that Weber did not change his views on these 
reforms in ascetic monasticism. In Weber’s view, each of these four move-
ments reflected an increasing emphasis on rationality. But, each also exhib-
ited a growing emphasis on dissatisfaction with the Church. And, each 
prompted both a re-examination of the monks’ lives and a re-evaluation of 
the monks’ views of the “outside world”. Towards the end of the Protestant 
Ethic Weber wrote that “the ascetics left their monastic cells” (“die Askese 
aus den Mönchszellen”) and carried their calling into the world (Weber, 
1991: 188). To understand Weber’s remarks it is important to briefly discuss 
these monastic reforms.
As noted above, Benedict’s Regula was not the first attempt at codifica-
tion of the monks’ way of life and there is no doubt that he drew from earli-
er works. However, there is little disagreement that the Regula Benedicti 
was not merely a compilation. Instead, scholars believe that it is a “closed 
work” with a single purpose – that of the monk’s complete devotion of his 
life to God (Lohse, 1969: 227, 229). Furthermore, there is general agreement 
on Benedict’s importance. Bernard McGinn maintains that “the Regula 
Benedicti is the single most important document in the history of Western 
monasticism, and arguably the most significant text from the whole late an-
tique period.” (McGinn, 1999: 27). Bernhard Lohse argued that one cannot 
understand the entire Western tradition of monks without understanding 
this work (Lohse, 1969: 226). And, Harnack said that it was nothing short of 
revolutionary (Harnack, 1904:118). 
It was revolutionary in large measure because, in Weber’s view, Benedict’s 
Rule showcased the “sobering rationalism” in the ascetic propensities (We-
ber, 2001: 337). Weber argued that the Roman influence pushed away the 
irrational and emotional emphasis on ecstasy and replaced it with the “strict, 
matter-of-fact, rationalism” that became the enduring trait of Western 
Christianity (Weber, 2001: 337). Benedict’s main concern is to order his own 
community (McGinn, 1999:28). In this vein, scholars correctly stress Bene-
dict’s demand for strict obedience (See Rule, Chapter V). However, Harnack 
points out that Benedict’s greatness was not limited to just that. Like Weber, 
a new paragraph, that “rationalen” is now in italics, and that instead of the Cistern being con-
joined with the Cluniac, it is now regarded “as still more”. Weber, 1991: 134–135. 
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Harnack emphasized Benedict’s rules that should govern daily life (Weber, 
1905: 28, 29–30, Harnack, 1904: 119). This emphasis on overall rules prompt-
ed Grützmacher, in his book on Benedict’s Rule, to underscore Benedict’s 
tendency to legislate (Grützmacher, 1892: 20, 41). However, Benedict’s no-
tion of “soberness” is found in more than in his interest in rationality and 
order. Indeed, it is found in Benedict’s beliefs regarding every aspect of life; 
McGinn maintained that “Moderation is the leitmotif” of the Rule (McGinn, 
1999:28–29). Many of the desert ascetics were immoderate in their enthusi-
asm and their practice of asceticism (Ware, 1995: 9). In response, Benedict 
warned that a “harsh zeal” can lead to evil.
Benedict also challenged the desert ascetic’s insistence on the primacy of 
contemplation. He warned of living only the “vita contemplativa”; one must 
also live the “vita activa” (Prinz, 1980: 19). Hence, Benedict’s insistence on 
“ora et labora”; that is, “prayer and work”. In Benedict’s view, “idleness is 
the enemy of the soul”; however, work is no longer to be regarded as punish-
ment for sin. Even Augustine regarded work as a continuation of God’s cre-
ation; Benedict contended that work is for the glory of God (Chapter 
 XLVIII, Prinz, 1980: 68). Work is that which connects the ascetic to the 
world and hinders the ascetic’s desire to flee it (Prinz, 1980: 71). The worker 
should do good work, not in order to take pride in it, but to glorify God. 
And, the cost of the work should be lower than a comparable cost demanded 
from someone from the outside world (Chapter LVII). In Harnack’s view, 
Benedict underscored the importance of work (Harnack, 1904: 119).
The second reform movement mentioned by Weber and discussed by 
Harnack was the Cluniac reforms. In Grützmacher’s view, the Cluny re-
form wished to return to the foundations of the Benedictine Order (Grütz-
macher, 1898: 181). It was the attempt to restore the purity that had begun to 
be lost. Weber believed that this reform continued to emphasize the “entire 
method of rational simplicity” that was found in Benedict (Weber, 2001: 
337–338). In order to combat the growing influence of the nobility on the 
Church, the Church needed to extend its influence over the pious nobility. 
But, if the Benedictine reforms applied only to those who lived within the 
walls of the monastery, then the Cluniac reforms extended to most of the 
entire “world Church” (Harnack, 1904: 122–123). It did this by extending 
the Benedictine life to the outside world (Harnack, 1932: 335, 339). If the 
most astonishing task of Gregory the Great was to have the monks flee the 
world in the service of the “world Church”, the great task of these later re-
forms was to go out into the world in order to save the Church (Harnack, 
1904: 124–125 and Harnack, 1932: 338). If the Universal Church wished to 
expand its considerable influence, it also indirectly expanded the impor-
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tance of the individual (Harnack, 1932: 340). The intersection of the lives of 
the monks and the “world Church” increasingly grew larger, and that gave 
rise to the third living reform, that of the rise of the Mendicant Orders and 
their founder, St. Francis. 
We know that Weber had the highest regard for Francis of Assisi. Weber 
links his name with Jesus (Weber, 1989: 520 and Weber 1992: 235). St. Fran-
cis wished to live the life of Christ, so, that meant living a life based upon 
true Christian beliefs (Harnack, 1904: 127; Harnack, 1932: 423). The main 
tenets of this life were humility, poverty, and love (Harnack, 1932: 421–422). 
Harnack emphasized the wide ranging consequences of Francis’ reforms. 
First, Western monasteries were no longer populated by the sons of the aris-
tocrats, thereby diminishing the nobility’s influence.90 Second, Francis’ em-
phasis also led to a radical appreciation of the individual as opposed to the 
institution (Grützmacher, 1903: 233, Harnack, 1904: 130). For Francis, it was 
not the Church that was of major importance; rather, it was the preaching of 
the Gospel (Harnack, 1904: 127). Third, the thirteenth century Franciscan 
view of the world differed greatly from that of the sixth and even the elev-
enth century (Harnack, 1904: 128). The Franciscans did not view the world 
as a place of evil and temptation; rather they regarded it as a “beautiful gar-
den” (Harnack, 1904: 129). The Franciscans, or Mendicants, were the ones 
who went out from the monasteries, not just into the world but into the 
cities (Weber, 1989: 87, Heussi, 1912: 441, Ohlemüller, 1931: 1054). Karl 
Müller also stressed the importance of the cities for the Mendicant Orders 
and suggested that the economic prosperity that was found in the urban ar-
eas allowed them to beg successfully (Müller, 1906: 207). It was the place in 
which they could fulfill their goal. As Weber wrote, they rationally went out 
into the world in order to bring about “systematic Caritas” (Weber, 2001: 
338). Harnack pointed out that the Franciscans were highly successful be-
cause they lived with the people and they spoke their language (Harnack, 
1904: 130). And, the Tertiary Order was probably the most successful. The 
First Order was the monks; the Second was the nuns. But, the Third Order 
lived within the world and had taken no vows (Ohlemüller, 1931: 1054). 
And, even though they were “at home” in the world, like the later Protestant 
ascetics, they limited the types of food and drink, avoided dancing and 
shows, and despised refinement and luxuries of all types (Ohlemüller, 1931: 
1055). Like the later Protestants, they were dedicated to God and they were 
90 Grützmacher, 1903: 232. Harnack maintained that until the Twelfth Century the mon-
astery was by and large an aristocratic institution reserved primarily for the nobles. The like-
lihood of the common people living in a monastery was as great as living in a nobleman’s 
castle. Harnack, 1904: 128. Also see Harnack, 1932: 424–425. 
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dedicated to their worldly calling. They lived an ascetic life but they did not 
give up their lives in the world (Werner, 1913: 1136). To put it differently, 
they were also between “world and Church” (Zöckler, 1899: 218).
If the goal of the Franciscans was love and charity; the goal of the Jesuits 
was order and domination. If the former were at ease in the world; the latter 
wished to control it (Harnack, 1904: 135–136). And, in Weber’s view they 
did it by means of rationality. Weber notes that it is “in principle” found in 
Benedict’s Rule, but to a greater extent in the Cluny reforms, and finally, 
“decisively” in the Jesuits (Weber, 1991: 134–135). The goal of all these was 
to free oneself from the “virtuous self-torture” and to emancipate one’s self 
from the “planloser Weltflucht” (“purposeless world flight”).91 The goal was 
to overcome one’s “natural state” and to free one’s self from the “power of 
irrational drives”. Finally, it was to reduce one’s dependence on the world 
and nature. Instead, the emphasis was on the supremacy of “planned will-
ing” (“planvollen Wollens”) and by having continuous “self-control” 
(“Selbst Kontrolle”) and “self-mastery” (“Selbstbeherrschung”). In Weber’s 
view, both the ascetic monks and the ascetic Protestants shared the high 
desire for “order in one’s life conduct” (“Ordnung in der Lebensführung”) 
(Weber, 1991: 135–136). The problem was that the medieval monks lapsed 
into a world of relative comfort and enjoyment; a problem that Weber came 
to realize also affected the Lutherans. Weber objected to the drunken and 
raw Lutheran way of life; what Germans call “natürlich” and “Gemütlich”. 
And, he objected to the sense of ‘passivity’ and ‘helplessness’ found in Lu-
theran spirituality (Weber, 1991: 142). As he wrote in a 1906 letter to Har-
nack, he despised Lutheranism for its softness, its tolerance, and its naïve 
belief in goodness. He bemoaned the fact that Germany never went through 
the “school of hard asceticism” (“Schule des harten Asketismus”) (Weber, 
1990: 32–33). Whereas the Lutherans had minimum ascetic penetration in 
their private and political lives, the Calvinists enforced the ascetic penetra-
tion throughout their entire lives (Weber, 1991: 142–143). 
Weber’s Asceticism
We know from Marianne Weber that the Protestant Ethic exemplified “the 
deepest roots of [Weber’s] personality and in an undefinable way bears its 
91 “Planloser Weltflucht” is difficult to translate. “Fleeing the world” is adequate for 
“Weltflucht” but “planloser” could be rendered by “aimless”, “directionless”, and perhaps 
“purposeless”. Weber intends to contrast this with the “aimed”, “directed”, and “purposeful” 
work by the Puritans in the world. Weber, 1991: 135. 
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stamp” (Weber, 1926: 350). Given this, it is not difficult to regard the Protes-
tant Ethic as a “self-testimonial” as Helmut Lehmann has done (Lehmann, 
1996). And, in a later article Lehmann suggested that Weber’s illness and the 
Protestant Ethic marked a crucial turning point in Weber’s personal life. 
Lehmann draws our attention to Weber’s radical physical transformation – 
from the corpulent, life-enjoying young professor to the older, hag-
gard-looking scholar with the penetrating gaze (Lehmann, 2005: 43). To-
wards the end of the biography Marianne likened her husband to the old 
knight in Albrecht Dürer’s “Knight, Death, and Devil” (Weber, Marianne, 
1926: 679–60; 686). In this etching, Dürer shows a gaunt and exhaust-
ed-looking man. Shown too are the devil and death; the knight’s only com-
panion is his equally old and tired dog. Although Marianne does not specify 
the year, the reference to Dürer is during the time that Weber took up his 
chair at Munich. Thus, it comes during the same time as Weber’s two “swan 
songs”. In Wissenschaft als Beruf and Politik als Beruf the themes of death, 
gods, and demons are pronounced. If one is to engage in politics, Weber 
contends that one must be strong, disciplined, and prepared to work with 
“diabolical powers”. In the same vein, if one is to engage in science one must 
have intellectual honesty; one must “become old to understand the devil” 
(Weber, 1992: 249, 105). However, in the modern, disenchanted world, both 
God and the devil are gone; as are the demons. What remains is not the “de-
mon” from Christianity, but the “Dämon” from Goethe (Albrow, 1990: 
66–67, 70). As Lawrence Scaff wrote, “Dämon” was for Weber, as for 
Goethe, the same as “fate” (Scaff, 1989: 68–69). Scaff maintains that the key 
to Weber can be found in a line from Goethe’s poem “Dämon” where Goethe 
writes that “So you must be, you will not escape yourself” (Scaff, 1989: 69). 
The point is that one must face one’s own destiny. Weber himself had no 
doubt that he had to face his own fate. However, to those who are unable to 
“manly endure” the “fate of time” Weber advises them to turn to the “wide 
and mercifully opened arms of the old church” (Weber, 1992: 110). Even if 
Weber were so inclined to take this escape, he could not have done so. We 
know from an oft-cited letter to Tönnies that Weber believed himself to be 
“unmusical” in religious matters (Weber, 1994: 65). Weber clarifies this, say-
ing that upon closer reflection, he finds that he is neither “anti-religious nor 
irreligious”. Instead, he considers himself to be a “cripple or a mutilated 
man”. In another letter to Tönnies written the next month, which is rarely 
cited, Weber suggests that even if he is unable to experience certain religious 
feelings, he is able to understand them and their consequences (Weber, 1994: 
70). Lehmann suggests that Weber understood how “cut off” he was from 
other people who had naive but genuine religious experiences (Lehmann, 
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2005: 40). But, Weber had no need for religious experiences. Instead he be-
lieved that it was “easy and simple” to face the “demands of the day” if one 
“finds and obeys the ‘Dämon’ who holds the threads of his life” (Weber, 
1992: 111). Weber had found his own “Dämon” and he obeyed the command 
to embrace his fate. And, he recognized that he was fated to fulfill two fun-
damental tasks: to fight the temptation to believe that “science” could give 
meaning to life and to dispel the illusion that politics could lead to happi-
ness. To try to accomplish these tasks required rigor, precision, and the abil-
ity to confront one’s own tendency to self-delusion. In his contribution to 
the Erinnerungsgabe für Max Weber Gerhart von Schulze-Gaevernitz set 
out the various traits that Weber contended were those of the Calvinist: 
self-mastery and self-trust, independence from the opinions and help from 
others, independence from one’s own inclinations, mistrust of feelings and 
instincts, and the planned conduct of life (Schulze-Gaevernitz, 1923: IV). In 
other words, those fundamental characteristics that he ascribed to the Cal-
vinist are the same disciplined, ascetic traits that Weber himself embraced. 
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Chapter Five
Protestant Ethics and the Spirit of Politics: 
Weber on Conscience, Conviction, and Conflict
Introduction
Every student of Weber knows that his reputation rests primarily on his 
work regarding the development of modern rational capitalism. Readers of 
the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism understand that Weber at-
tempts to provide an ideal typical account of this process. He traces its be-
ginnings to its theological roots: Luther’s notion of “calling” and Calvin’s 
doctrine of predestination. He then discusses its theological foundation in 
certain Protestant sects and its moral grounding in Franklin’s monetary 
convictions. Weber concludes with a treatment of the secular forms and the 
repercussions of modern capitalism. What students apparently do not rec-
ognize is that Weber believes there is a political development that is parallel 
to this economic development.92 Weber himself does not provide an account, 
but by looking at a number of his works such an account can be constructed. 
To offer an account of the parallel political development would likely re-
quire a work as long as the Protestant Ethic itself. My intention here is far 
more limited: I will focus primarily on Weber’s treatment of certain key 
features of the two major Protestant reformers in relation to political activi-
ty. These include their shared notion of conscience and their common belief 
in a God-ordered world. It also includes a discussion of their differing the-
ological principles and the consequences those have for their beliefs regard-
ing political activity and confrontation. Luther’s conservative and passive 
theology meant shunning politics and avoiding political conflicts; Calvin’s 
radical and active theology meant taking political stances and even justify-
ing rebellion and revolution.93 
92 “The entire process (of the development of the modern state) is a complete parallel to the 
development of the capitalistic enterprise….” Weber, 1992: 165. In the “Zwischenbetrach-
tung” the discussion of the political order follows the treatment of the economic order and 
Weber speaks of “homo politicus” as being similar to “homo oeconomicus”. Weber, 1989: 
487–491. 
93 There is no doubt that Calvin was interested in founding a theocratic state and there is 
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This paper is divided into four sections.94 In the first section I briefly set 
out the notion of conscience and show how Luther and Calvin used it to 
justify their theological rejection of Catholic authority. In the second I focus 
on what Weber takes to be Luther’s fundamental theological principles. I 
show how Weber believes that Luther’s theology of love is rather conserva-
tive and that his doctrine of two kingdoms leads to a quiet resignation in 
earthly matters. In the third I show Weber’s contrasting view of Calvin. 
Weber believes that Calvin’s theology of awe and his doctrine of predestina-
tion lead not only to a basic right to political activity, but even more, to a 
fundamental duty to resist tyranny. In the final section I address many of 
the “theological” aspects of Weber’s Politik als Beruf. Weber’s 1919 speech is 
widely, and correctly, regarded as Weber’s political masterpiece; however, 
religious names and theological themes are found throughout that work. 
Weber mentions Jesus, John, Luke, Mark, Luther and Calvin, and he dis-
cusses the notion of theodicy and the absolute ethics of the Sermon on the 
Mount. In this section I set out Weber’s rejection of Christians as political 
actors as well as his emphatic denunciation of their secular successors – the 
modern German revolutionaries. I end by briefly discussing Weber’s own 
convictions concerning the necessary traits that one must have to engage in 
modern political conflicts.
Conscience
At first it would seem that Weber has no interest in the notion of conscience 
because he apparently does not use the term. However, there are three rea-
sons for supposing that he was very familiar with the term and what it 
meant. First, there is a strong connection between a number of Heidelberg 
theologians and the study of the concept of conscience. Richard Rothe, 
Daniel Schenkel, and Wilhelm Gass were all professors of theology at the 
university during the middle decades of the nineteenth century. And, Edu-
ard Güder was a close friend and colleague of another significant Heidelberg 
much to be said for the claim that Calvinist discipline leads to the rise of the early modern 
state. See Gorski, 2003. To address this thesis lies beyond the scope of this paper. My concern 
here is with Weber’s concentration on the radical and revolutionary aspects of Calvin’s doc-
trine.
94 For Weber’s account I have tended to rely on those sources that he himself cites: Matthi-
as Schneckenberger, Max Scheibe, F.W. Kampschulte, Erich Marcks, and of course Weber’s 
close friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch. I cite the German as it is given which explains the 
variations in spelling. 
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theology professor, Karl Hundeshagen.95 Second, as these and other schol-
ars argue, the notion of conscience is in general a fundamental part of the 
Protestant Reformation and is in particular a major factor in the works of 
Luther and Calvin.96 Finally, as I will suggest, Weber’s notion of “convic-
tion” (“Gesinnung”) is almost identical to the notion of “conscience” (“Ge-
wissen”). 
In 1876 Albrecht Ritschl, another significant source for Weber’s under-
standing of Protestant theology, published an article entitled “Ueber das 
Gewissen.” In this work Ritschl brings together a number of important 
points regarding our understanding of this concept, points that were made 
separately by others. First, he notes that the idea of conscience is found first 
in the ancient world and was used to signify the “inner and individual” as 
opposed to the outward and legal (Ritschl, 1896: 177–178). Second, it is both 
extremely personal and universal. This point was made earlier (1869) by 
Gass in his Die Lehre vom Gewissen when he said that it was individual and 
universal (Gass, 1869: 113). It is universal in the sense that every human be-
ing has a conscience (Gass, 1869: 207). Gass concludes “Who is without con-
science must be Christ or the devil”, which is a variation of his quotation 
from the Theologia deutsch: “Who is without conscience is either Christ or 
the devil” (Gass, 1869, 89 and note  2). But, it was Rothe who emphasized the 
personal side of conscience. In his Theologische Ethik he insists that we do 
not speak of “the conscience”; but rather, of “my conscience” (Rothe, 1869, 
II: 28, see also Ritschl, 1896: 181, 190 and Hoffman, 1910: 4: 1405). However, 
it is not purely individual and subjective; but rather, it is also “objective”. 
This is clarified by three authorities: Ritschl suggested that it was the “voice 
of God” (Ritschl, 1896: 182, 183). Schenkel, in his 1856 article “Gewissen” 
for the first edition of the Real-Encyklopädie für protestantische Theologie, 
wrote of the “consciousness of God” or the “agreement with God” (Schen-
kel, 1856, V: 133, 134). And, Güder, in his 1857 essay “Die Lehre vom Gewis-
sen nach der Schrift”, wrote that it was the “voice of God”, or the “knowing 
with God” (Güder, 1857: 247, 273). The emphasis by Ritschl, Schenkel, and 
Güder is that when one acts according to one’s conscience one is acting in 
95 Hundeshagen was responsible for ensuring that a number of works by Matthias Schne-
cken burger were posthumously published. Güder was the editor of Schneckenburger’s Ver-
gleichende Darstellung des lutherischen und reformirten Lehrbegriffs. Weber refers to this 
work many times in the Protestant Ethic and it serves as a major source for his understanding 
of the differences between Luther and Calvin.
96 According to Weber’s cousin, Otto Baumgarten, the fundamental principle of Protes-
tantism is freedom of conscience. Baumgarten, 1910: II: 1193. And, in the article “Gewissen” 
for the third edition of the Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche “free-
dom of conscience” is the dominant theme. Kahler, 1899: 650.
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accordance with God. As Troeltsch wrote: the Lutheran “knew only one 
authority, God and one’s own conscience, in which God spoke” (Troeltsch, 
1908: 81). It is this sense of allegiance to God that gave the Protestants the 
courage to stand up to the authority of the Catholic Church. Thus, Ritschl 
writes that it was Luther’s belief in his “personal conscience” that gave him 
the moral authority to stand up against the “highest worldly power” 
(Ritschl, 1896: 201). Güder writes that it is the “authority of Jesus” that al-
lows us to fight the “good fight” (Güder, 1857: 285). In Schenkel’s view, one’s 
conscience is the “central organ” for moral authority and one must obey it 
(and God).97 Both Luther and Calvin placed the highest emphasis on listen-
ing to their consciences (Holl, 1928: 255). This is why the notion of con-
science, meaning the freedom of conscience, was so important to the Re-
formers in general and to Luther in particular (Schenkel, 1856: 137, 135, 
141–142). 
Weber recognized the greatness of acting according to one’s conscience. 
However, he preferred to speak of convictions. Indeed, Weber sets out what 
he calls the “ethics of conviction” (“Gesinnungsethik”).98 In Politik als 
Beruf Weber identifies Luther with this “ethics of conviction” and he prais-
es him for his words and deeds of protest: “I cannot do other, here I stand”.99 
But, Luther’s protest led to many others. As Gass pointed out, Luther 
prompted “thousand others” also to stand up (Gass, 1869: 177–178). This 
firm belief in what is right is why Weber could have such a high opinion of 
Luther. In a 1906 letter to the Berlin theologian Adolf Harnack, Weber 
wrote that personally Luther “towered above all others” (Weber, 1990: 32). 
However, Weber immediately added that as a historical manifestation Lu-
theranism was “the most terrible of the terrible”. To see how Weber could 
have such a high opinion of Luther and yet so despise Lutheranism we must 
turn to Weber’s account of the latter.
Weber on Luther’s Theological and Political Thinking
We know from Weber himself that his understanding of the doctrinal dif-
ferences between Lutheranism and Calvinism comes primarily from Mat-
97 Troeltsch quoted Calvin’s claim that he was certain in his conscience that what he taught 
and wrote did not come from himself, but came from God. Troeltsch, 1912: 613, note  313. 
98 Troeltsch uses the term “Gesinnungsethik” a number of times in his Soziallehren and he 
refers to Luther’s conscience at least once. Troeltsch, 1912: 437–438, 441, 447, and 456. 
99 “ich kann nicht anders, hier stehe ich”. The Editors add “Ich kann nicht anderst, hie 
stehe ich, Got helff mir, Amen.” Weber, 1992: 250 and note  151.
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thias Schneckenburger (Weber, 1905: 5. note  4). For the Lutheran, the im-
portant doctrine was justification; for the Calvinist, it was the doctrine of 
predestination (Weber, 1905: 2 and 20–21). Schneckenburger believed that 
ultimately whether one believed in Luther’s teachings or in Calvin’s was a 
matter of personal preference (Schneckenburger, 1855: I: 8–9). And, this 
preference was mostly a matter of psychology. The Lutheran is self-con-
scious in recognizing one’s immediate turn to God; the Calvinist is self-con-
scious in recognizing the steps to salvation (Schneckenburgger, 1855: I: 
XXXVIII). But, the difference also comes down to the Lutheran’s emphasis 
on Jesus as a person versus Calvin’s emphasis on Jesus’ teaching. However, 
for Weber the real difference seems to be between the Lutheran and the Cal-
vinist conceptions of God. In the second part of the Protestant Ethic Weber 
mentions the notion of a “double” God (Weber, 1905: 9, note  9). Both Luther 
and Calvin shared this notion, although each emphasized different aspects. 
According to this notion, there are two “types” of God: one type is the 
all-merciful God while the other is the all-powerful one. As Weber puts it, 
one type is like the “loving modern father” while the other is the “strict 
royal patriarch” (Weber, 2001: 361). Or, to put it differently, there is the 
grace-giving and loving father of the New Testament; and there is the arbi-
trary despot – Jehovah of the Old Testament (Weber, 1905: 9, note  9). How-
ever, Schneckenburger is not Weber’s source for these types; rather, they 
come from Ritschl and Julius Köstlin. Weber refers to the former’s Geschichte 
des Pietismus but I cannot locate any passages.100 Weber cites Köstlin’s arti-
cle “Gott” in the third edition of the Realencyklopädie für protestantische 
Theologie und Kirche. There, Köstlin writes of the “double-sided” religious 
notion of God: one who is loving and forgiving in contrast to one who has 
absolute sovereignty (Köstlin, 1899: 791). While Luther and Calvin initially 
seemed to have shared this conception, Weber maintained that Calvin 
moved closer to the idea of the absolute sovereign while Luther moved clos-
er to the notion of the forgiving father. Weber maintains that Luther’s God 
is the one from the New Testament. This is the heavenly father who is good 
and forgiving.101 Köstlin writes of children’s trust in the closeness to God 
and in the enjoyment of fatherly love (Köstlin, 1899: 782). For Luther, God 
is the God of love and the conception of love dominates Luther’s theology 
(Köstlin, 1899: 790–791). This notion of God’s mercifulness underscores 
Luther’s faith that even if one loses God’s grace, one can regain it by doing 
100 However, Ritschl does offer a number of similar comments in his three-part article 
“Geschichtliche Studien zur christlichen Lehre von Gott.”
101 Weber, 1905: 9, note  9. Also Weber writes of the “humanly comprehensible ‘father in 
Heaven’”. Weber, 1905: 10. Also see Weber, 1989: 491.
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enough penance (Weber, 1905: 9). Schneckenburger also stresses the Luther-
an’s belief in God’s mercifulness and emphasizes that the Lutheran antici-
pates eternal salvation (Schneckenburger, 1855, I: 103, 182). Schnecken bur-
ger also places emphasis on the Lutheran’s simple faith in being one of God’s 
children (Schneckenburger, 1855: I: 103, 203, 211). Weber makes much of 
Luther’s insistence on mere faith and he stresses his opposition to intellectu-
al rationalism. (Weber, 2001: 225; Weber, 1989: 483). And, Troeltsch insisted 
that in every opposition between reason and faith, understanding and mys-
ticism, Luther always “came down on the latter side” (Troeltsch, 2004: 148). 
Troeltsch also insisted that despite all of Luther’s scholastic and humanistic 
training, he always remained “a child of the people” and the “son of a peas-
ant” (Troeltsch, 2004: 145). For Luther, it is ultimately a matter of the “unio 
mystica” – the union with God. This longing for the mystical union with 
God is, according to Schneckenburger, the whole point of every religion 
(Schneckenburger, 1855: I: 38, 83). As Weber noted, the highest religious 
experience for the Lutheran is the mystical union (Weber, 1905: 21;  Troeltsch, 
1912: 618). But, as Weber also noted later, this mystical union is the most 
irrational of religious experiences: it transcends boundaries, it knows no 
form, and it is inexpressable (Weber, 1989: 483, 501). It is the “objectless ex-
perience of the mystic” (Weber, 1989: 507). And, it is inherently passive. It 
means contemplative possession; it means that the mystic feels himself to be 
a “vessel” (Weber, 1905: 22; Weber, 1989: 482). As a result of all this, the 
mystic “flees” the world (Weber, 1989: 482). The issue of how mystical Lu-
ther was has been a source of some controversy. What was not controversial 
was that, at best, Luther was “indifferent about the world” (Weber, 2001: 
359; Troeltsch, 1912: 461, 473, 477).
The Lutheran’s “opposition” or “indifference” to the world is also based 
on another critical aspect of his theology: the doctrine of the “two king-
doms.” Weber’s cousin Baumgarten maintained that the separation of the 
“spiritual and the worldly swords” was one of the most fundamental princi-
ples of Luther’s theology (Baumgarten, 1919: 70). And, Christian Luthardt 
believed that Luther’s distinction between the Godly realm and the worldly 
realm was basic to Luther.102 And, according to Troeltsch, this was the dis-
tinction between the “world in Christ” and the “world outside Christ”. This 
“world outside Christ” is the “world of the devil” and in it man is a “tool of 
the devil” (Troeltsch, 2004: 161). As such, it was a work of reason and was a 
102 Luthardt, 1867: 76. Troeltsch maintained that despite a tendency to gloss over doctrinal 
differences Luthardt’s book was still the best work on Luther’s ethics. Troeltsch, 1912: 475.
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necessary evil (Troeltsch, 1912: 561). These points have far-reaching ramifi-
cations for Luther’s conceptions of politics and political activity.
Julius Köstlin noted that as much as Luther disliked Aristotle and his 
philosophy, he agreed with him that man was a being who naturally needed 
others: “a solitary being is either a beast or a God.” (Köstlin, 1883. II: 485–
490). As such, humans needed to live in a state. In Luther’s opinion the state 
was somewhat divine (Troeltsch, 1912: 561). Luther did not mean that it was 
really divine, for that would go against his doctrine of the two kingdoms. 
However, it was the heavenly father who grounded the laws and principles 
needed to ensure the peace and order in this world (Troeltsch, 1912: 485, 
532–535, 540). However, Luther also maintained that humans were inher-
ently evil, thus the state was inherently “unchristian” if not “evil”  (Troeltsch, 
1912: 562). But, it was an evil necessary to ensure order in this world. Thus, 
Luther had an interest in the political order only in so far as it was a mani-
festation of his theological concerns. In Troeltsch’s opinion, this lack of con-
cern regarding the state did not rest on a lack of political talent, as many 
people have maintained. For, if it were, it could be cultivated. Rather, 
 Troeltsch maintained that it lay in Luther’s fundamental theological princi-
ples which are necessarily foreign to political matters (Troeltsch, 1912: 567). 
In one sense, it rested on Luther’s sole personal concern: “What must I do in 
order to have God’s grace?” (Schmidt, 1901: 51). This concern with grace 
and love also carried over to Luther’s political concerns. In another sense it 
had to do with Luther’s ideal of the “pure community of love”. This commu-
nity did not need the state and its laws; but, according to Troeltsch, this 
ideal was merely a vision of “Christian utopia” (Troeltsch, 1912: 562, 595; 
see also 427, 478). As Troeltsch often repeated, Luther’s ideas were “radically 
conservative” (Troeltsch, 1911: 181; Troeltsch, 1912: 436, 456, 486, 532). They 
were radical in that they broke with the Church, its authorities, and its doc-
trines; and instead embraced the notions of faith, individuality, and con-
science (Troeltsch, 1908: 81–83). But, like Catholic dogma, Luther’s doctrine 
held that the political order stemmed from God and any rebellion against 
the authorities was tantamount to a rebellion against God. The use of force 
is strictly forbidden because it is both “completely contradictory” and “un-
christian” (Troeltsch, 1911: 182). As such, there could be no justification for 
rebellion or resistance (Troeltsch, 1912: 562–563). If he were to take up arms 
he would only harm his soul. The authorities may harm him by spoiling his 
goods, his wife, and his daughter, but they cannot harm his soul (Schmidt, 
1901: 59). What was allowed was only passive resistance (Troeltsch, 1912: 
534, 561; Müller, 1902: 2: 477). Luther’s theology of universal love and for-
giveness coupled with his doctrine of the two kingdoms meant that political 
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activity was a necessary evil and should be shunned if possible and that po-
litical resistance should be avoided at all costs. As Weber suggests, “normal 
Protestantism” legitimizes the state and leaves the question of force to it 
(Weber, 1992: 244). However, Weber also suggests that Calvin’s very differ-
ent theology leads to some very different political conclusions. 
Weber on Calvin’s Theological and Political Thinking
The Church historian Karl Müller offers one of the best concise formulations 
of the contrast between Luther and Calvin.103 In his Kirchengeschichte Müller 
writes that Calvin rejects Luther’s central belief in God’s “mercifulness and 
kindness”. For Calvin, it is not a matter of trusting God; it is a matter of 
fearing him (Müller, 1902: 2:475). Kampschulte adds to this sentiment by 
saying that Calvin’s God is not the forgiving and merciful God of the Gos-
pels, but is the angry and punishing Jehova of the Old Testament.104 What is 
important is not Luther’s notion of God’s love, but Calvin’s insistence on 
God’s absolute majesty (Troeltsch, 1912: 615–616). And, in contrast to Lu-
ther’s longing for God, Calvin believes that there is an “unbridgeable gulf” 
between man and God (Weber, 1905: 10). Finally, instead of Luther’s doc-
trine of “radical ethics of love”, there is Calvin’s doctrine of predestination.105
According to this doctrine of predestination, God has foreordained 
everything. In addition, this is a “double decree”: God chose to save a few 
and has damned all others (Scheibe, 8, 66, 72, 89; Stähelin, 1863: 273). Those 
among the elect are the members of the invisible “true church” (Scheibe, 
1897: 8; Hadorn, 1913: 4: 2113). Like the “true church” itself, its members 
show no outward signs that they belong to it (Weber, 1905: 18). And, no one 
can be certain whether one is among the elect or among the damned (Kamp-
schulte, 1869: I: 265–266; Marcks, 1892: 292; Scheibe, 1897: 42; and Weber, 
1905: 13). Our individual fate is unknown to us and unknowable by us (We-
ber, 1905: 10). Anyone who attempts to penetrate God’s secrets is, Calvin 
103 Weber appreciated Müller’s work and he mentions him several times in the Protestant 
Ethic. Weber, 1905: 6, n.  4, 62 n.  123, 65, n.  128. 
104 Kampschulte, 1869: I: 277. He adds that it is no accident that the sense of the Old Testa-
ment permeates Calvin’s Institutes. Marcks also emphasizes how much of the spirit of the Old 
Testament is found in Calvin’s writings. Marcks, 1892: 295, 321. Stähelin wrote that Calvin 
wanted to found a theocratic state that was similar to those described in the Old Testament. 
Stähelin, 1897: 3: 669. 
105 Troeltsch, 1912: 636, 638. Weber tells us that he bases his interpretation of this doctrine 
on Max Scheibe’s Calvins Prädestinationslehre. Weber, 1905: 9. What he does not say is that he 
undoubtedly made use of Troeltsch’s views on predestination. See Troeltsch, 1913a. 
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insists, doomed to find oneself in a labyrinth from which there is no exit 
(Kampschulte, 1869: I: 265). Calvin maintained that all of this is beyond 
human understanding and to try to comprehend it drives us into the gravest 
of perplexities.106 The most we know is that some people are chosen while 
others have been damned (Weber, 1905: 10). 
In addition, this decree is eternal and unchangeable (Marcks, 1892: 131; 
Scheibe, 1897: 7, 24, 29; and Troeltsch, 1913a: 4:1706). Since this is an eternal 
decree one cannot lose grace, but neither can one ever hope to gain it (Schei-
be, 1897: 7, 9; Weber, 1905: 9–10, 19). Whereas Luther held that one could 
regain grace with sufficient penance, humility, and trust in God’s word and 
sacraments, Calvin believed that one’s state of grace or damnation was fixed 
and immutable (Scheibe, 1897: 9). Luther believed that while humans were 
naturally corrupt, they could strive toward gaining God’s forgiveness. 
However, this could be taken as a type of Pelgianism. Pelgius had argued 
that since God is the greatest good, we, his creations, have the capacity to be 
good. Pelgius placed his emphasis on morality and free will. Augustine 
strongly objected to Pelgius’s views and in his fight with him, Augustine 
placed his emphasis on grace and predestination. Since Adam’s fall from 
grace, man is totally corrupt. As such, humans completely lack the capacity 
to be good; only by God’s grace is one saved. Calvin agreed with Augustine 
that man does not have the choice to be good or bad. Humans have sinned 
against God, which Weber defined as having breached our faith with God 
(Weber, 2001: 293). Calvin repeatedly insists that those elected for salvation 
have done nothing, and could do nothing, to warrant it. And, one who has 
been damned can do nothing to redeem oneself. God’s eternal decree is sole-
ly for his glorification and for the humility of humans (Scheibe, 1897: 59, 61). 
To think that there is anything in us that would make us worthy is an af-
front to God. And, it is an affront to God to try to apply “earthly standards 
of justice” to him (Weber, 1905: 10; Scheibe, 1897: 57; Kampschulte, 1869: I: 
262). God is the ground and norm of all grounds and norms; however, there 
are none that stand over him or by which one could judge him (Kamp-
schulte, 1869: I: 262; Troeltsch, 1912: 615). That some may be saved and oth-
ers damned through no specific fault of their own may seem unreasonable or 
unfair to us. Because humans are totally corrupt, God could have chosen to 
have damned all humans. God, in his righteousness has chosen to damn 
many. However, in his mercifulness he has chosen to save some (Scheibe, 
1897: 23). Calvin had no difficulty maintaining two apparently conflicting 
106 Weber writes: It is “the recognized impossibility to measure God’s decree by human 
standards”. Weber, 1989: 521; Scheibe, 1897: 48, 57, 126.
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concepts: that God is all powerful – and that man has full responsibility for 
himself. And, he saw no contradiction in maintaining that God fore-or-
dained everything – and that man was guilty of his sins (Holl, 1928: 263). 
Again, Calvin’s point is that humans have no right to protest against God’s 
choice; we cannot make any claims against God. Given the greatness of God 
and the severity of our sins, we have no right to make any ethical claims 
against God (Weber, 2001: 301). And, as Weber says, to complain of our lot 
is like an animal complaining that it was not born a human.107 What is of sole 
importance is God’s majesty and that everything (even all things social and 
political) is done for the “greater glory for God” (Weber, 1905: 15). In con-
trast to Calvin’s emphasis on the doctrine of predes tination, there is little 
mention of it in Luther’s theology of grace  (Troeltsch, 1913a: 4: 1706). In-
stead of emphasizing God’s power and majesty, the Lutheran prefers to em-
phasize God’s goodness and love. And, where there is a theology of love, 
there is a community of believers who have hope for the future life. Howev-
er, Calvin’s doctrine of predestination leads to inner isolation; as Weber puts 
it; it leads to that “illusionless and pessimistically colored individualism.”
If Calvin’s doctrine of predestination leads to this type of individualism, 
it also leads to a solution to one of the most perplexing problems of Christi-
anity: namely, the problem of theodicy.108 It was Leibniz who gave the term 
much of its currency. Troeltsch and Otto Lempp wrote the articles on theo-
dicy for the first edition of Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart. 
 Troeltsch wrote that it is the problem of attempting to explain the relation 
between God and the world, and Lempp defined it as the answer to the 
question concerning the reason, sense, or purpose of evil. (Troeltsch, 1913b: 
5: 1186; Lempp, 1913: 5: 1177; see Hanke, 2001: 221). In his Das Problem der 
Theodicee Lempp asked how could an all-powerful, all-knowing, all merci-
ful God create such a world of suffering, a veritable “vale of tears”? (Lempp, 
1910: 5, 7, 15, 36, 42). How can one reconcile God’s twin properties of being 
all-powerful and all-good with the evil and suffering in the world? Weber 
describes the “theodicy of suffering” as how can one reconcile the notion of 
a perfect deity with such an imperfect world.109 In Politik als Beruf he poses 
107 Weber, 1905: 10. Weber uses virtually the same words in the section “Das Problem der 
Theodizee” in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft as does Troeltsch in his Soziallehren. Weber, 2001: 
297; Troeltsch, 1912: 615.
108 Otto Lempp points out that it is a problem in most religions but it is especially acute in 
Christianity. Lempp: 1913: 5: 1177. Troeltsch suggests that the doctrine of predestination re-
leases the Calvinist from all problems of theodicy which had so plagued the Lutherans. 
 Troeltsch, 1912: 617. 
109 Weber, 2001: 296. Weber also writes of a “theodicy of happiness”. Those who are happy 
are not content just with the fact that they are happy; they also want this happiness to be “le-
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the problem: How can a power that is both all powerful and good create an 
irrational world of such undeserved suffering and so many unrighted 
wrongs and has such stupitidy which can never be meliorated (Weber, 1992: 
241)? He believes that there are three possible answers: dualism, Hinduism, 
and Calvinism.110 Here Weber’s concern is with Calvinism.
Like Luther, Calvin believes that we are placed in a world ordered by 
God. And, God demands obedience to him and to those earthly authorities 
who rule in his name (Marcks, 1892: 298–299). Unlike Luther, who had little 
interest in politics, Calvin demonstrated “astonishing knowledge” of politi-
cal life (Bohatec, 1937: XVI). Marcks stressed both his legal background and 
his political interests, and he referred to Calvin as a theologian and a states-
man (Marcks, 1892: 284–285). Like Luther, Calvin believed the state is nec-
essary, but not in the sense of a necessary evil. Instead, it is necessary in the 
same way that we need food and drink, water and light (Kampschulte, 1869: 
I: 270). However, the state is not only a necessary legal organization; it is 
also a moral community (Marcks, 1892: 298; Bohatec, 1937: 11). Further-
more, the sovereignity and authority of earthly rulers do not come from 
themselves, but are granted to them by the “creator of the state ordinances” 
– God himself (Bohatec, 1937: 12). Calvin hated the idea of anarchy so he 
was fearful of democracy which might lead to it (Carduans, 1903: 43; Bo-
hatec, 1937: 23, 30, 60). However, he was just as adamant against the notion 
of the monarchy because he was concerned that it would lead to tyranny. 
Unlike God, who by his essence is incapable of being tyrannical, men cer-
tainly can be and often are (Bohatec, 1937: 25). Humans have no right or 
standard by which to judge God; however, they do have the right to judge 
their fellow humans. For Calvin, there is, and must exist, a contract, a “mu-
tual obligation”, between ruler and subject (Bohatec, 1937: 66, 89). As long 
as the ruler acts as subject to this highest authority and holds up his end of 
the contract, he has the right to demand obedience from his subjects (Bo-
hatec, 1937: 65). Thus, like Luther, a revolution is not just resistance against 
earthly authority; it is also resistance against God’s authority (Bohatec, 
1937: 75, 77). 
gitimate”. As Weber puts it, they want the “right” to this happiness; they want to be convinced 
that they “deserve it”. Weber, 1989: 89–90. 
110 In the Introduction to the Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen Weber writes that there 
are three: the individual doctrine of Karma, Zarathustrian dualism, and the predestination 
decree. Later he refers to the first as the Indian doctrine of Karma. Weber, 1989: 95, 520–522. 
In the section “Das Problem der Theodizee” Weber lists these three but refers to the Indian 
doctrine of “Karma” as the belief in the transmigration of souls. Weber, 2001: 299). In his ar-
ticle on predestination Troeltsch suggests that there are four: dualism, Buddhism, the doctrine 
of predestination, and pure pantheism. Troeltsch, 1913b: 5: 1187.
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However, Calvin parts ways with Luther when a ruler breaks his contract 
with his subjects, for then he is also breaking his bond with God. As such, 
the tyrannical ruler has absolutely no claim to obedience because he has 
broken God’s order. (Bohatec, 1934: 137). This is a revolution against God, 
and it justifies and even demands resistance (Bohatec, 1934: 139, Schmidt, 
1901: 62). Marcks maintained that Calvin always believed that he was “re-
sponsible before God” (Marcks, 1892: 319). And, Calvin frequently invoked 
the Biblical injunction that it is always better to obey God than man (Her-
zog, 1854: 2: 516; Schmidt, 1901: 62; Carduans, 1903: 45; Troeltsch, 1912: 
688). But, in Calvin’s view such a tyrant is not even a man – a “prince” who 
acts like this is no longer worthy to be counted as a human. (Carduans, 1903: 
43; Bohatec, 1937: 79). Such a rebel is even lower than a flea or a worm, for 
they are still God’s creatures (Carduans, 1903: 42). Bohatec puts it this way: 
the prince has robbed God of his right and his throne; therefore, one should 
spit in his face rather than obey (Bohatec, 1934, 137; Bohatec, 1937: 78). Men 
are supposed to obey, but God determines when men must rebel against 
such tyranny. Thus, this is not just “passive resistance” but a “right to active 
resistance” and even a duty (Bohatec, 1934: 140, 151). As men are “tools in 
the hands of God”, they must fight against the tyrannical power (Bohatec, 
1934: 149). They are “chosen” to fight against the Godless so the issue of the 
use of force is no issue (Weber, 2001: 363–366, 391). Marcks makes much of 
Calvin’s fighting spirit and how this spirit infused his later followers 
(Marcks, 1892: 286, 291, 295, 316, 320, and 325). For the Calvinist, it be-
comes a duty to mount a forceful defense of faith against tyrannts and even 
to wars of faith (Weber, 2001: 393; Weber, 1992: 244). It was this “exception” 
of Calvin that led the way to the entire Hugenot doctrine of active resistance 
(Kampschulte, 1869: I: 273; Carduans, 1903: 51; Bohatec, 1934: 202–203). 
Troeltsch claimed that the “cry of the people” was always the ultimate 
justification for Calvin and his successors (Troeltsch, 1912: 684). Whether 
this is true of Calvin may be disputed; what is not disputed is that Calvin’s 
theory of the right to active resistance was taken up by his students, Beza 
and Hotman, the first “Monarchenmacher’ (Troeltsch, 1912: 685; see 
Marcks, 1892: 359; and see Weber, 1992: 187). And, it leads to the the notions 
of the right to resistance, the sovereignty of the people, and even to civil and 
human rights (Troeltsch, 1912: 685, 687, 691).
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Weber’s Own Political Thinking
Unlike his Heidelberg colleagues Troeltsch and Georg Jellinek, Weber never 
had much interest in the notions of natural and human rights. And, it is 
relatively easy to understand why: Weber rejected the teleological principles 
which underlie the first and he disputed the belief in natural equality that 
supports the second. Instead of conceiving the world as an ordered one in 
which lasting peace and happiness could be found, Weber believed that it 
was a chaotic place in which economic and political conflicts eternally oc-
cur. And, instead of believing that consequences were God’s concern, We-
ber held that they were ours and ours alone. By considering these funda-
mental convictions about the world we can envision Weber’s likely respons-
es to Luther, Calvin, and their “intellectual” heirs. And, we can regard these 
responses as answers to the question of what is the “real connection between 
ethics and politics?” (Weber, 1992: 233). 
For the “true Christians” there is no connection because they truly hold 
to the “absolute ethic of the Gospels”. These are the Christians who answer 
the question of whether the use of force is ever justified with an “uncondi-
tional and unequivocal” “NO” (Weber, 1992: 234). In their view, one does 
not resist evil with force, and if struck one turns the other cheek. This ethic 
is one of complete and total pacifism. One can never use force, even if to 
bring about absolute justice on earth (Weber, 1992: 245). There is a total 
trust in God and complete faith in doing what God commands. As Weber 
puts it: “the Christian does right and leaves the consequences to God.” (We-
ber, 1992: 237; see Troeltsch, 1912: 637). But, Weber recognizes the difficul-
ties of living according to this ethic and he acknowledges that the number 
must be small. Weber says that those who live by the absolute ethics are, like 
Jesus and St. Francis, “‘not from this world’”. (Weber, 1992: 247). This is 
because one must be a saint like Francis and live like Jesus to be able to ad-
here to it (Weber, 1992: 235). 
Most people are unwilling or unable to live like that and most people are 
unable or unwilling to accept injustice in the world. Weber cites a 1906 study 
in which only a minority blame their lack of faith on the results of modern 
science. Instead, the great majority blame their loss of faith on the gross in-
justices in this world (Weber, 1989: 95). These are the people who cannot 
accept the world as it is and wish instead to establish heaven on earth. These 
are the workers, socialists, and revolutionaries who hope for the “socialism 
of the future” (Weber, 1984: 462¸ 629). They dream of an idyllic future in 
which there is total equality and there is no longer “the dominance of man 
over man” (Weber, 1984: 617). However, politics is exactly that: “the relation 
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of dominance of man over man” (Weber, 1992: 160). These are people who 
confuse the line between ethics and politics. These are the modern German 
revolutionaries who claim to want heaven on earth but will use strikes and 
terror to achieve it. These “dictators of the street” do not adhere to the max-
im of peaceful protest – they use violence when it suits them (Weber, 1992: 
223). Weber likens this to Schopenhauer’s remark about causality; that the 
absolute ethics is not a carriage in which one can get on and off when one 
feels like it (Weber, 1992: 234). Furthermore, they object to war when it suits 
their purposes. In Weber’s opinion there is no question that, if given the 
choice between a few years of war and then the revolution, or immediate 
peace but no revolution, these “revolutionaries” would no doubt choose 
more war and then revolution (Weber, 1992: 239; see also Weber, 1984: 632). 
In Weber’s opinion it is not enough for these people to have “noble inten-
tions” (Weber, 1992: 170, 234, 228–229). Indeed, Weber’s major complaint 
against these “literary types” is that they neither understand nor appreciate 
the seriousness of politics. And, in Weber’s view, they are simply “political 
dilettantes”. But, politics is “not a frivolous intellectual game” nor is it a 
“vain self-admiration in the feel of power” (Weber, 1992: 228–229. Also, see 
232–233). The first is a delusion and the second is an illusion; instead, poli-
tics is the striving for real power. (Weber, 1992: 159). Thus, politics is not a 
matter either for dilettantes or for children.111 Unfortunately, these people 
hopelessly confuse ethics and politics.
Weber does not have any of this confusion. He fully recognizes that one 
who strives for politics, strives for power. And, Weber does not have any 
illusions about what this means – it means dealing with “diabolical powers”. 
Furthermore, it means acknowledging that ethics does not enter into politi-
cal considerations. The war and its revolutionary aftermath did not prompt 
Weber to adopt these views; although they did seem to strengthen them 
(Weber, 1984: 94–98,163). Indeed, these are present in his early writings. In 
1892 Weber objected to the literary dilettantes and their social-political 
“Dilettantismus” – they approached the issue of struggle as “an inexperi-
enced child” (Weber, 1993: 235). These thoughts are amplified three years 
later in his “Freiburg Address”. There, Weber insisted that we must give up 
“the naïve freedom-like ideals of our early youth” (Weber, 1993: 552). And, 
while it is fine for youths to have ideals, mature people must not cling to 
111 In Wissenschaft als Beruf Weber uses the same tone concerning the “big children” 
(“große Kinder”) of the professorial pulpits and the editorial rooms. Weber, 1992: 92. The 
editors of volume four of the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe quote from one of Weber’s 1896 
letters where he wrote of the “political children” who “play with fire and then set the house 
ablaze.” Weber, 1993: 613.
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them (Weber, 1993: 573). It is an illusion to believe in the “soft well-being” 
and to have “optimistic hopes for happiness” (Weber, 1993: 572–573). 
Grown-ups must give up the “dream of peace and human happiness” (We-
ber, 1993: 559–560). The world is not the place where love can prevail over 
force and where good can come only from good and evil only from evil. 
Weber insists that “whoever does not see this is, in fact, politically a child” 
(Weber, 1992: 240–242). In reality, politics is struggle (Weber, 1984: 482, 487, 
537).On the one hand, Weber agrees that one should passionately follow 
one’s heart and he allows that politics should not be done solely with one’s 
head (Weber, 1992: 249). But, on the other hand, Weber denies that it should 
be done solely with the heart. Politics requires a tremendous amount of fo-
cus, strength, and perseverance – it is like the “long boring through hard 
wood”. Therefore, it requires both “true” (not “sterile”) “Leidenschaft” 
(“passion”) as well as “Augenmaß” (Weber, 1992: 252–253). “Augenmaß”, as 
Weber defines it, is the capacity to see the realities with calmness and col-
lectedness – it is the “distance” between things and men (Weber, 1992: 226). 
It is the ability to see “the realities of life” and not see mere illusions (Weber, 
1992: 240). The politician must not mistake the “illusion”of the “acosmic 
ethics of love” for the “world of realities” (Weber, 1992: 240, 249). There is, 
then, a fundamental tension between those who hold an “ethics of convic-
tion” with the “realities of the world” (Weber, 2001: 367). For politics de-
mands just the opposite to the Sermon on the Mount; “you should forceful-
ly resist evil” (“du sollst dem Übel gewaltsam widerstehen”) (Weber, 1992: 
235). The specific tasks of politics demand that one use force to solve them. 
Thus, those who want to save their souls, or save the souls of others, should 
not seek the path of politics (Weber, 1992: 247). Politics, like economics, is 
the struggle to the death, and one must be prepared to fight with all one’s 
powers (Weber, 1993: 573). For Weber, acting according to one’s convictions 
is not enough; one needs to be responsible for the foreseeable consequences 
of one’s actions. It is this third notion, the notion of responsibility that is of 
paramount importance for Weber (Weber, 1992: 227). It is not enough that 
one wants to make impressions and to play with the “shining illusion of 
power”, for that leads to the abdication of responsibility (Weber, 1992: 229). 
And, it is not enough to leave the consequences to God. Whether it was be-
cause Weber believed that he lived in a post-Nietzschean world, or that he 
was “unmusical” in matters of faith, or simply for some other reason, Weber 
insisted that one no longer had the luxury to act solely according to one’s 
conscience and to disregard the consequences. Instead, politics demands 
that one acts with regard to the foreseeable consequences of those actions; 
that is, politics demands that one act responsibly. But, this is not Luther’s or 
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Calvin’s belief in their responsibility before God. Instead, we have a respon-
sibility to history, a conviction that Weber held all throughout his life. At the 
conclusion of his Freiburg Address, Weber writes of our “responsibility to 
history” (“Verantwortlichkeit vor der Geschichte”) (Weber, 1993: 567, 573). 
And, at the conclusion of Politik als Beruf, Weber means the same thing 
when he speaks of our “responsibility for the future” (“Vorantwortung vor 
der Zukunft”) (Weber, 1992: 232; see also Weber, 1984: 595). The weight of 
this responsibility is heavy and its demands are arduous; thus, Weber insists 
that politics is neither for those who are weak-willed nor for those who are 
sentimental. In Weber’s opinion, only those who have strong nerves and will 
take responsibility for their political actions should be permitted “to stick 
their hands in the spokes of the wheel of history.”112 
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Chapter Six
Max Weber’s Charismatic Prophets 
There may be questions concerning the meaning of Weber’s conception of 
charisma, but there is no question about Weber’s source for it, because he 
specifically names him. In a major departure from his usual practice Weber 
not only refers to Rudolph Sohm, but he does so a number of times. In an-
other change from his usual practice, Weber singles out Sohm for high 
praise. Accordingly, scholars justifiably believe themselves to be very fortu-
nate that Weber indicated the origin for his notion of charisma.113 Unfortu-
nately, many of them seem content with this knowledge and have not pur-
sued some of its implications. One implication comes from the fact that We-
ber borrowed the notion of charisma from Sohm, but that he utilized it in a 
much different form than did Sohm. For Sohm, charisma was an important, 
but a relatively minor, weapon in his theological battle about the origins of 
Roman Catholicism and its doctrine of canon law. For Weber, it was not 
only important, but it was a major part in his tripartite conception of 
“Herrschaften”. Another implication stems from Sohm’s fundamental focus 
on the anonymous early Christian leaders. In contrast, Weber’s primary fo-
cus is on political and ethical leaders. This specific concern prompted Weber 
to examine one group of charismatic leaders – the Old Testament prophets. 
In the “Religiöse Gemeinschaften” section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
Weber writes: “Under ‘prophet’ we will here understand a pure personal 
carrier of charisma….”114 Weber not only emphasizes the personal aspects of 
charisma, but in the remainder of the sentence he will set out a number of 
charisma’s other defining characteristics. While Weber will discuss many 
types of prophets in this section, his main focus is on the Old Testament 
Prophets. Unfortunately, Weber’s comments here have been overlooked, 
with the single exception of Peter L. Berger. In “Charisma and Religious 
113 Bendix 1977; Turner and Factor 1994; Kroll 2001; Riesebrodt 2001; Adair-Toteff 2005; 
Weber 2005. Weber lists a second, but rather minor, source – Karl Holl. Weber briefly refers 
to Karl Holl’s 1898 doctoral dissertation Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim Griechischen 
Mönchtum. Holl 1898; Weber 1922: 124. 
114 “Charismaträger.... ” Weber 2001: 177. Abraham Malamat noted that while there is no 
exact word in the Old Testament to match “charisma”, it is clear that there was something like 
a charismatic leader. Malamat 1981: 116–117. 
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Innovation: The Social Location of Israeli Prophecy” Berger maintained 
that: “One of the building blocks of Weber’s theory of charisma was his 
understanding of Israeli Prophesy.” Berger further suggested that Weber’s 
understanding of the Israeli Prophets came from a close reading of the lead-
ing German specialists.115 Berger was correct in both claims; unfortunately, 
in the fifty years since he published his article no one seems to have followed 
up on his suggestions and examined more closely Weber’s treatment of the 
Old Testament prophets. An examination of Weber’s discussions regarding 
the Old Testament prophets is important; it not only adds to the political 
and ethical components of Weber’s notion of charisma, but it also provides 
examples for his personal conception of the genuine political leader.116
This essay is divided into five sections. In the first I discuss Sohm’s notion 
of charisma and its importance for Weber and then I draw the contrasts be-
tween their conceptions. In the second I focus on Weber’s “sociological” 
notion of prophet and its embodiment of charisma. In the third I set out the 
general context for Weber’s understanding of the Old Testament prophets. 
In the fourth I examine the political and ethical importance of the three Old 
Testament Prophets who were the best examples for Weber’s conception of 
charisma. In the final section I show how these prophets affected Weber 
personally and how they served as influential examples for his conceptions 
of modern charismatic political leaders. 
Weber, Sohm, and Charismatic Differences
There is no question that Rudolph Sohm was a source for Weber’s notion of 
charisma and there is little doubt that Sohm was a major influence on We-
ber’s overall thinking. Sohm was a widely respected legal scholar who wrote 
extensively on the nature and history of law. Furthermore, he had a well-de-
served reputation as a teacher. He taught at Strassburg and at Freiburg, and 
at Leipzig from 1887 until his death in 1917. As a student Weber heard Sohm 
115 Berger 1963: 940, 943. That Weber relied on his contemporaries for understanding the 
Old Testament prophets should be readily understandable. He admitted that he was not a 
theologian and so he relied on the Old Testament specialists, just as he relied on Protestant 
authorities when he was writing The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
116 Since “Max Weber’s Notion of Charisma” appeared in 2005 in the Journal for Classical 
Sociology several things have been published which have prompted me to rethink Weber’s 
origins for his idea of charisma. First, the Max Weber Gesamtausgabe volume Herrschaften 
was published in 2005. Second, the Gesamtausgabe volume Das Antike Judentum appeared 
the same year. Third, the Gesamtausgabe volume containing Weber’s last lecture course on 
“Staatssoziologie” was published late in 2009.  
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lecture. This was during Weber’s military service in Strassburg and he con-
firmed it in his academic “Lebenslauf” (Weber 2008: 352–353). Weber relied 
on a number of Sohm’s legal writings, beginning with Sohm’s 1880 essay 
“Fränkisches Recht und römisches Recht” as well as his 1888 article “Die 
Deutsche Genossenschaft” (Weber 2008: 214–215, 330, 405, 424). However, 
it was Kirchenrecht, Sohm’s book on Church law that Weber utilized in de-
veloping his notion of charisma.
Weber cites Sohm for being his source for the notion of charisma at least 
seven times in four different works: twice in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft, 
once in “Probleme der Staatssoziologie”, twice in “Die drei reinen Typen der 
Herrschaften”, and twice in Allgemeine Staatssoziologie (Weber 1922: 124; 
Weber; 2005: 735, 755; Weber 2009: 78–79). He compliments Sohm for being 
the first scholar to consider charisma from a purely historical point of view 
and he praises Sohm for offering an account of charisma that was “brilliant-
ly developed” (Weber 2005: 755, 462).
Sohm discussed charisma in the first volume of his Kirchenrecht which 
was published in 1892. Sohm’s major contention was that the Catholic no-
tion of Church law was a contradiction in terms and that it fundamentally 
violated the original spirit of Christianity. (See Sohm 1892: 2–3). Sohm’s 
thesis was provocative and was later challenged by the noted Church histo-
rian Adolf Harnack. Harnack argued that that Church law was not only a 
part of the early Church, but that the Church was able to survive only by 
developing a hierarchy and an authority based upon offices and doctrines. 
This debate was heated and extensive and is theologically important. More-
over, several commentators have suggested that this debate heavily influ-
enced Weber. Both Wilfried Nippel and Thomas Kroll have suggested that 
Weber developed his notion of charisma in the context of this debate be-
tween Sohm and Harnack (Nippel 2000: 10; Kroll 2001: 53–54). While Nip-
pel and Kroll were correct to point out the similarities and they were right 
to suggest that this theological debate had some influence on Weber, they 
overlook the major differences and accordingly ignore the importance that 
the Old Testament prophets play in Weber’s conception of charisma. 
Charisma, for Sohm, is the special, “personally” God-given gift of grace 
(Sohm 1892: 6, 54). Sohm insists that the charismatic person is the true 
“leader” of the true “church”. The “true” church is the “Ecclesia”; it is the 
gathering of the believers in which God’s gift of charisma operates (Sohm 
1892: 18). This gathering need not be large; indeed, Sohm cites Matthew 18, 
20 where Jesus will be there where “two or three gather in my name” (Sohm 
1892: 20; Sohm 1912: 28–29, 49). According to Sohm, the “Ecclesia” differs 
from the institutional Church, not just in size but also in leadership. The 
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Roman Catholic Church is founded upon law, but the “Ecclesia” is based 
upon love. The Office of the Church demands “unfree” obedience, but the 
“Ecclesia’s” charismatic leader asks for “free” recognition (Sohm 1892: 27). 
It is through prophecy that the Holy Spirit is called (Sohm 1892: 14, 30–32). 
Thus far there are a number of similarities between Sohm’s notion of charis-
ma and that of Weber, enough of them to prompt Kroll to announce that 
they are similar (Kroll 2001: 64). However, when one places these notions 
within their respective contexts, they are rather different. The context for 
Sohm was strictly theological and his sole purpose was to prove that Cathol-
icism with its emphasis on church authority and canonical law is far re-
moved from early Christianity. Roman Catholic doctrine maintained that 
the Church was an organization of believers and that the Church hierarchy 
had the divinely given authority to regulate and enforce all parts of religious 
life (Sohm 1912: 19–21). At the head of this organization stood the Pope; and 
he was the only person who could be a Christian in the “full sense of the 
word” – all others were “second class” Christians (Sohm 1912: 22). The Pope 
is infallible and has jurisdiction over every aspect of life, including scholar-
ship and science (Sohm 1912: 31). Not only does canon law have no place in 
evangelical doctrine, but the true Ecclesia is a charismatic organization 
(Sohm 1912: 10, 50). In contrast to the Catholic Church, the Ecclesia is a 
“disorderly” organization; or as Sohm insists, it is “pneumatic anarchy” 
(Sohm 1912: 54, 61). Charisma is important to Sohm but primarily in his 
claim that there can be no theological justification for Church authority 
which is based upon canon law. The only true Christian “authority” is 
God-given charisma and that has nothing to do with political, legal, or reli-
gious orders (Sohm 1912: 47–49). In marked contrast Weber’s conception of 
charisma is fundamentally political, and that is manifested in his use of 
prophets as examples of “charismatic carriers”.    
“Prophet” – “Sociologically Speaking”
In Religiöse Gemeinschaften Weber asks: “What is, sociologically speaking, 
a prophet?” He then answers: “By ‘prophet’ here we will understand a pure-
ly personal carrier of charisma, whose power of his mission is revealed by a 
religious teaching or a divine command.”117 These teachings and commands 
were neither ordinary nor regular; as Julius Wellhausen, one of Weber’s con-
117 “Wir wollen hier unter einem ‘Prophet‘ verstehen einen rein persönlichen Charis-
maträger, der Kraft seiner Mission eine religiöse Lehre oder einen göttlichen Befehl verkün-
det”. Weber 2001: 177. 
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temporaries insisted, the prophets were “warners” and “witnesses” (Well-
hausen 1906: 4). Weber emphasizes that he is unconcerned with the question 
whether this is revealing an old revelation or a new one; or as he also puts it, 
whether this is a “religious renewer” or a “religious establisher”. What he is 
concerned with is emphasizing the “personal”, and he contrasts the “person-
al” of the prophet with the “office” of the priest. The priest offers salvation 
by virtue of his office in contrast with the prophet who does so by virtue of 
his personal charisma. This does not mean that a priest cannot have person-
al charisma; Weber admits that occasionally one does have it (Weber 2001: 
178). Weber also contrasts the charisma of the magician with that of the 
prophet – the former works through an oracle or by dream divination – the 
latter by the “specific gift of the spirit” (Weber 2001 179). Wellhausen noted 
that the prophets did not speak from the law; but rather, from the spirit 
(Wellhausen 1906: 5). To emphasize again: the charismatic leader has specif-
ically personal powers given by God. 
To understand what Weber means by charisma, it is helpful to follow We-
ber himself who primarily set out his concept of charisma in contrast to the 
two other types of legitimate authority; namely, what he terms legal author-
ity and traditional authority.118 Legal authority is based upon the foundation 
of rules and the capacity for competence; the operative word here is knowl-
edge (Weber 1976: 125–126, 129). Legal authority is largely a modern phe-
nomenon and it tends to replace traditional authority. Traditional authority 
is based upon the foundation of long-standing tradition and includes the 
important notion of privilege (Weber 1976: 135). Here, authority is based 
upon tradition; specific knowledge and rules are lacking. Legal authority is 
fully non-personal: the official follows his or her duty to base the decision 
upon rules, regardless who the person is (“ohne Ansehen der Person”) (We-
ber 1976: 129, Weber 2005a: 727). In contrast, the traditional authority is 
vested in the person, so that the patriarch or tribal leader has some degree of 
personal leeway in rendering his decision. However, Weber writes of legal 
authority being impersonal, by virtue of the impersonal office, and tradi-
tional authority being impersonal, by virtue of a long and impersonal tradi-
tion (Weber 2009: 90). Weber also insists that both legal authority and tradi-
tional authority rest on norms (Weber 2005: 247). Whereas the former norms 
are abstract laws and rules; the latter are specific and holy (Weber 2005: 247). 
Weber repeatedly emphasizes the pious aspect of tradition (Weber 2005: 
248, 251, 257, 468, 257). Furthermore, Weber makes it abundantly clear that 
118 For the difficulties in translating “Herrschaft” see Adair-Toteff 2005: 191–192. In the 
following translations I try to capture the best sense of the word, but I freely admit that there 
are other possible renditions. 
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the traditional leader is strictly bound by the past and by no means is enti-
tled to make arbitrary decisions (Weber 1976: 130, Weber 2005a: 729). Both 
legal authority and traditional authority are marked by a sense of perma-
nence, which Weber stresses by his repeated usage of various forms of 
“everyday”. He speaks of “everyday”, in the case of legal authority he speaks 
of “everyday forms” (“Alltagsformen”) and insists that rules apply “every-
day” (“Alltag”). In the case of traditional authority, Weber writes about the 
“everyday beliefs of faith” (“Alltagsglauben”) (Weber 1976: 124, 126, 141–
143). In the part of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft that has been published as 
Religiöse Gemeinschaften Weber employs even more forms of “everyday”. 
These include “ökonomischen Alltags” (“economic everyday”), “Alltagsin-
teressen” (“everyday interests”), “Alltagsordnung” (“everyday ordering”), 
“Alltagsethik” (“everyday ethics”), and “Alltagshandel” (“everyday trade”) 
and “Alltagskapitalismus” (“everyday capitalism”) (Weber 2001: 157, 323, 
368, 312, 371; and Weber 2005a: 485). Both legal authority and traditional 
authority need and perpetuate a sense of permanence and both function well 
during ordinary times and under ordinary circumstances. Weber calls the 
patriarch the “natural leader of the everyday” and he refers to legal authori-
ty as maintaining a system of “calculable continuing needs” (Weber 2005: 
753). Both types of authority flourish during ordinary times and require 
ordinary people. This is true whether they follow tradition like “traditional 
authority” or they follow rules like bureaucratic authority.
Extraordinary times, however, call for extraordinary people. People who 
seem to have charismatic authority appear primarily during periods of great 
unsettledness and upheaval. Times of crisis require special leaders – charis-
matic leaders. In Weber’s considered view, charisma is a radical, and even 
revolutionary, power. In “Drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft” We-
ber calls charisma “one of the greatest revolutionary powers in history” and 
in his last lecture course subtitled “Staatssoziologie” Weber says that charis-
ma is a “revolutionary power from above”. There, he also refers to rational-
ity and charisma as the “two great revolutionary powers” (Weber 2009: 
92–95; see also Weber 1976: 142). 
Charisma is revolutionary in part because it is the antithesis to legal au-
thority. Unlike “rational” legal authority, charisma is “irrational”. Legal au-
thority is impersonal and regular, whereas charismatic authority is personal 
and exceptional. Charismatic authority is also anti-traditional, because it 
breaks with what has always been. It not only breaks all traditional or ra-
tional norms; it also inverts all values. Weber cites Jesus’ insistence that “It 
is written but I say unto you” (Weber 1976: 141; Weber 2005a: 468; Weber 
2005b: 653). Weber insists that “the old law is broken through new revela-
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tion” and that the charismatic leader gives “new commands” (Weber 2009: 
92–93, Weber 1976: 141). Charisma is also revolutionary because it is “the 
eternally new” (“Das ewig Neue”) (Weber 2005: 735). It is radical because of 
its extraordinariness. Weber continuously emphasizes charisma’s “extraor-
dinariness” calling it the “außertägliche Qualität” (“extraordinary quality”) 
and (“außeralltägliche Character”) (“extraordinary character”) (Weber 
2001: 740, Weber 2001: 122). He also refers to it as the “außeralltägliche 
Kraft” (“extraordinary power”) (Weber 2009: 90–91).119 
Charisma’s extraordinariness also rests on its almost exclusive personal 
characteristic. Weber constantly refers to it as personal: it is the “personal 
authority” and it is “personally effective” (Weber 2005: 469, 467). It de-
mands devotion or submission to the person and it is the belief or faith 
(“Glaube”) in the person (Weber 2005: 734, 740–741). Some of the charis-
matic leaders have specific powers: the charismatic magician has the “capac-
ity for magic”, the charismatic war hero has performed heroic deeds, and the 
ancient charismatic demagogue had the power of his own words.120 For 
these charismatic people, their powers are very personal in that they seem to 
belong to them, but it is different for the Old Testament prophets.
Weber and the Old Testament Prophets
Weber distinguishes between two different types of prophets. First, there is 
what he calls “exemplary prophets” and second, there is what he refers to as 
“ethical prophets”.121 Weber engages in his usual practice of accenting the 
contrasts between the two types, but it seems reasonable that there are over-
laps; that is, a prophet can be regarded as both “exemplary” and “ethical”. 
People are drawn to the “exemplary” prophets because of who they are as 
persons. These prophets show the way to salvation by virtue of their own 
lives. Weber offers as examples, Zarathustra, Jesus, and Mohammed (Weber 
2001: 178). People are drawn to the ethical prophets because of the “doc-
119 Weber refers to charisma as “außerwerktäglich” and “unwerktäglich” – two terms that 
resist translation but mean “out of the workday” and “not like a workday”.
120 Weber 2005: 735–737. Weber often has Pericles in mind when he writes about the an-
cient demagogue. Weber goes to some lengths to remind his readers and listeners that the term 
‘demagogue’ did not always have such an unpleasant sense and that he refers specifically to 
Pericles. Weber 2005: 507, 736–737 and Weber 1992: 191. For Weber’s discussion of the dema-
gogue and Pericles, see Adair-Toteff 2008. Eckhart Otto noted that for Weber “demagogue” 
carried no negative overtones. Weber 2005b: 608, note  2. 
121 For a helpful discussion of Weber’s distinction between the two types, see Martin 
Riesebrodt, “Ethische und exemplarische Prophetie”. Riesebrodt 2001, especially 200–203.
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trine” that they reveal or teach (Weber 2001: 178). This revelation or doc-
trine may be concrete or it could be abstract; in both cases, obedience is an 
“ethical duty” (Weber 2001:189).Weber identifies Buddha and the Old Testa-
ment prophets as examples of “ethical prophets”.122 The followers have an 
ethical duty to obey the doctrine, but the prophet must also be obedient and 
first respond to his “calling”. It is with the notion of calling that Weber’s 
sources offer important information. 
The Old Testament prophets are “called” and that prompted some com-
mentators such as Marti to refer to this calling as one’s “prophetic calling” 
(Marti 1900: XVII, see Marti 1900: XX). This calling is specific; Cornill 
refers to this as one’s “calling vision” (“Berufsvision”) and he cites the year 
in which the prophet was “called”.123 Weber notes that this type of calling is 
radically different from the type of “calling” that is commonly used to de-
scribe people in academia, business, or in government. For these people, 
their “calling” (“Beruf”) is shown normally by their everyday experience, 
knowledge, and practice. This is why Weber calls the priest’s “Beruf” a 
“normal” one (Weber 2001: 214). In marked contrast, the truly religious 
charismatic person has a “special” “Beruf”, even “a special supernatural” 
‘Beruf’ (Weber 2001: 173, Weber 2005: 460, see Lang 2001: 172). Duhm not-
ed that the prophets were called by a higher being, that is, by God (Duhm 
1903: XI, Duhm 1916: 82, Sellin 1912: 31, Hölscher 1914: 189). Giesebrecht 
refers to this as the “godly calling” (“göttlicher Beruf”) or “heavenly call-
ing” (“himmlischer Beruf”) (Giesebrecht 1894: XI, Giesebrecht 1897: 24–25, 
Giesebrecht 1894: 52). These individuals were singled out and were given the 
special gift of being able to have an exchange with an “invisible world” 
(Duhm 1916: 82, 91). It was as if they had two natures; that is, one in which 
they could see the things that normal people could and another in which 
they could see God (Marti 1900: 164, 167, Gunkel 1913: 1869, Gunkel 1915: 
XXII). In any case, the prophets seemed to carry with them something se-
cretive (Gunkel 1915: XX). Gunkel suggested that the fundamental experi-
ence of the prophets (the “Nabi”) was ecstasy and sometimes the term 
seemed to apply to anyone who had visions and heard things. Weber seems 
to have adopted this view from Gunkel, and to a lesser extent from Hölscher’s 
view (Weber 2005b: 384–385, 633–637). However, Gunkel was writing 
about the whole range of prophets and not just the great ones and Hölscher 
122 It appears that Weber may be following Duhm here because Duhm specifically men-
tions Jeremiah and lists Buddha, Mohammed, as well as Paul as “prophetic forms”. Duhm 
1889: 7. 
123 Cornill 1891: 133, 154, see Weber 2005b: 639. Sellin writes of the “hour” in which Jere-
miah was called. Sellin 1912: 72.
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was attempting to counter a highly rational conception of them. Duhm 
maintains that “Nabi” is not identical with “prophets” as it covers a slightly 
wider group of people (Duhm 1916: 81). Duhm sometimes regarded the 
prophets as ecstatic but other times seemed to think that they were not ec-
static but that the seers were (see Giesebrecht 1897: 55). Like Duhm, Weber 
insisted that the prophets never sought ecstasy (Duhm 1903: XI). Instead, it 
came to them, and Weber allowed that the prophets had it in varying degrees 
(Weber 2005b: 639, 632). Furthermore, Weber noted that Amos emphatical-
ly rejected the title of “Nabi” even if he did have visions (Weber 2005b: 386, 
Weber 2001: 179, see Sellin 1912: 31). But, as Giesebrecht argued, Amos had 
very few visions and was rarely ecstatic. For the most part, the great Old 
Testament prophets neither had visions nor were moved by ecstasy (Giese-
brecht 1897: 38). Yet, there is a sense of something “otherworldly” in that the 
prophets were “called” and were given a mission (Weber 2001: 252). Weber 
refers to this simply by “missions” as in having a “prophetic mission” or a 
“religious mission” (Weber 2001: 203, 187). Other times, Weber refers to this 
as a “Sendung”, specifically, a “Godly mission” (Weber 2005: 462–464, 467, 
Giesebrecht 1897: 16, 19, 21, Hölsher 1914: 199, and Duhm 1916: 4). Even 
when Weber writes of the “personal mission” and the “personal effective-
ness” of the charismatic person, he makes it very clear that this is neither the 
mission nor effectiveness of the person, but rather of God who has given the 
prophet this task.124 
Many of the prophets distanced themselves from others who claimed the 
title. Weber suggested that the “true” prophets were often peasants and al-
most all were outsiders (Weber 2005b: 622, 626). Yet, Jeremiah came from a 
famous family of priests (Duhm 1903: X). Like the official seers or royal 
priests, most of the professional prophets were regarded as frauds. Unlike 
priests and oracles, these prophets were reluctant to speak; indeed, they of-
ten indicated that God forced them to speak (Weber 2005: 633–635). In par-
ticular, Amos made it plain that he was forced to prophesize against his will 
(Sellin 1912: 31). Unlike the priests and seers, the prophet does not lie; rather, 
the prophet speaks the truth no matter what – God’s truth (Weber 2001: 
192).
Certain of the prophets claimed not to be speaking in their own voices, 
but in God’s. Either God spoke directly through them or they retold what 
124 Weber 2005: 467. Riesebrodt notes Weber’s inconsistent usage of the terms “exemplary 
prophets” and “ethical prophets” and prefers to emphasize the notion of “mission” by calling 
the latter “ethische Sendungsprophetie”. Reisebrodt 2001: 200–203; see Weber 2005b: 510. 
Lang also differentiates between “Sendungsprophetie” and “exemplarischer Prophetie”. Lang 
2001: 172.
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God had said to them (Weber 2005b: 636). Gunkel went so far as to maintain 
that the prophets’ “fundamental conviction was that these thoughts came 
directly from God” (Gunkel 1913: 1867). The prophets did not speak nor-
mally; instead, they “called” or “cried out” (Gunkel 1915: XXIV). What 
they said was not their own; but, it was God’s “voice”, his “word”, his 
“mouth” (Weber 2005b: 643, 653, Duhm 1903: XXV, XXIX, XXXII; Gun-
kel 1915: XXVIII). Those who did speak from “their own hearts” were not 
considered true prophets; instead they were regarded as the “lying proph-
ets” (“Lügenpropheten”) (Gunkel 1913: 1867, Gunkel 1915: XXXIII). The 
true prophets regarded themselves simply as God’s servants and they be-
lieved that they were God’s instrument (“Werkzeug”) (Weber 2005b: 616, 
626). This was clearly true for Amos; it was less true for Isaiah. The latter 
tended to speak in the first person and used the third person in regard to 
God; the former constantly used variations of “God spoke” (Giesebrecht 
1897: 41). God does not “speak about this or that”; his message is a simple 
“powerful unity” (Giesebrecht 1897: 49). Often, though, the message was 
not heard and the messenger reviled. It was rare that a prophet was offered 
remuneration, but when it was, the prophet refused it (Weber 2001: 179–
180). Mostly the prophet is in fear for his life and his honor (Weber 2005: 
615). This is especially true of the political prophets who draw attention to 
corruption and injustice and warn of the sinking power and the rising 
threats (Weber 2005: 654). Often they are forbidden to speak to the people 
or on the streets, and Weber likens this to the modern issue of freedom of 
the press (Weber 2005: 613). Prophets were seen as a threat to the existing 
ruler and there was some validity to this fear. The prophets themselves did 
not see their missions to replace one set of human orders with another, but 
to divinely usurp them (Weber 2001: 185). Unfortunately, most of the proph-
ets were Cassandra-like in nature and, as Weber pointed out, most often the 
people did not heed them (Giesebrecht 1897: 14, Hölscher 1914:239, Weber 
2001: 194).
Amos, Jeremiah, and Isaiah
These three prophets hold a special place in the history of Old Testament 
prophets and just as importantly they have a special meaning for Max We-
ber. They had certain key beliefs and convictions that animated their con-
duct and determined their lives. Amos is the oldest of the great Old Testa-
ment prophets and serves as the best introduction to certain of their charac-
teristics. Jeremiah is the purest and illustrates the prophet at the “highest 
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perfection” and, according to Marianne Weber, held a particular fascination 
for her husband (Cornill 1891: 174, 154; M. Weber 1926: 605). Weber be-
lieved that Amos and Jeremiah were the “most powerful of the writing 
prophets” (Weber 2005b: 432). Isaiah is probably one of the most tragic of 
the prophets and, as I will show, plays a particularly important role in We-
ber’s own thinking (see Cornill 1891: 132). Finally, Weber himself makes 
considerable use of these three in his own writings on ancient Judaism. 
Amos was a raw and harsh man who wished to live a simple life, but God 
“called” him and told him to prophesize (Weber 2005b: 307, 620–621; Sellin 
1912: 29, 31; Duhm 1916: 94). Amos rejected the name “Nabi” and he insist-
ed that he was no learned prophet nor did he belong to any community of 
prophets (Weber 2001: 180, Giesebrecht 1897: 7; Hölsher 1914: 196). God 
compelled him to speak because the people had turned against him. Instead, 
they lived immoral lives, practiced a perverse religion, and worshipped a 
cult-like, false God (Weber 2005b: 626–631; Sellin 1912: 32). The old values 
were gone; now it was the egoistical individual against what remained of the 
community, the rich against the poor, and the higher class against the lower 
one (Hölscher 1914: 192). The richer people would sell things at such inflated 
prices so that the poor were forced into slavery. This allowed the rich to 
spend more and more on drink – at the cost of the poor (Hölsher 1914: 204). 
Drunkenness was everywhere and orgies were frequent (Weber 2005b: 510). 
All of this prompted God to have Amos “speak” – but Amos almost always 
claimed that his words are God’s words (Hölsher 1914: 196). Amos’ speeches 
were not like those of the older “prophets” – he had no hallucinations and he 
did not speak in a half-understandable language. He was not forced to speak 
by some mystical power nor was he moved by some poetic force (Duhm 
1916: 91). Nor did he preach by giving lengthy speeches. Instead, he spoke 
briefly with sharp, clear logic but with pathos and passion. His “truly, pas-
sionate anger stemmed” from the immorality of the people; this intensity 
prompted Duhm to call Amos “the prophet of anger” (Duhm 1916: 93, 95). 
All of the plagues that the people suffered – famine and drought, war and 
earthquakes – may have been sent by God but the people brought them on 
themselves because of their immoral acts (Hölscher 1914: 194; Weber 2005b: 
551). God did not demand this or that – he demanded one, simple, but im-
portant, thing: justice (Hölsher 1914: 203). Amos warned of the “coming 
catastrophe” if the people did not return to God’s ways (Giesebrecht 1897: 
11; Hölscher 1914: 196; Duhm 1916: 89). 
Jeremiah also saw that his people had fallen into drunkenness and de-
bauchery and he, too, wanted to save his people (Duhm 1903: XIII, XXIV). 
Like some of the other prophets, Jeremiah initially resisted God’s com-
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mandment that he speak, saying that “I am too young” (See Sellin 1912: 63). 
Unlike Amos and some of the earlier prophets, Jeremiah seemed to care less 
about the community and cared more about the individual. That is why he 
spent so much time wandering the streets and alleys “testing” people (Duhm 
1903: XIV, XXIII; Duhm 1916: 253). He apparently sought their “inner per-
son” in hopes of finding something good; but he was almost always disap-
pointed (Duhm 1916: 255–256). Duhm suggested that Jeremiah had little 
regard for the community with its “letter of the law” and instead concen-
trated on the individual who had the “spirit of ethics” (Duhm 1903: XIV; 
Sellin 1912: 64). Yet, Duhm also emphasized that Jeremiah was probably the 
most politically active and most politically influential of all of the great 
prophets (Duhm 1903: XVI-XVII). 
If Amos came from a family of shepherds and Jeremiah from a family of 
priests, Isaiah came from a noble background (Duhm 1916: 145, 171). As was 
fitting for someone of that stature, it was incumbent upon him to fight 
against wrongs. Rather than doing so from any official position, Isaiah was 
determined to follow his calling as prophet (Marti 1900: XX). Perhaps with 
some justification, some people have suggested that Isaiah was the “prince” 
among the prophets, but much of this had to do with his specific task (Sellin 
1912: 42). It was his duty to speak of the coming collapse and to constantly 
warn of the impending dark day of doom (Duhm 1916: 151, 157, 161). In-
stead of the typical prophetic complaint about injustice and the oppression 
of the poor, Isaiah was more concerned about the corrupting politics of the 
powerful (Hölscher 1915: 238, 244). Isaiah warned of the Assyrian threat but 
he also warned of the mistake of seeking Egypt’s aid. It was not that he had 
some blind hatred of foreigners; rather, he had a full understanding of the 
political risks associated with accepting such help (Duhm 1916: 164, Sellin 
1912: 135). The people had brought on this misfortune by seeking riches, 
power and honor rather than in being law-abiding and just (Marti 1900: 
XXI; Duhm 1916: 171, 174). If Isaiah had a defining objection to the people, 
it was his contempt for their overwhelming arrogance (Hölscher 1914: 249). 
All of these prophets objected not just to the way in which many of the Is-
raelis chose to live their lives, they condemned them for their willful rejec-
tion of the agreement that they had with God. Weber was interested in them 
not only because of their historical and sociological importance, but because 
of their significance as political and ethical leaders.
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Weber and Modern Prophets
Weber had completed his studies on Hinduism and Buddhism during the 
summer of 1916 and by the Fall he was working on ancient Judaism. He had 
been very interested in comparing the Eastern religions, but his interest in 
Judaism seemed even greater. Marianne testified that his study of the Old 
Testament prophets made a significant impact on her husband. Writing in 
her biography Max Weber. Ein Lebensbild she noted how he found the great 
Old Testament prophets exceptionally appealing, because they were the 
“first historically certifiable political demagogues” and their writings were 
the “earliest, immediately contemporary political pamphlets” (M. Weber 
1926: 604). However, she noted that Weber’s interest in them was not purely 
scholarly; and she suggested that he was personally drawn to them. This was 
because they acted whenever great powers threatened their homeland (M. 
Weber 1926: 604). Marianne believed that of all of the prophets, it was Jere-
miah who held the greatest fascination for her husband and for her. She 
wrote that Jeremiah was forced to speak and that of which he spoke was 
extremely powerful. However, Jeremiah’s words were met with contempt 
and ridicule. While “charisma was his privilege”, he had no interest in gain-
ing sway over his disciples in the manner in which a Christian charismatic 
leader did. Instead, Jeremiah’s “pathos was inner loneliness”. Marianne 
wrote that when Max read to her about Jeremiah, she saw her husband’s own 
destiny.125 There is much to be said for Marianne’s selection of Jeremiah as 
the most important prophet for her husband – especially the fact that Jere-
miah was one of the most political of them. Yet, there are many things that 
speak against her choice. As Sellin pointed out, we know more about Jere-
miah than virtually any other prophet and that he stands closest to us as a 
human being (Sellin 1912: 62). But, his psychological makeup is completely 
foreign to Weber’s; Jeremiah’s heart is warm and soft, and if he had not been 
called to become a prophet, undoubtedly he would have become a poet (Sel-
lin 1912: 68; Hölscher 1914: 269, 275; Duhm 1916: 244). He possessed the 
greatest naiveté and his life was filled with a tension between duty and love, 
or as Schmidt wrote between the softness of his nature and the hardness of 
his task (Giesebrecht 1894: XI; Hölscher 1914: 269; Schmidt 1915: 201). Ernst 
Troeltsch, Weber’s friend and colleague, set out the opposition between 
Amos and Jeremiah in a work which he acknowledged relied heavily on 
Weber’s just published Hebraic study. In “Glaube und Ethos der hebräis-
125 “Wenn er der Gefährtin abends daraus vorlas, so sah sie in manchem sein eignes Schick-
sal.” M. Weber 1926: 605.
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chen Propheten” Troeltsch argued that Jeremiah embodied love and inner 
warmth, in contrast to Amos with his sense of force and the majesty of God 
(Troeltsch 1925: 46). Giesebrecht and Sellin also noted that Jeremiah had no 
majestic spirit and they pointed out that he lacked a sense of darkness and 
pessimism (Giesebrecht 1894: X, Sellin 1912: 68). While Jeremiah was an 
important prophet, he was not the best voice to warn against the approach-
ing dark times. Instead that voice belonged to Amos. And, it was Amos who 
can serve as the best example for Weber and his belief in the urgent need for 
a modern charismatic prophet.     
Perhaps more than any of the other prophets, Amos cared about nothing 
more than about morality (Wellhausen 1914: 107). As Wellhausen wrote: 
“Angry and destroying, making holy reality valid, she [the truth] decimates 
the illusion and the vain.”126 Schmidt maintained that Amos rejected false 
equality and hopeless ideals, but was always concerned with justice and re-
sponsibility (Schmidt 1917: 43, 63, 69). Cornill believed that Amos had the 
greatest sense of righteousness and that he incorporated the moral law (“Sit-
tengesetze”). Religious feeling was not a “comfortable resting pillow” (“be-
queme Ruhekissen”) but was an “ethical demand” (“ethische Forderung”) 
(Cornill 1894: 44). Consequently, Amos spoke “hard words” (“harte Worte”) 
with “strong passion” (“heftige Leidenschaft”) (Gretzmann 1910: 322). 
Amos had sufficient grounds for his beliefs and he was certain of his warn-
ings. (Smend 1899: 180). He recognized that it was his duty to use the power 
of his words to warn others of the impending dangers and to compel them 
to change their ways. It is mostly Amos’ concern for the future that seems to 
have drawn Weber’s attention the most. 
As the war continued Weber became increasingly more pessimistic about 
Germany’s future, and with Germany’s loss and the resulting political up-
heaval he was even more concerned. In his post-war scholarly writings and 
in his later university lectures, Weber adhered to his dictum of avoiding 
making value judgments and instead offered mostly dispassionate accounts 
of general constitutional issues. However, in his open lectures he was very 
personal and extremely passionate about questions of leadership. He warned 
against childish idealism and romantic dilettantism. He cautioned the older 
generation against its longing for an idealized past in which order and stabil-
ity reigned. He warned the younger generation against yearning for a future 
utopia in which there would be freedom, justice, and equality for all. Most 
importantly, Weber warned of “false prophets”. Towards the end of Politik 
126 “Zornig, zerstörend macht sich die heilige Realität geltend; sie vernichtet den Schein 
und das Eitle.” Wellhausen 1906: 23.
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als Beruf he spoke scathingly about the little “Kathederpropheten” of the 
auditoriums and the radical “dictators of the streets” (“Diktatoren der 
Straße”) (Weber 1992: 110, 223). Both types are dilettantes and they suffer 
from vanity and self-delusion (Weber 1992: 105, 176, 183). They take them-
selves too seriously and do not regard the situation seriously enough; in-
stead of maintaining the “proper distance” (“Augenmaß”) to themselves and 
to the issues, they engage in “intellectual frivolity” (Weber 1992: 227–229). 
Worse still, they excuse whatever costly errors and deadly mistakes they 
make with the simple declaration that they have “noble intentions” (Weber 
1992: 234). As the Old Testament prophets warned of the future, Weber 
warned the students not to anticipate the blooms of the summer day but 
should instead be prepared for the “polar night of icy darkness”.127  
Max Weber’s companion speech Wissenschaft als Beruf is primarily about 
the nature of the scholar, but it is also about the future of Germany. This is 
especially evident in the closing pages of the work where he speaks of Ger-
many’s destiny and of the disenchantment of the world (Weber 1992: 109). 
He also speaks of the “swindle and self-delusion” of seeking mystical reve-
lations in book stores and he warned again of the fanatical sects of the “Ka-
the der prophetie” (Weber 1992: 109–110). The “Kathederpropheten” were 
the modern equivalents to the “lying prophets”; so instead Weber invokes 
the “true prophets” and quotes the Isaiah-Oracle “Duma” (Isaiah, 21, 11/12): 
Es kommt ein Ruf aus Seir in Edom: Wächter, wie lang ist es Nacht? Der Wächter 
spricht: Es kommt Morgen, aber noch ist es Nacht. Wenn ihr fragen wollt, kommt ein 
ander Mal wieder. (Weber 1992: 111).128
Zu mir ruft’s von Seir: Wächter, wie weit in der Nacht, Wächter, wie weit in der 
Nacht? Spricht der Wächter: Es kommt Morgen und auch Nacht – Wenn ihr fragen 
wollt, fragt, kehre wieder, kommt! (Duhm 1902: 126).
As Marti pointed out, Edom was a perpetual wasteland and was in chronic 
need. Marti also noted that because the question is repeated, indicates the 
urgency of the situation (Marti 1900: 166). In Duhm’s opinion, day and night 
are symbolic and represent the ending of oppression and hunger and the 
beginning of freedom and happiness (Duhm 1902: 126–127; Marti 1900: 166). 
What struck Duhm, was the objectivity and neutrality and the insistence on 
factuality (Duhm 1902: 127). What struck both Duhm and Marti, was that 
127 Weber 1992: 251. Loewenstein, who heard both Beruf lectures, recounted how Weber 
had set out in “unmerciful clarity the thorn-filled path of the politician”. Loewenstein 1966: 
34.
128 From Seir in Edom comes a call: Watchman, how much longer is the night? The watch-
man speaks: The morning comes but it is still night. If you want to ask, come another time.
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the watchman could not offer a clear answer, hence the suggestion for the 
person to come back and again ask (Duhm 1902: 127; Marti 1900: 166). 
Weber immediately comments on this passage that we know that the Jews 
had asked and had waited for two thousand years, and that we also know of 
their heart-wrenching fate. The lesson that Weber says we should draw from 
this is that simply asking and waiting is insufficient by itself; instead, we 
must attend to our work and face the “demands of the day”. Implicit in We-
ber’s comments is that the age of the Old Testament prophets who had 
placed all of their faith in God had long since passed. In Nietzsche’s famous 
phrase, “God is dead”; or, in Weber’s own admission that he was “unmusical 
in religious matters”, there is no God to help us. He believed that we must 
meet our fate alone. However, this recognition should not lead us to despair. 
It was Nietzsche who insisted that pessimism need not be just a symptom of 
decline and instead spoke of a “pessimism of strength”.129 We are on our 
own to meet our fate; what we must have is intellectual honesty and political 
responsibility (Weber 1992: 110, 226). If we have both of those virtues and if 
we listen to our “Dämon”, then, as Weber says, “It is simple and easy…to 
hold on to life’s threads.”130 At the end of Politik als Beruf Weber insists that 
the person who can lead must not only be a “leader” (“Führer”), but also a 
“hero” (“Held”) (Weber 1992: 252). Malamat suggested that the Judges in 
the Old Testament were not just leaders, but they were also charismatic he-
roes (Malamat 1981: 113). And, they were “daemonic” – in Weber’s sense.
It was Weber’s scholarly source Hermann Gunkel who drew attention to 
the “daemonic” nature of the Old Testament prophets and their “tragic call-
ing” (Gunkel 1913: 1872, 1867). But, it was Weber’s close friend Karl Jaspers 
who wrote that the “daemonic” is found deep within certain special individ-
uals and that it is the most powerful force that moves their entire being 
(Jaspers 1919: 169). There are, of course, significant differences between Max 
Weber and some of these Old Testament prophets; they were moved by their 
religious feelings, whereas Weber was moved by his love for Germany. 
However, Weber not only recognized kindred spirits, but he realized that 
their sense of conviction and responsibility and their passionate need to 
speak unpleasant truths was similar to the need for political leaders.131 For 
129 Nietzsche 1988: 12. See also Lawrence Scaff’s penetrating comments. Scaff 1989, 68–71.
130 Weber’s use of “Dämon” can be taken as referring to one’s “inner self.” Both Scaff and 
Wolfgang Schluchter point to Goethe, and it is the latter who suggests that it means “individ-
uality” and “character”. Schluchter 2009: 15. The whole passage is: “Die aber ist schlicht und 
einfach, wenn jeder den Dämon findet und ihm gehorcht, der seines Lebens Fäden hält.” We-
ber 1992: 111. 
131 Karl Loewenstein, who was twenty years old when he first met Weber in 1912 has given 
one of the best portraits of Weber the man. In 1964, he remembered that Weber was a “great, 
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him, the Old Testament prophets served as important examples of the truly 
charismatic leaders who tended to appear in troubled times. There is no 
question that Rudolph Sohm was the historical source for Weber’s concep-
tion of charisma; but there should be little doubt Weber regarded the Old 
Testament prophets as exemplars for the modern political leader.
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Chapter Seven
Weber and “Kulturprotestantismus”
Max Weber’s Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus is 
regarded as a “classical text.” However, Heinz Steinert has observed, “every-
one knows it, but nobody reads it.” (Steinert 2010: 11). Steinert insisted that 
if we do read it, that we will understand it only if we know its historical 
context (Steinert 2010: 13, 16–17, 31). The historical context of Die pro tes-
tan tische Ethik is, as he emphasizes, protestantisch. To understand Die pro-
testantische Ethik we need to understand what Protestantism was for Weber 
and for Weber’s Germany. The critical need for this historical understand-
ing of Protestantism is demanded by a reading of the very first pages. The 
first part is entitled “Das Problem”, but as Steinert observes, Weber does not 
begin with a statement of a problem; he begins by introducing “doubtful 
statistics” regarding the economic and social differences between Protes-
tants and Catholics in Germany. These statistics were taken from the recent 
work by Weber’s former student Martin Offenbacher regarding the south-
ern German state of Baden and are buttressed by his own, earlier research 
on East Prussia (Steinert 2010: 42). These statistics are designed to show that 
Protestants emphasize the ethic of work and that Catholics do not. This 
belief in the superiority of Protestantism was not peculiar to Weber; rather, 
it was embedded in German culture throughout most of the nineteenth 
 century. Steinert insists that to comprehend Weber’s writing, we need to 
understand its culture, meaning that we must be familiar with the relevant 
traditions and controversies. The tradition that Steinert has in mind is “Kul-
turprotestantismus” and the controversy that Steinert refers to is the “Kul-
turkampf.” “Kulturprotestantismus” refers to the belief in the greatness of 
Protestant theology and culture. Weber insisted that he was not religious, 
but he was well-versed in the culture of German Protestantism. Weber was 
brought up in a Protestant household and he continued to be interested in 
Protestant religion and culture. He frequently published his writings in 
“Die Christliche Welt”, one of the main organs of Protestant political cul-
ture. At Heidelberg he was a very close friend and colleague of the Protes-
tant theologian Ernst Troeltsch and he was a member of the Eranos-Kreis, 
which was devoted to investigating religious questions (Steinert 2010: 51). 
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“Kulturkampf” refers to the great “Protestant offensive” in the struggle be-
tween the two Christian Confessions over the issue of authority: State or 
Church? (Steinert 2010: 27). While this controversy was more or less con-
fined to the 1870s, its after effects were still apparent when Weber was writ-
ing Die protestantische Ethik.
Steinert reminds us that while we must accept the edition of Die protes-
tantische Ethik that is found in the 1920 edition of the Gesammelte Aufsätze 
zur Religionssoziologie as the “definitive work”, we must also remember 
that it was written as a two-part essay during 1904 and 1905. While Weber 
made important additions to the 1920 version, it is fundamentally a turn of 
the century work. Consequently, it predates the First World War, the Rus-
sian revolutions, and the German ones. Steinert also reminds us that it is 
centered primarily on “Arbeit als Beruf” and insists that the 1920 “Vorbe-
merkung”, with its emphasis on Occidental rationality, “definitively does 
not belong” to Die protestantische Ethik (Steinert 2010: 30). He maintains 
that only by recognizing these points and understanding its context can we 
understand this work. He also insists that Weber’s writing may be clothed 
as a “scholarly investigation” but, is in fact, really a “Kampfschrift.” It is not 
a scientific account but is a religious pamphlet – one designed to show the 
superiority of Protestantism. Steinert may not be completely correct in his 
analysis; but he is certainly right to insist that we put “protestantische” back 
into Die protestantische Ethik. 
It is my intention to honor Heinz Steinert by adding to his work which 
stresses the considerable importance that “Kulturprotestantismus” had for 
Max Weber. I will first build upon Steinert’s brief treatment of “Kultur pro-
tes tan tismus.” Second, I will add to his short discussion of Bismarck’s “Kul-
turkampf.” Third, I will discuss four of the most important and relevant 
cultural speeches which were given in honor of Luther’s 400th birthday. The 
speeches were given by Julius Köstlin, Albrecht Ritschl, Adolf Harnack, 
and by Heinrich von Treitschke, one of the greatest Protestant politicians. 
In the fourth section, I will discuss the impact that he had on Max Weber. 
Weber had a very complex reaction to Treitschke as a man and to his think-
ing. Like his contemporaries, Weber was immersed in the discussions about 
Protestantism and culture; but for him, Treitschke practically embodied 
some of the beliefs and values of Protestantism, culture, and politics. Con-
sequently, nineteenth-century German Protestantism is one of the most im-




The term “Kulturprotestantismus” is problematic. While most scholars 
agree that the term is polemical and that it was used to justify the belief in 
the cultural superiority of Protestantism over Catholicism, “Kulturprotes-
tantismus” does have many meanings (Graf 1984: 214–215; Hübinger 1994: 
7). There is also some question about how long it has been in use; some trace 
it back to 1920 while Steinert seems to suggest its origins are more recent. 
This claim that it is more recent is supported by the fact that in the third 
edition of the six-volume Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart there is no 
separate entry for “Kulturprotestantismus.” (RGG III). There is also the 
issue of who coined the term; Friedrich Wilhelm Graf quotes from Manfred 
Schick’s 1970 dissertation that the originator of the term has not yet been 
discovered (Graf 1984: 214). Finally, there is the question about the begin-
nings as well as the duration of “Kulturprotestantismus”, with some schol-
ars suggesting that it ranged from 1900 to 1914 while others have insisted 
that it began about a decade earlier. Still others consider that “Kulturprotes-
tantismus” began as a movement when the “Protestantenverein” was first 
formed around 1865 while still others suggest that it covers an epoch; from 
Schleiermacher to Troeltsch (Graf 1984: 214–215; Hübinger 1994: 26). 
It is to Schleiermacher’s credit that religion was no longer despised by the 
cultured and the intellectuals and it is to Hegel’s credit that theology could 
be understood historically. It is to the credit of both of them that their stu-
dents took that positive interest in theology and religion and transformed it 
from being simply a matter of faith into the subject of serious scholarly con-
cern. This was demonstrated in a number of ways, first, by the new journals 
that the students of Schleiermacher and Hegel founded. Although the edi-
tors and contributors to journals, such as the Theologische Jahrbücher and 
the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, held differing viewpoints that repre-
sented their schools; they all shared the interest in developing an historical 
account of Christianity. Second, this is manifested by a number of historical 
works, such as Leben Jesu, by David Strauß, and the multi-volume history 
of dogma by F.C. Baur and the massive history of the Church by August 
Neander. Third, it is shown by the existence of a scholarly encyclopedia; 
several scholars had this idea and it became the Real-Encyklopädie für pro-
tes tantische Theologie und Kirche. This eighteen volume work was to have 
been under the editorship of Matthias Schneckenburger, who figures prom-
inently in Die protestantische Ethik; but his early death meant that his influ-
ence was restricted primarily to the first volume (Hundeshagen: 1860: 
Band13: 618; Sieffert 1899: Band 7: 786). Fourth, scholars turned their atten-
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tion to Luther’s life and work. According to Adolf Harnack, two of the most 
important treatments of Luther’s biography and theology were the books by 
Julius Köstlin and Harnack’s father Theodosius (Harnack, A. 1890: 700, 
note  2). According to Theodosius Harnack, Luther had two conceptions of 
God: the hidden God and the revealed one. The first is the “deus abscondi-
tus” that will also be found particularly in Calvin and, by extension, Max 
Weber. This Deity is the creator God who cannot be fathomed. This is also 
the Deity that Luther refers to as the “God outside of Christ”. This Deity is 
in contrast to the “God in Christ”; that is, the “Savior God”. The first is the 
God of wrath (“Zorn”); the second is the God of love (“Liebe”) (Harnack, 
T. 1927: Band I: 85–87, 93, 94, 96, 102–103). The first God is the God of pre-
destination, who out of wrath has damned people to Hell: He is to be feared. 
However, Harnack maintains that Luther gave up this unconditional deter-
minism soon after 1525. Instead of maintaining that most people were eter-
nally damned, Luther now believed that God wants all to be saved. Instead 
of unconditional wrath there is unconditional love. This is Luther’s “an-
ti-predestination” doctrine which then lays great weight on the notion of the 
“eternal, fatherly, grace giving” will. (Harnack, T. 1927: I: 111–112, 136, 145, 
166–168, 178–179).
Although Harnack’s Luthers Theologie was important and influential, 
the writings by Julius Köstlin were probably more important. Köstlin was 
partially responsible for the beginning of the Weimar edition of Luther’s 
works as well as the later and much shorter Braunschweig edition (Eck 1912: 
Band III: 1580). Besides writing all three lengthy entries on Luther for the 
Realencyklopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche he also wrote 
two massive works on Luther. In his entry on Luther for the first edition 
Köstlin reasonably complained that no one had yet provided a full scientific 
account of Luther’s theology (Köstlin 1857: Band 8: 617). Köstlin’s entry was 
scientific and objective; however, despite its 40 pages in length, it was not a 
full account. The response to this entry was so overwhelming that Köstlin 
decided to write his biographical and theological works on Luther. It was 
with some pride and a fair amount of justification that Julius Köstlin could 
claim to have offered the first complete and scientifically written Luther bi-
ography (Köstlin 1881: Band 9: 74). He was referring to his two volume 
Martin Luther, sein Leben und seine Schriften. Köstlin did not intend his 
biography to appeal only to other scholars; he wrote it more for popular 
consumption. However, he intended his two volume work Luthers Theolo-
gie to be read by educated people. This two volume work appeared in 1863 
with a second edition in 1883.
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Köstlin’s Luthers Theologie can be said to be divided into three parts. Part 
one is devoted to setting out Luther’s life until approximately 1523, thereby 
chronicling Luther’s early years. These years include his life as a monk and 
as a professor. And, they especially include his many vigorous fights against 
the Catholic Church. The second part focuses on Luther’s life from roughly 
1523 until his death. Köstlin devotes most of this part to discussions con-
cerning Luther’s theological disputes with other Reformers. The third part 
is Köstlin’s attempt to provide a systematic discussion of Luther’s theology.
In part one, Köstlin shows Luther’s “negative” side. That is, he shows how 
and why Luther’s antagonism towards the Pope and the Church prompted 
him to insist on its radical reformation. Köstlin aptly demonstrates that Lu-
ther’s complaint was not with the overall practice of Indulgences; rather, he 
was concerned with the Pope’s own misuse of that practice as well as his 
countenance of others’ abuse of it (Köstlin 1883a: I 180–247). This misuse 
prompted Luther to question the Church’s authority, both in the personal 
form of the Pope and in the institutional form of the Catholic Church. As 
Köstlin repeatedly stresses, Luther’s objections were not capricious but were 
firmly based upon Scripture. Thus, based upon the Bible, Luther questioned 
the Catholic account that provided Peter with the sole authority over reli-
gious matters. In Luther’s opinion, it was bad enough that the Pope claimed 
control over both churchly and earthly realms. But, it was even worse in that 
the Pope demanded total “oriental submission.” Furthermore, as an institu-
tion the Church tried to justify this use of Papal force, which Luther re-
ferred to as the “tyranny of the hierarchy”. In other passages, Luther is more 
specific, calling it the “Roman hierarchy.” (Köstlin 1883a: Band I: 212, 253–
259, 267–271. See also 342–346). Furthermore, Köstlin shows that Luther 
had not only a firm understanding of both the Old and the New Testament 
but of the Church Fathers as well. And, he used that knowledge against the 
abuses by the Pope and by the Church. Consequently, Luther had consider-
able respect for Moses and the Law; it is just that Christ and grace replaced 
them. Furthermore, Köstlin shows how much Luther understood the teach-
ings of the Church Fathers. He shows how much Luther took from Augus-
tine and from other mystics. His latter rejection of mysticism was only par-
tial: he always believed in mystic’s sense of Jesus’ inner dwelling; he rejected 
the extreme subjectivity of certain mystically inclined people.132 
Köstlin details Luther’s objections against the “traditional” church prac-
tices. Thus, he argues against the church practice of celibacy and its refusal 
132 Köstlin, 1883: Band I, 139–140, 145, 153, and II, 75, 243, 259–263. The question of Lu-
ther’s mysticism in general and his use of Tauler in particular, are crucial issues for Max We-
ber.
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to allow marriage. He also takes it to task for the practices of general Mass 
and private confession. He condemns the church practices of praying to the 
Virgin Mary and the saints for protection and intercession. Finally, he argues 
against the traditional church belief in Purgatory. Köstlin again underscores 
Luther’s contention that his arguments are not merely his; rather, that they 
rest upon the authority of Scripture. And, the Catholic Church cannot claim 
to be a higher authority than the Bible (Köstlin 1883a: Band II: 4–33, 50). 
In the third part Köstlin discusses Luther’s positive theology. Most im-
portant is Luther’s insistence that the sole authority is the “Word”, that is, 
Holy Scripture. Köstlin cites Luther’s insistence that it is better to have more 
faith in a lay person who acts in accordance to the Bible than it is to have 
faith in the Pope who does not. In Luther’s view, grace and truth belong to 
Jesus and not in the hand of any person (Köstlin 1883a: Band I: 246, 277, 
281). The Bible is the norm and the source for how a Christian should con-
duct his or her life. The Bible is, for Luther, the “objective” word of God and 
it contains the real truth (Köstlin 1883a: Band I: 249, 252–255, 286). The Bi-
ble, according to Luther, tells us to have faith in God and that the only way 
to heaven comes through Jesus Christ. Thus, Luther discounts the impor-
tance of the notion of a church and he bases this in part on Jesus’ remark that 
where two or three come together that is where he will be. The church is 
nothing more or less than the community of the holy ones; that is the com-
munity of the believers (Köstlin 1883a: Band II: 434–436, 444, 534–536). 
Köstlin’s account of Luther’s positive theology lacks some force; Köstlin 
gives a far better picture of Luther as critic and fighter. 
For many German theologians, Köstlin’s interpretation of Luther’s theol-
ogy was more influential than that of Harnack. However, Harnack’s inter-
pretation seems to have had more of an impact on Troeltsch. It is likely that 
Max Weber’s discussion in the Die protestantische Ethik of the two Gods 
relies on Ernst Troeltsch’s recommendation of Harnack’s Luthers Theolo-
gie. In his important contribution on Luther and the modern world in Das 
Christentum from 1908, Troeltsch writes that in his opinion, Harnack’s 
presentation is the best to date (Troeltsch, 1908: 161). What is odd is that 
Troeltsch had not even mentioned Harnack’s work in his discussion of Lu-
ther in his 1906 edition of Protestantisches Christentum und Kirche in der 
Neuzeit. If more people had adopted Harnack’s views, the “Kuturkampf” 




Luther’s theological concern about religious issues in the sixteenth century 
had prompted him to take issue with Church authority; by the nineteenth 
century political issues were beginning to cast doubt on religious authority. 
While the German Revolution of 1848 never materialized, many of the lib-
eral sentiments that underlie it continued for decades. At the beginning of 
the 1870/1871 War there was an outpouring of national sentiment. Bismarck 
wished to take advantage of such feelings of unity to extend northern Ger-
many’s influence to the south. While the Constitution of 1871 was a com-
promise of sorts, Bismarck was able to consolidate power over almost all of 
Germany. As Nipperdey writes, after 1871, there were two major issues that 
concerned Germans: one was the extension of the German Constitution 
from just a document to something more significant which would control 
peoples’ lives (Nipperdey 1998: 75, 85). The other was the “Kulturkampf.” 
This was a struggle between Protestants and Catholics and has been de-
scribed as a conflict between state and church (Hartmann 1995: 365). It re-
volved around the issue of authority. Which had the higher authority: the 
State or the Church? Rudolf Sohm noted that some educated Catholics 
strongly objected to the Papal claim (Sohm 1888: 179; Mulert 1913: Band V: 
1432–1434). However, most German Catholics believed that they owed their 
allegiance not to Germany, but to “over the mountains” – meaning to Rome. 
Originally, the term “Ultramontanism” had only a geographical mean-
ing: “beyond the mountain” and it stemmed from the Middle Ages when 
German students would go “over the mountains” to study at Bologna and 
other schools (Beurath 1908: Band 20: 215; Mulert 1913: Band V: 1430). But, 
by 1871 it had begun to take on political and religious overtones. The origin 
of the conflict can be centered on the doctrine of Papal infallibility which 
the Vatican announced in July 1870.133 The doctrine was based upon the 
“absolute certainty” of the supreme wisdom of the Pope when he spoke “ex 
cathedra” and therefore demanded “absolute respect.” (Köhler 1910: Band 
II: 782). Furthermore, this demand for absolute obedience was interpreted 
to mean obedience to the Pope in religious and moral matters, but also in 
every other matter as well. In short, the “Roman question” had to do with 
the resurgence in the belief in the Pope’s domination of the world. (Nipper-
dey 1998: 364–365, 370; Beurath 1908: Band 20: 217). Thus, Harnack sug-
gested that on the basis of the Pope’s claims, one could choose the year 1870 
133 This was the latest in a series of controversial decrees; the first was the decree of 1854 
regarding the Virgin birth which was followed by the one ten years later which rejected mod-
ern principles. See Nipperdey 1998: 428.
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as the founding of the Papacy. The Pope had ruled over not just the Church 
but over the entire world in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, so the claim 
was that the contemporary Pope wanted to do the same. (Harnack 1911: 
213). The term “Kulturkampf” began to circulate in 1872; the high point 
occurred two years later with assassination attempts on Bismarck’s life by 
Catholic supporters (Foerster 1912: Band VI: 1810). By the late 1870s, how-
ever, the liberal era was over and the stridency of the “Kulturkampf” had 
ebbed to some degree.134 However, the Bismarckian sense of nation and the 
belief in progress increased while Catholics continued to believe in interna-
tionalism and Papal authority.
Luther’s Commemoration
Probably the single most important year for “Kulturprotestantismus” was 
1883, the 400th commemoration of Luther’s birth. This celebration was par-
tially a reaction to Catholicism, but more so, it was the outpouring of im-
mense pride in this great German. Celebrations were held everywhere – in 
large cities and small towns. Virtually every major thinker was asked to give 
a speech. However, each celebration and every speech needs to be consid-
ered in relation to the “Kulturkampf.” That is why there is so much empha-
sis on Luther’s enormous contributions to every aspect of German life; not 
just theologically, but literary, scientifically, and even politically.
There were numerous speeches that deserve attention, but here I consider 
the four given by Köstlin, Ritschl, Harnack, and Treitschke. All four 
speeches emphasized Luther’s greatness and in varying degrees all four in-
cluded defences against some of the Catholic charges. However, each of the 
four speakers stressed what he thought most important about Luther and 
his legacy.
If the other speeches were to emphasize Luther’s massive contributions to 
Germany, Köstlin’s speech was intended to provide a far more personal pic-
ture of him. Despite having published the massive biography that showed 
Luther in all his complexities as well as publishing the two-volume work 
treating Luther’s detailed theology, Köstlin took pains in his speech to show 
that fundamentally Luther was a person who believed in the good and sim-
ple German traits and who acted according to the dictates of his conscience. 
134 While there was considerable resistance by numerous Catholic teachers and officials, 
Nipperdey insists that the “Ultramontantists” won. They rejected the progress of the modern 
world and the “god of the people”, and instead embraced tradition and the hierarchical au-
thority of the Church. Nipperdey 1998: 428, 431, 436. 
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In this, he was going back to his entry on Luther in the first edition of the 
Real-encyklopädie (Köstlin 1860: Band 8: 576.). Köstlin insisted that despite 
Luther’s education and despite his fame, he never forgot that he was nothing 
more than a son of a German peasant. Moreover, he never forgot that he was 
a man of the people (Köstlin 1883b: 3, 4, 72). He was brought up with the 
belief that God was loving and merciful and he continued to hold that belief 
while he pursued his studies in philosophy. He was not very interested in 
typical disputes and he tended to approve of the values in the new human-
ism. However, the sudden death of a close friend was such a shock that he 
temporarily lost that belief and took the vows of a monk. At the Erfurt 
monastery Luther learned that his early belief in God’s love was naïve; in-
stead, God’s fundamental essence was power and will (Köstlin 1883b: 5–9, 
15). Luther’s basic hope and faith in God’s goodness was replaced by the 
belief in the Church’s form and authority. But, during this time he also be-
gan to read the mystic Tauler and while he took from him the mystic’s belief 
in the inner striving for the union with God he rejected the mystic’s meta-
physical inclinations as empty and abstract. In the same way, Luther object-
ed to scholastic philosophy as being both too abstract and too subtle (Köst-
lin 1883b: 19–20, 16, 61, 65). Köstlin paints Luther’s move towards reform as 
a move away from that which is abstract and foreign to something more 
simple and innate. That is why Köstlin emphasizes Luther’s sense of con-
science. When asked to recant, Luther said that he would not; when de-
manded to desist, Luther maintained that he could not. It was not a matter 
of external Church authority but was a matter of internal belief formed by 
his own reading of the Gospel. Furthermore, he rejected the attempt by 
anyone to substitute Luther’s authority for that of the Church: “You must 
not be Luther’s disciple but Christ’s” (Köstlin 1883b: 23–25, 30, 34, 38, 42, 
55). It was a matter of individual thought and faith, hence he insisted on 
freedom of conscience – claiming that “thinking is toll free”. Because Luther 
believed that each person must listen to God, he believed it important to 
ensure that each person could read the word of God; hence, his translation 
into simple, natural, German (Köstlin 1883b: 43, 53, 57, 70–71). In his sim-
ple, truly human manner, Luther represented the simple and truly human 
German “Volk” – and, this is what Köstlin wished to remind his audience 
(Köstlin 1883b: 4, 75). 
The second speech to be considered was given by Albrecht Ritschl. De-
spite the great amount that Ritschl wrote on theology, his speech given on 
November 10, 1883 in Göttingen, was the primary document in which he 
offered his portrait of Luther (Ritschl 1906: Band 17: 25). It is, in many ways, 
a true expression of Ritschl: It is powerful and personal; it is positive and 
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critical. It begins, however, in a rather surprising way. Ritschl reminds his 
audience that there are some who think that Luther was single-handedly 
responsible for all modern positive developments. He cites a book published 
80 years before, in which the author, a Frenchman by the name of Charles 
Villers, contended that Luther was responsible for modern science and the 
modern state. Luther was, in Villers’ view, one of the highest scientific au-
thorities. Furthermore, Luther provided the freedom in religion, morals, 
and history. In fact, for Villers, we have Luther to thank for the entire 
“Aufklärung” (“Enlightenment”) (Ritschl 1887: 5–6). 
In Ritschl’s opinion, these are great exaggerations, as are many of the 
Catholic accusations against him. However, Protestants tend to glorify Lu-
ther’s heroic character while ignoring his personal flaws. Here, Ritschl would 
neither defend Luther against the Catholic diatribes nor go into detail over 
Luther’s personal problems. Instead, he wishes to give an account of Luther’s 
historical greatness. Luther never wanted to be regarded as a pope nor as a 
prophet (Ritschl 1887: 6–7). And, in regards to modern culture, Luther was 
not responsible for modern science or for the modern state. In fact, many of 
the impulses for the “revolution” in the Church came not from Luther, but 
from the Mendicant Orders (“Bettelorden”) of the Church itself.135 
Luther’s greatness stems instead from his twin concerns with Christian 
freedom and Christian morality, both of which are based upon faith. Faith 
and trust in God were most important, patience and humility were also 
crucial.136 And, Luther’s greatness comes because of two worldly things that 
he stressed. One, instead of the emphasis on the Catholic doctrine of fleeing 
the world, Luther insisted on the importance of the world as part of God’s 
plan. Second, instead of the Catholic doctrine of the two groups – the high 
group of priests and low group of laymen, Luther emphasized the impor-
tance of work. It did not matter whether the person was engaged in the 
“high” priestly “Beruf” or the “low” “Beruf” of the common people; all 
were in the service of God (Ritschl 1887: 15–16).
135 Ritschl 1887: 9. The “Bettelorden” stem from the 13th Century. Heussi 1913: Band IV: 
441. They include the Franciscans, Dominicans, and certain groups of Augustiners, among 
others. Hauck 1897: Band 2: 671. Catholics tended to glorify these Orders for their lives ded-
icated to simplicity and poverty while minimizing the fact that these Orders grew out of the 
rejection of the Church’s power and wealth. Harnack offers an excellent but short account of 
their history and importance. Before the Thirteenth century monasteries were primarily 
filled with the sons of the nobility. But, because of the influence of St. Francis and others the 
poor as well as the rich went to live and study there. Harnack also credits the “Bettelorden” 
for the great scholastics as well as for the inspiration for the great artists of that century. Har-
nack 1904b: Band I: 128–132.
136 Ritschl 1887: 7, 9–10. Ritschl acknowledged that these were the virtues of the Stoics, but 
he stressed their importance for Christians. Ritschl 1887:11–14.
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In much of the second half of the speech Ritschl provides a short account 
of Church history. He begins by emphasizing that the Reformation did not 
spring full blown out of the Medieval Church like some Athena. Like Lu-
ther himself, many bishops and nobles had for some time objected to the 
Church’s power and wealth, and wanted a return to the notions of responsi-
bility and morality. The Reformation was not a total break from the Church. 
As with the Catholic Church, a number of Lutheran followers believed in 
the importance of the individual mystical union with God. And, Ritschl 
objected to this, believing that it meant a return to the world-fleeing, ascetic 
tendencies of the Catholic Church (Ritschl 1887: 17–22).
Unfortunately, the Catholic Church, the “Ultramontanists”, had em-
barked on an intentional overcoming of the Protestant Church. For 40 years, 
Ritschl insisted, the “Ultramontanists” had worked to stress their type of 
piety (Ritschl 1887: 23–26). But, Ritschl emphasized that Luther did not 
believe that true piety was found in the philosophy and rhetoric of the 
Catholic Church. It is not the knowledge of the visible Church that is im-
portant. Instead, what is of foremost importance is one’s personal faith and 
trust in God. Ritschl notes that without understanding this, one cannot un-
derstand Luther. Ritschl quotes from Luther: “If God is for us, who is 
against us?” Ritschl concludes by expressing his fervent conviction that 
Protestantism will be victorious (Ritschl 1887: 28–29).  
The speech that Adolf Harnack gave in Giessen on November 10, 1883 
would not have drawn as much attention as the one by Köstlin and Ritschl 
because he was not yet as famous as the others. He had yet to publish his 
Dogmengeschichte nor his Das Wesen des Christentums, but he had already 
made enough of a name for himself that his speech was bound to draw con-
siderable interest. Like Harnack’s earlier work, the title of his Luther speech 
indicates his scientific concern with history: “Martin Luther, in seiner Be-
deutung für die Geschichte der Wissenschaft und der Bildung.” As with 
Ritschl, Harnack contends that Luther’s significance in science and educa-
tion was great. Harnack counts Luther as an incomparable man and one of 
the very few people who have changed history in general and Germany in 
particular. Harnack claims that as Germans, “we speak with his words, 
judge by his standards, and we find the power of his spirit in our excellence 
as well as our failures.” (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 143–144). In spite of this, 
Harnack asks, how well do we really know him? Is he not too great for us? 
Is he not too distant from us? Is he not too resolute for us? How can we 
know this man who was both as powerful as a hero and yet as simple as a 
child? Only a master could answer these questions; Harnack restricts him-
self to sketching Luther’s significance in culture. Yet, even here there are 
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difficulties: Luther had not discovered something important, like the laws of 
gravitation. Nor, can one point to a single work and say, here is Luther, in 
the sense that one can consider that the Divine Comedy is Dante or perhaps 
Faust is Goethe. Only when we consider Luther in light of his religious con-
victions can one begin to understand him. His religious beliefs were the se-
crets and the strengths of his life. This meant dealing with the questions 
concerning the purpose and the goal of human life (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 
144–146).
For Harnack, Luther’s impact on science was only indirect; but, that is 
not to say that it was minimal. In fact, Harnack insists that it was maximal. 
To show this, Harnack suggests that we look back to the beginning of the 
Fifteenth century. At that time the Church was the fundamental power rul-
ing almost everything. For almost a thousand years the “dogmatic system” 
had scarcely changed. As Augustine had taught, so it remained. Theology 
was primary and all else was subservient, including science. Augustine 
taught a two-world doctrine: there is the sensible world and there is the 
spiritual one. And, while the Church maintained dominance in this world, 
it did so mostly because of its emphasis on a “world-fleeing metaphysic.” 
This particular type of metaphysic impeded all science (Harnack 1904a: 
Band I: 146–150).
As there was a doctrine of two worlds there was also a doctrine of two 
truths. One truth was valid for theology and the other was valid for philo-
sophy. But, the philosophical “truth” was mostly a weak protest against the 
“irrationality of Church dogma.” As things had been, so they seemed des-
tined to be forever. Harnack suggests that someone might wish to object to 
this picture because it appears to ignore the role of the Renaissance. But, he 
addresses this: while the Renaissance gave us the Humanists and rediscov-
ery of antiquity, it did not give us a way to a newly powerful morality or a 
means to discover the boundary lines between faith and knowledge, be-
tween spirit and nature, and between beauty and truth (Harnack 1904a: 
Band I: 153).
It was Martin Luther who gave us these; he rejected the philosophical and 
mystical conceptions of God, and he embraced the notion of the living God. 
No manner of Churchly asceticism could lead us to God; instead, it was a 
matter of free, individual faith. However, this freedom was not an “empty 
emancipation” or a freedom for some “subjectivity.” Rather, it was the rec-
ognition of our subservience to God and with that a freedom from all earth-
ly laws. In the love of God we find the highest law and the meaning of our 
lives (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 155).
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With Luther’s rejection of Church dogma and his demonstration that the 
Church was not infallible, it appeared that the foundation of civilization was 
foundering. This was enormously significant, because it meant not only the 
break with the Church of the Middle Ages, but it also meant a return to the 
source. Instead of placing his trust in the Church, Luther placed his faith in 
the Word of God. That had additional implications: this knowledge of God 
and Christ was not based upon some empty letters, but upon the living Gos-
pel. It also meant certainty for the worldly orders of marriage, family, state 
and “Beruf” (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 158–160). It now meant that religious 
authority was not something external and that the state was no longer to be 
regarded as a necessary form of force. Quoting Goethe, it meant that “we 
have again the courage to stand with firm feet on God’s earth” (Harnack 
1904a: Band I: 164). Finally, it meant that we have freedom and responsibil-
ity in our “Beruf”, no matter what it is. Luther’s clear and living convictions 
mandated a whole range of new ideas: his people, his church, his education. 
For Harnack, Luther was not merely a man; “He was the Reformation”. In 
Harnack’s closing remarks, he insisted that Luther was the personal embod-
iment of all that is great and powerful and enduring and that Luther will 
remain the ideal for all time (Harnack 1904a: Band I: 168–169).
Heinrich von Treitschke’s speech was entitled “Luther und die deutsche 
Nation” and on first glance it may not seem as focused on religion as the 
other three. However, he speaks just as passionately as the others about Lu-
ther’s religion, comparing Luther’s conversion to Paul’s “metanoia” and he 
regards Luther’s theological conflicts with the Church as parallel to those of 
Jesus against the Pharisees (Treitschke 1907: 143). He underscores Luther’s 
fight against the Church’s rigidity, its false dogma, and the numerous abuses 
by the Church. He praises Luther’s commonsense and his belief in the good-
ness of the world and the work of the common man (Treitschke 1907: 141, 
141). He focuses on Luther’s relation to God and claimed that with “child-
like trust” he built his belief on the power of God’s word alone. Treitschke 
also emphasizes Luther’s Germanness in quoting his claim “For my Ger-
mans am I born, they I wish to serve” (“für meine Deutschen bin ich gebo-
ren, ihnen will ich dienen.).” This is also indicated by Luther’s determina-
tion to have God speak to Germans in German (Treitschke 1907: 140, 151). 
Treitsch ke places most of his emphasis on Luther’s importance in history 
and culture; it was Luther who introduced modernity, not the Italian poets 
and painters. It was Luther who was responsible for the modern German 
state. Although Luther was not a politician, he was politically astute enough 
to help bring about the German nation in a manner that was more peaceful 
and required less force than anywhere else (Treitschke 1907: 146, 149). This 
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he did by helping to break the state away from the Church’s dominance and 
by supporting the sovereignty of the state. It was a matter for the state to 
determine laws, to regulate loans, and to care for the poor. These were polit-
ical duties and no longer fell under the province of the Church. The individ-
ual was also freed from Church authority; for Luther, one obeyed one’s own 
conscience. Treitschke pays special tribute to Luther’s demand for the “au-
tonomy of conscience”, and this was in keeping with the recent emphasis by 
Protestant theologians on the moral imperative for freedom of conscience 
(Treitschke 1907: 138, 143, 153. See also Adair-Toteff 2011: 21–24). As 
Treitsch ke noted, it was unfortunate that not every German could partici-
pate in this celebration of Luther: Catholics will not, and could not, grasp 
the greatness of Luther’s spirit, a spirit which fills the air of the State, society, 
home, and science. Treitschke contrasts the freedom to think and decide for 
one’s self with the stifling stench that comes out of the “Lügenstübchen” of 
the Vatican (Treitschke 1907: 143–143, 156). Treitschke does have hope – 
German Catholics are still German and they share many of the fundamental 
traits and virtues of all Germans. In this respect they are far closer to the 
German Protestants than they are to their fellow Spanish believers. And, he 
believes that the day will come when all Germans will honor Martin Luther, 
Germany’s hero and teacher (Treitschke 1907: 141, 157).  
Weber and Treitschke
There are many reasons to link Weber and Treitschke: Treitschke was a fre-
quent visitor to the Weber house in Berlin, when Max was young. Max often 
mentioned him in his letters to his cousin, Otto Baumgarten. Otto’s own 
father had been on close terms with Treitschke before breaking with him. 
Later, Max attended Treitschke’s lectures in Berlin.137 Then there are the 
similar traits: the love of scholarship and the passion for nationalism. It 
would not be a great exaggeration to suggest that, with the exception of Bis-
marck himself, Treitschke represented the best and the worst of German 
nationalism and its connection to German Protestantism. Given these rea-
sons, it seems odd and even unfortunate that we lack a serious study com-
paring Weber and Treitschke: two German giants.
What we do have is mostly psychological speculation. Arthur Mitzman 
suggested that Treitschke was like a father figure, against whom young Max 
137 Wolfgang Mommsen argued that Weber heard not only Treitschke’s lectures on “Staat 
und Kirche” but also his “Politik.” Mommsen notes that Weber never listed him as his aca-
demic teacher. Mommsen 1974: 10 and note  38.
133Weber and Treitschke
rebelled. Mitzman argues that Max fought against the “cynical ruthlessness” 
of those two “despots”: Max Sr. and Treitschke (Mitzman 1970: 24, 36, 52, 
61, 150). More recently, Joachim Radkau suggested that there was a connec-
tion between Treitschke and Weber’s uncle Adolf Hausrath. Like Weber Sr., 
Hausrath defended Treitschke and they all seemed to express German chau-
vinism (Radkau 2005: 131, 209, 607). While studying in Heidelberg Max 
would occasionally visit his uncle, but relations between the two never 
seemed to be very good. 
We know from Weber’s early letters that he had a mixed opinion of 
Treitsch ke. On the one hand, in a letter to his cousin Fritz Baumgarten We-
ber wrote that Treitschke’s Deutsche Geschichte was a “true joy” and, in a 
later letter to his mother he expressed his anticipation of the second volume 
(Weber 1936: 74, 29, 64). On the other hand, he was concerned about 
Treitsch ke’s lack of scholarly objectivity, as indicated in a letter that Max 
wrote to Hermann Baumgarten (Weber 1936: 175; Weber 1926: 80, 336). 
Baumgarten was a critical influence on the young Weber, with Radkau go-
ing so far as referring to him as Weber’s political mentor. Radkau also sug-
gests that Weber’s emphasis on separating politics from scholarship has its 
origins in Baumgarten’s writings (Mommsen 1974: 7; Radkau 2005: 38–39). 
After volume two of Treitschke’s Deutsche Geschichte appeared Baumgar-
ten published a short and highly critical work called Treitschkes Deutsche 
Geschichte. Baumgarten objects to Treitschke’s pronounced subjectivity 
and his political activity. For Treitschke, history is not a goal but is simply a 
means to win over the reader to his specific view of the present. For Treitsch-
ke is not an historian, but a party man and publicist, so truth and objectivity 
do not matter. Baumgarten believes that nothing worse could happen to 
German education than if this attempt to draw students into the party 
struggles of the day becomes widespread (Baumgarten 1883: V, 5–6. 50). 
Marianne Weber wrote how as a student Weber witnessed first-hand the 
enormous power that Treitschke’s demagoguery had on young people. We-
ber was twenty-three years old when he listened to Treitschke as he tried to 
politicize his listeners and to persuade them of Bismarck’s greatness and to 
warn them about the influence of the Jews. (Weber, 1926: 102, 127). In this 
conflict between Baumgarten and Treitschke, Weber sided with Baumgar-
ten. In a letter to his father, Max recounted a visit where Hausrath attacked 
Baumgarten, insisting that one could make dozens of Baumgartens out of 
one Treitschke. Max wrote how he attempted to defend his uncle Hermann 
from his uncle Adolf, but that he was fearful that Adolf was going to turn 
his attack totally on him (Weber 1936: 74). Like Baumgarten, Weber object-
ed to Treitschke’s blurring the line between scholarship and partisanship – 
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in his lectures on state and church he propagandized for his values. Mari-
anne wrote how Weber learned from that experience; he resolved never to 
allow himself to blur the lines between politics and scholarship and that he 
would refrain from substituting subjective values for objective facts. In 
“Wissenschaft als Beruf” Weber objects to those who bring their values into 
the lecture hall, where there is no possibility of criticism. The ones who do 
are not teachers, but demagogues: people who want to be leaders. (Weber 
1992b). When he said that, Weber was likely remembering Treitschke. For 
Treitschke, there was nothing wrong in what he did; he condemned what he 
called “bloodless objectivity” and he objected to the misuse of the stance 
“Sine ira et studio.” (Barth 1913: Band V: 1327). In contrast, Weber makes 
much of the importance of “sine ira et studio” in scholarship. In fact, it ranks 
among his fundamental principles of scholarship. This does not mean that 
Weber always followed his own advice. Anyone reading his speeches recog-
nizes that he is prone to overstep his distinction between facts and values. 
An example of this is his Freiburg “Antrittsrede”, where his passionate na-
tionalism overshadows his cool scholarship.138 Anyone reading his writings 
will also notice that he often exaggerates his thesis and overstates his case. 
Examples of this can be found in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft where he an-
nounces the difference and then concedes that it is not as hard and fast as he 
had first indicated.139 Maybe the differences between Weber and Treitschke 
are not as pronounced as Weber might have liked. But, one could claim that 
Treitschke represented one part of the legacy of “Kulturprotestantismus”, 
the side that was subjective, and idealized German culture and tradition. 
One could insist further that Weber represented the other side, the side that 
valued scholarship, progress, and tolerance. There is no doubt that Treitsch-
ke thought there was absolutely nothing wrong in misusing scholarship in 
the service of Germany. And, there is certainly no question that Weber be-
lieved that this practice was intellectually dishonest and that it was morally 
reprehensible to do.
Heinz Steinert might have been inclined to exaggeration in his assess-
ments of Max Weber’s Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalis-
mus. He might not be completely convincing in his discussions of what he 
took be its flaws. However, there can be no doubt that after reading Max 
Webers Unwiderlegbare Fehlkonstruktionen no one will read Weber’s work 
the same way again. Steinert has proven that we simply cannot be content to 
138 Weber, 1921. See Mommsen’s comments about Weber’s passionate remarks in this 
speech with his later denunciation “Von allen Arten der Prophetie” and his banning of prac-
tical values from the lectern. Mommsen 1974: 39. 
139 See his treatment of “Herrschaft.” In Weber 1922a. 
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regard this work as a classic and cannot try to honor Weber by making the 
obligatory references to “Geist”, “Arbeit”, or “Kapitalismus.” Steinert has 
shown that we must learn to read this work carefully and this is accom-
plished by recapturing its historical context. In my tribute to Steinert, I have 
tried to recapture the historical context of “Kulturprotestantismus”; and I 
have done so out of respect for both Max Weber and Heinz Steinert.
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Chapter Eight
Max Weber on Confucianism versus Protestantism 
When Max Weber first published his Die protestantische Ethik und der 
Geist des Kapitalismus in 1904 and 1905, he expected that criticisms of it 
would come primarily from theologians. He admitted that he was no spe-
cialist in theology and he allowed that his account of the relationship be-
tween Protestantism and the rise of modern capitalism was not complete. 
He only claimed that he was offering an “idealist” sketch of the relationship; 
and that his was in marked contrast to the fuller “materialist” conceptions 
offered by Karl Marx and his followers. Furthermore, Weber denied that his 
account was a causal one, meaning that it was unlike those provided by the 
adherents of historical determinism. Instead, he simply suggested that his 
was one possible explanation. Despite all of these admissions, qualifications, 
and clarifications, Weber was still attacked. Weber was right about the de-
gree of criticism, but he was wrong about their sources – these attacks were 
not mounted by theologians, but initially they came from historians and 
later they were made by economists. Felix Rachfahl and H. Karl Fischer 
were among the historians, while Werner Sombart and Lujo Brentano num-
bered among the economists (Weber 1987: 5, 7, see also Hamilton 2000: 
161–166). But, all of these critics focused on Weber’s views of Protestantism 
and the West. 
In contrast to these critics, those who have been critical of Weber’s discus-
sion of capitalism and the East have tended to be sociologists, sinologists, 
and historians. They have attacked his account of why industrial capitalism 
did not develop in China and they have criticized his discussions of ration-
alism and tradition. Like the critics who attacked Weber’s focus on the West, 
these critics were similarly harsh in their criticisms of Weber’s concern with 
the East. And, like those critics, these were mostly wrong. What I intend to 
do in this paper is to set out Weber’s reexamination of his Protestant thesis 
in light of his studies on Confucianism. I begin with a short discussion of 
Weber’s critics; I then move to provide a detailed examination of Weber’s 
own writings on Confucianism, Protestantism, and modern capitalism.
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Weber’s Critics
The following is by no means a complete account of every criticism of We-
ber’s views on Confucianism and capitalism, but it will provide some sense 
of the various kinds of comments that scholars have made. I examine these 
for two reasons: first, they provide a historical context which shows how 
critics have consistently viewed Weber’s writings on China, and second, 
they demonstrate how they fail to recognize Weber’s significant theoretical 
points because of their almost exclusive focus on empirically verifiable fac-
tors. 
The earliest criticism of Weber’s examination of China appeared in 1923 
as part of the two-volume remembrance of Weber. The article was entitled 
“Religion und Wirtschaft in China” by Arthur von Rosthorn. Rosthorn 
was regarded as an expert, but unfortunately, he did not take into consider-
ation the final published piece in volume one of the Gesammelte Aufsätze 
zur Religionssoziologie.140 Instead, he concentrated on the pieces which We-
ber had published in 1915 in the Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpo-
litik. What is even more unfortunate is that Rosthorn took Weber’s writings 
to be criticisms of China. As Rosthorn made abundantly clear in a speech 
that he gave in 1919, he regarded the Chinese as socially superior to Europe-
ans. Not only were they more civilized, they also lived better lives. Tradi-
tion and moral customs (“Sitten”) ensured order and they guaranteed social 
respect for others (Rosthorn 1919: 5, 11). The Chinese education system was 
humanistic and moral, rather than technical and intellectual as in the West 
(Rosthorn 1919: 13, 15, 19). Rosthorn suggested that the Chinese economic 
system guaranteed that labor was relatively cheap, but he also insisted that 
the cost of living was also low. What it also meant was that there was no 
heavy industry and no capitalism. Rosthorn agreed with Weber on this, but 
disputed Weber’s explanation for the reasons why these were missing in 
China.
Rosthorn suggested that China’s highly developed hand work precluded 
industrialization and he claimed that its cities rejected the need for capital 
(Rosthorn 1923: 225). He accused Weber of misunderstanding the Chinese 
way of life – as when Weber said that the Chinese lacked the word for reli-
140 Weber knew of Rosthorn’s work and regarded him as a “significant authority”. Weber 
1989: 287, Weber’s note  2. See also Weber 1989: 286, note  1; 287, note  6; 292, note  25. He espe-
cially pointed to Rosthorn’s 1919 ”Das soziale Leben der Chinesen” and said that Rosthorn 
was “one of the best specialists” on China. Weber 1989: 131–132. Weber knew him from the 
time when Rosthorn gave a lecture in Heidelberg (1906) and then met him when he was teach-
ing in Vienna (1918). See Weber 1989: 41–43. 
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gion. Weber thought of religion as dogma, but as Rosthorn pointed out the 
Chinese regarded it as ethical. And, Rosthorn noted that when Weber sug-
gested that the Chinese were not “free”, he failed to understand that the lack 
of laws actually entailed more freedom for the Chinese, not less (Rosthorn 
1923: 228–229). However, Rosthorn himself misunderstood Weber when he 
claimed that Weber wanted to find the “causal connection” between religion 
and economics, and he also erred in thinking that Weber had disdain for the 
Chinese preoccupation with world order and human happiness. Most im-
portantly, Rosthorn was certainly wrong to believe that Weber thought that 
he could prove the differences between Puritanism and Confucianism 
(Rosthorn 1923: 230, 232). However, Rosthorn was correct to state that the 
emphasis on tradition and lack of technical innovation were undoubtedly 
obstacles to the development of a rational system of economics like that 
found in the West (Rosthorn 1923: 225, 230). 
 If Rosthorn believed that he had found numerous problems in Weber’s 
account of China, Otto B. van der Sprenkel was convinced that Weber’s 
discussion made a fundamental contribution to the study of China (van der 
Sprenkel 1965: 348). Van der Sprenkel acknowledged that Weber had no spe-
cialized training in the area, that he worked from second-rate translations, 
and that some of his judgments were wrong; but he was convinced that We-
ber made a lasting contribution to our knowledge of China (van der Spren-
kel 1965: 348, 370). In particular, Weber emphasized the importance of Chi-
nese bureaucracy and he stressed the roles that education and rationalism 
played in it. But, one of the things that seemed to have impressed Weber the 
most, according to van der Sprenkel, was its “enduring stability” (van der 
Sprenkel 1965: 353). Unfortunately, he primarily focused on Weber’s discus-
sion concerning Chinese bureaucracy and mostly ignored Weber’s examina-
tion of the connections between religion and economics (van der Sprenkel 
1965: 358–367).
Despite van der Sprenkel’s praise for Weber, Arnold Zingerle criticized 
him for reducing Weber’s account to one of stability and even stagnation 
(Zingerle 1983: 181–184, 191). In addition, Zingerle criticized scholars in 
general for dismissing the need for thorough examinations of Weber’s writ-
ings on the East by simply regarding them all as counterpoints to Weber’s 
Protestant ethic thesis (Zingerle 1983: 174). This was the thrust of his contri-
bution to Wolfgang Schluchter’s collection on Weber and China. This article 
was a continuation of Zingerle’s earlier book. 
It is in the book Max Weber und China that Zingerle addresses Weber’s 
thesis in detail. That this book is a reworking of his dissertation should not 
detract from its considerable worth. In the first half Zingerle examines We-
142 8. Max Weber on Confucianism versus Protestantism
ber’s “sociology of domination” (“Herrschaftssoziologie”) in respect to 
China and in the second half he focuses on Weber’s “sociology of religion” 
(“Relgionssoziologie”) with regards to China. However, his major focus is 
to examine Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis as related to China. Zingerle’s 
examination of this is extensive; given the limited scope of this paper I can 
only offer a brief account of it.
Zingerle makes three crucial introductory points: first, that Weber was 
the pioneer who recognized the religious factor in the massive change in 
Europe’s transition to modernity; second, that he investigated this in rela-
tion to other world religions; and third, that he used the term “capitalism” as 
short-hand for the “‘spirit’ of capitalism” (Zingerle 1972: 98–101). For Zin-
gerle, rationalism and innovation are two key elements in Weber’s concep-
tion of capitalism (Zingerle 1972: 101–105, 117, 121, 129, 139–140, 143). As a 
result, Zingerle focuses on the activity of the individual. Unfortunately, this 
emphasis leads him to misunderstand Weber’s conceptions of the ascetic and 
the mystic, but it also leads him to underestimate the importance of the Pu-
ritan’s transcendent God in relation to the Chinese beliefs. I might suggest 
that Zingerle’s preoccupation with sociological concepts diverted him from 
a sufficient appreciation of Weber’s emphasis on religious factors – factors 
which I will return to later. 
In the beginning of his “Warum hat das vormoderne China keinen indus-
triellen Kapitalismus entwickelt? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Max We-
bers Ansatz” Mark Elvin discusses Weber’s general sociological theory; he 
notes that Weber wants to examine the relationship between “motive” and 
“given circumstances” (Elvin 1983: 115). Specifically, Elvin wants to know 
why industrial capitalism did not develop in China and in his explanation he 
appears to utilize factors that were found in Zingerle’s account: he places 
emphasis on rationality and innovation and he stresses economic concerns 
(Elvin 1983: 117–120). In addition, he believes that verifiable factors better 
explain the lack of capitalism. In accordance with this approach, the second 
half of the paper is devoted to topics like money and taxes, agriculture and 
water regulation. 
Stephen Kalberg’s focus in his “Weber’s Critique of Recent Compara-
tive-Historical Sociology and a Reconstruction of his Analysis of the Rise 
of Confucianism” is, as the title indicates, primarily a theoretical investiga-
tion in which he uses Weber’s writings on Confucianism as a concrete illus-
tration (Kalberg 1999: 208). As such, it is likely to be of more interest to 
students of methodology and to social theorists than to those seeking to 
understand Weber’s contrast between Confucianism and Puritanism. None-
theless, Kalberg is extremely helpful in pointing out the importance of the 
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clan and bureaucracy and even more so by emphasizing the ritualism and 
utilitarianism of the literati. These factors, coupled with the concern for this 
world, meant that it could never “give birth to a notion of salvation, or even 
meditations upon the problem of theodicy” (Kalberg 1999: 226–230). These 
points are crucial, and are ones I will return to later. 
The most recent contribution to the discussion of Weber on China is John 
Love’s “Max Weber’s Orient”. As the title indicates, Love provides an over-
view of all of Weber’s writings on the Orient, not just on China. But, he does 
emphasize Weber’s writing on Chinese traditionalism and its impact on its 
bureaucracy and he stressed Weber’s discussion on the importance of the 
family in Chinese society (Love 2000: 175–177). Love also addresses some 
of the criticisms directed at Weber’s writings on China. Most of these criti-
cisms have alleged that Weber misunderstood Confucianism and that he 
was wrong to think that it was the obstacle to the development of capitalism 
in China. Most of these critics suggest that it was found in other, economic 
factors (Love 2000: 179–184). Love admits that Weber’s account should be 
modified in light of modern scholarship, but he insists that the account is 
fundamentally correct. And, he praises Weber for realizing that he needed 
to reexamine his Protestant thesis in light of his China study. Weber’s re-
search showed that China possessed some “rational, ascetic, scientific and 
commercial cultural elements”; therefore, he needed to demonstrate how 
Chinese rationalism differed from that of the West (Love 2000: 173).
Weber’s Account
Each of these preceding papers contributes to our understanding of Weber’s 
conception of China, while some provide greater insight into the relation-
ship between Confucianism and China’s economic history. However, all of 
these focus primarily on material factors, thus they overlook the “idea” fac-
tors, which I believe are the keys to understanding Weber’s reasons for ex-
plaining the lack of modern industrial capitalism in China. In this regard it 
is worth recalling what Weber wrote in the crucial “Einleitung” to the 
Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen. Weber writes that “Interests (material 
and ideal), not: ideas, immediately drive human activity”, he adds the critical 
modifier: “But: the ideas through which ‘world-images’ are created, very 
often work the switches that determine the tracks which further move along 
the dynamic of the interests of the actors”.141 Weber acknowledges the im-
141 “Interessen (materielle und ideelle), nicht: Ideen, beherrschen unmittelbar das Handeln 
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portance of interests, but he also emphasizes that there are times when 
 certain fundamental ideas will determine the directions in which those in-
terests move. This was why he focused on the two “ideas” in Die protestan-
ti sche Ethik – Luther’s concept of “Beruf” and Calvin’s doctrine of pre-
destination. Weber expanded his efforts at uncovering these particular ideas 
in Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen and one of his goals was to ac-
count for why capitalism failed to develop in China. For Weber, this was a 
critical issue given China’s emphasis on rationality; thus, there had to be 
some other important difference. While material and immaterial interests 
were important, Weber sought to reveal the “ideas” upon which these inter-
ests were “based”. 
Throughout his volume on China Weber offers a number of reasons for 
why rational capitalism did not arise in China. He notes the various obsta-
cles: the lack of legal form and the sociological groundwork for capitalism 
(Weber 1989: 257). It lacked the “rational calculable functions for adminis-
tration and law” (Weber 1989: 279). And, it lacked the “rational functioning 
of the apparatus of the state” – and it lacked “machine-like calculations”. For 
Weber, why these things were missing in China was “the deciding question” 
(Weber 1989: 283). 
In Weber’s view, one of the most important and defining characteristics of 
China was its great emphasis on “education”. But, it is not merely education 
for the sake of education; there must be some fruitful end-result. Weber 
contrasts the well-known Kantian “Thoughts without content are empty, 
intuitions without concepts are blind” with a version more appropriate for 
the Chinese: “Thinking without fruit from reading is sterile”.142 The Chi-
nese student was trained to be the life-long servant of the state (Flitner 2001: 
269, 278–279). Weber, of course, uses the German term “Bildung” that is far 
more expansive than the English word “education”. While the Chinese sys-
tem used exams, the successful candidate was required to be more than sim-
ply competent in any area; he was expected to be especially well-versed in 
Chinese culture. As a result, Weber differentiates the Chinese literary man 
from the Christian and Islamic clerics, from the Jewish Rabbis, the ancient 
Egyptian priests, from the Indian Brahmins, and from the Egyptian and 
Indian scribes by the fact that he was so important to all facts of Chinese 
life. He was the person responsible for maintaining “the unity of Chinese 
der Menschen. Aber: die ‘Weltbilder’, durch ‘Ideen’ geschaffen wurden, haben sehr oft als 
Weichensteller die Bahnen bestimmt, in denen die Dynamik der Interessen das Handeln fort-
bewegte.” Weber 1989: 101. 
142 “Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind”. Kant’s Kri-
tik der reinen Vernunft. “Denken ohne Lesefrüchte ist steril”. Weber 1989: 360.
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culture” and he was regarded as a “living library” (Weber 1989: 285–286, 
292). He was a “cultural man” who knew all the rituals and maintained tra-
dition. He was the “single carrier of the unity of Chinese culture” (Weber 
1989: 288–289, 303).
The Chinese culture differed from that of the West in that it was over-
whelmingly humanist and literary. China lacked the speculative philosophy 
of ancient Greece but it had a form of philosophy that Weber referred to as 
one of “practical sobriety” (“praktischer Nüchernheit”). Confucianism was 
its highest form. The educated man was a noble literary type but he was not 
one who studied calculations (Weber 1989: 311). Weber indicated that as the 
centuries passed the science of calculation kept receding until it was virtual-
ly gone. In addition to lacking mathematics, China also lacked natural 
sciences, geography, and the study of language (Weber 1989: 312). 
Mathematics and the natural sciences were of increasing importance in 
the West, but in China it was the notion of traditional culture that continued 
to remain the most important. Traditional culture encompassed a range of 
notions: harmony, decorum, and piety among them. Weber emphasizes each 
of these in turn. Harmony, order, beauty – these are “cosmic” virtues that 
humans should strive to emulate (Weber 1989: 318–320). Zingerle made the 
important point that one of the major characteristics of Confucianism’s tra-
dition was that the elder was the irreplaceable role model who was supposed 
to be emulated (Zingerle 1972: 113). The officials should act with temperance 
and moderation; and Weber even emphasized that “decorum” (“Schicklich-
keit”) is the “Confucian fundamental concept!” (“konfuzianischer Grund-
begriff!”) (Weber 1989: 351, 359, 452, 473). Weber repeatedly refers to the 
“noble” and “educated” Chinese man as “Gentleman” (Weber 1989: 165, 
357, 359, 472–474). Weber’s choice of the English term is deliberate, because 
it suggests the cultivated, refined man who understands and maintains his 
correct place in society. Societal harmony and personal equanimity are re-
quired, just as the lack of ostentation and the suppression of passion are en-
couraged (Weber 1989: 351). There is no such thing as “sin”, except in the 
sense of “sinning” against the “social fundamental duty” (“soziale Grund-
pflicht”). “Piety” is the “cardinal virtue”, but it is not piety in the Western 
abstract sense; rather, it is both personal and communal. It is the piety, hon-
or, and respect accorded to the parents, teachers, and officials. The chil-
dren’s pious respect for their parents was “the absolute primary of all vir-
tues” (“die absolut primäre aller Tugenden”) (Weber 1989: 352). Piety is also 
the “mother of discipline” – not so much as the sense of the individual, but 
the sense of a component in social life (Weber 1989: 360). Discipline, order, 
and obedience are all important in each of Weber’s three types of “Herr-
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schaft” (“authority” or “domination”). They are traditional, bureaucratic, 
and charismatic. What is distinctive in Chinese traditional authority is its 
extreme emphasis on how its legitimacy rests on the patriarchy (Weber 1989: 
121). China was rational and had its codification of laws; however, the ra-
tionality was rather narrowly focused and the laws were based upon the 
personal interpretation of the “traditional” bureaucrats. This is what Weber 
called “patrimonial bureaucracy” (Weber 1989: 125). While there were some 
similarities between China and the medieval cities, they were rather mini-
mal and were mostly related to the regulations governing apprentices. How-
ever, the Chinese cities lacked the absolute monopoly over the apprentices 
and it also lacked the political and military powers of the medieval cities 
(Weber 1989: 158). Furthermore, the Chinese official lacked both the legal 
form as the foundation for law and the sociological framework for the accu-
mulation of capital (Weber 1989: 257). What the patrimonial bureaucracy 
seemed to do was to further social leveling (Weber 1989: 254). However, 
Weber modifies this when he returns to the discussion about the respect 
accorded to the officials (Weber 1989: 333–335). This respect was not based 
so much upon respect for the law, as it was respect for the person. In the 
section on patrimonialism in Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Weber emphasizes 
that in bureaucratic authority respect is given to the impersonal laws, but in 
patrimonial authority it is given to the person (Weber 2005: 247–248, 251). 
The West had the “binding norms and regulations” of bureaucracy; China 
lacked these (Weber 2005: 293). In contrast, Weber writes of the “holiness of 
tradition” and the respect for the “eternal laws” (Weber 2005: 247, 251, 257). 
Helwig Schmidt-Glitzner maintains that there is an analogy between patri-
arch and ruler and that one must respect both (Schmidt-Glitzner 2001: 226). 
Furthermore, the Western bureaucrat has the duty towards competence 
whereas the Chinese has the duty towards his superior (Weber 2005: 295). 
The emphasis was on the piety towards the officials and teachers and on the 
strict adherence to the traditional order (Weber 2005: 329). As a result, mil-
itary-like discipline is all-important in every aspect of social life. For Con-
fucius, “‘insubordination’ is worse than a lower character” (“‘Insubordina-
tion’ ist schlimmer als niedrige Gesinnung”) (Weber 1989: 353). Freedom 
was less important than order. Accordingly, Weber suggests that “‘Reason’ 
of Confucius was a rationalism of order: better to live as a man in peace than 
to live as a man in anarchy” (Weber 1989: 367). 
This notion of harmony and order is also found in the economic sphere. 
Some of the differences between China and the West can be attributed to the 
cultural attitudes towards work and wealth. Weber suggests that the Chi-
nese value work – when it is masterful handwork (Weber 1989: 274). In ad-
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dition, there is a saying: “a noble person is not a tool” (“Ein Vornehmer ist 
kein Werkzeug”), meaning that he regards himself as a goal and does not see 
himself as merely a means to some end. Furthermore, the factual compe-
tence of the educated bureaucrat is not limited; the “higher man” strives for 
multiplicity and variety (Weber 1989: 356–357). What the Chinese do not 
value is wealth simply for wealth’s sake, because that would be ostentatious. 
And, he insists that the seeking of profit counts as the source of social un-
rest. The balance and harmony of the soul is shaken by the drive for wealth. 
And, historically it was the corrupt officials who sought to become enriched 
by bribes (Weber 1989: 355). This cultural rejection of wealth should not 
suggest a lack of economic theory; indeed, Weber warns against thinking 
that the Chinese do not understand the law of supply and demand. He notes 
that they actually have a firm and modern understanding of that as well as 
the relationship between speculation and profit (Weber 1989: 354). 
One of the biggest differences is in the area of law. We should remember 
that Weber was trained as a lawyer; both his dissertation and his “Habilita-
tionsschrift” were in law (Weber 2008: 2–3; Weber 1986: 2, 5–12). We should 
recall that he often viewed social theory through legal thinking (Turner and 
Factor 1994: IX, 1, 166, 177). And, we should remind ourselves that Weber 
was convinced that the development of rational law was one of the key fac-
tors in allowing modern capitalism to develop in the West. He reminds us of 
this in the “Vorbemerkung” to the Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Religions sozio-
logie where he insists that the Western “rational structure of law” provided 
the conditions that made guaranteed calculations possible (Weber 1920: 11). 
In his last lectures at Munich he spoke of how the “systematic, definitively 
determined and easily taught” “rational law” was the decisive factor for the 
rise of modern capitalism (Weber 2011: 370–372). Rational law provided the 
freedom to enter into contracts and it also provided the possibility of guar-
antees. According to Weber, this expansive legal freedom made it possible 
for the United States to have the greatest economic success. 
At first glance it might seem that China would also be a place for the de-
velopment of both rational law and capitalism. In the “Einleitung” to the 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft volume on law, Werner Gephard and Siegfried 
Hermes note  that it would seem that the dominating class of bureaucrats 
would make China a likely place for systematic, rational law to develop. 
Chinese law was systematic, but it did not become rational in the Western 
sense (Weber 2010: 619). They point out that it is wrong to blame this on 
religious grounds. Instead, they suggest that Weber sought the answer in the 
Chinese legal culture (Weber 2010: 93–94). 
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Chinese law lacked many of the features of law found in the West. It did 
not have a free market and it lacked free exchange. It lacked the Western legal 
form and it lacked the “rational calculable functions for administration and 
law” (Weber 1989: 256–257, 279). It lacked the “rational functioning of the 
apparatus of the state” – and it lacked “machine-like calculations”. In the 
Recht volume Weber discussed how traditional law in general lacks a sense 
of permanence. Weber noted that “holy tradition” appears to be permanent 
but it is not always the case – someone can announce a new revelation (We-
ber 2010: 445–446, 462). Traditional law is often dependent on everyday 
needs; something from which rational law is emancipated (Weber 2010). In 
his lectures Weber gave the following example. Someone could buy a house 
and then if he became poor, have the legal right to have the seller buy it back 
(Weber 2011: 373). It was clear to Weber that many features of Western juris-
prudence were missing in Chinese law; for him, “the deciding question” was 
why? (Weber 1989: 283).
Chinese law was rational in that it had a codification of laws; however, the 
rationality was rather focused and the laws were based upon the personal 
interpretation of the “traditional” bureaucrats. Weber called this “patrimo-
nial bureaucracy” (Weber 1989: 125). What is distinctive in Chinese tradi-
tional authority is its extreme emphasis on how its legitimacy rests on the 
patriarchy (Weber 1989: 121). While there were some similarities between 
China and Western medieval cities, they were rather minimal and were 
mostly related to the regulations governing apprentices. The Chinese cities 
lacked the absolute monopoly over the apprentices and it also lacked the 
political and military powers of the medieval cities (Weber 1989: 158). And, 
China was oriented towards the continual organization around familial 
power and honor – all based upon honor and morality. (Weber 1989: 258–
259, 262). The court that had primary jurisdiction over organization and 
disputes was not some abstract civil one; rather it was the “Temple” court 
that enjoyed the people’s trust (Weber 1989: 268). Thus, he was more than 
aware that the Chinese had Confucian ethics to regulate society and to de-
termine outcomes in cases of dispute (Quan 2010: 38, 43–44).
The Chinese had great respect for the law; however, it was not the respect 
for the abstract rule but was the respect for the person. The Western bureau-
crat has the duty towards competence whereas the Chinese has the duty 
towards his superior (Weber 2005: 295). In the section on patrimonialism in 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Weber emphasizes that in bureaucratic authori-
ty respect is given to the impersonal laws, but in patrimonial authority it is 
given to the person (Weber 2005: 247–248, 251). The West had the “binding 
norms and regulations” of bureaucracy; which China lacked (Weber 2005: 
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293). In contrast, Weber writes of the “holiness of tradition” and the respect 
for the “eternal laws” (Weber 2005: 247, 251, 257). Helwig Schmidt-Glitzner 
maintains that there is an analogy between patriarch and ruler and that one 
must respect both (Schmidt-Glitzner 2001: 226). 
Weber was well aware of the importance of law regarding the peculiarities 
of China’s agriculture. He knew of the importance of water supply and he 
was cognizant of the problems in securing permanent ownership of land 
(Weber 1989: 243). And, he was well aware of the need for order and how 
various attempts at reform were blocked (Weber 1989: 246–247). Finally, he 
was knowledgeable about the systematic codification of Chinese law (Weber 
1989: 249). 
Weber’s “Results”
In the critical section “Konfuzianismus und Puritanismus” of the volume 
on China Weber takes stock of his account and then embarks on proving the 
results of his study. He notes that there are two important areas of differ-
ence between what he calls “Confucian rationalism” and “Puritan rational-
ism”. These are the differences in regard to magic and the differences with 
respect to the world and to God (Weber 1989: 450). The way that Weber 
announces the two areas of difference might suggest that they carry equal 
weight; however, the importance of magic is considerably less than the im-
portance of the world and God. Accordingly, I will only briefly treat the 
former while concentrating more fully on the latter.
Before turning to the differences regarding magic, it is helpful to consider 
Weber’s discussions of magic in his other works. In Die protestantische 
Ethik of 1904–1905 the notion of magic is mostly missing but it does figure 
prominently in the “religiöse Gemeinschaften” section of Wirtschaft und 
Gesellschaft. There, Weber stresses the importance of symbolism for magic 
effectiveness (Weber 2001: 127). Moreover, the real deciding issue is whether 
the magician can perform; Weber says that it is simply a question of results 
(Weber 2001: 161). The magician was primarily the rain-maker; this was the 
case throughout history and the world, but this was especially so in the are-
as of northern China. Because of the region’s unstable rain patterns, a magi-
cian who could make rain was clearly needed there. But, the magician did 
not simply have the power to bring about rain; he also was the one with the 
power to restore the “cosmic order” (Weber 1989: 176–177; Weber 2001: 
191). The magician’s power points to a number of issues: first, while the 
Chinese lacked an “all-powerful and all-knowing” Deity of Judaism and 
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certain forms of Christianity, the gods and the spirits were still regarded as 
being extremely powerful (Weber 1989: 172). Second, the “god of heaven” 
was immensely important, not simply because the rains came from him.143 
Weber noted that the “Himmelgeist” was “primus inter pares” (Weber 1989: 
261, Weber’s note  7. See also the editor’s note  17.) Third, the gods did not 
“speak to people”; rather they revealed themselves to certain individuals 
(Weber 1989: 170). Thus, the magician was one who was chosen to under-
stand them and had the power to influence them. Fourth, the “ethical” heav-
ens protected the all-important “eternal order” (Weber 1989: 176). In short, 
magic was a crucial part of Chinese life, and it was in his study of China that 
Weber first accorded it a place of real importance.144
In the “Resultat” section of his book on China Weber emphasizes how 
prominent magic was for “Confucian rationalism”. For the Chinese, the 
world was a “magic garden” (“Zaubergarten”) and the practice of magic was 
part of normal everyday life. Weber stresses that this emphasis was both 
natural and positive (Weber 1989: 450–451). In contrast, the ascetic rational-
ism was at the highest level and magic was considered abnormal. Everything 
magical was regarded as bogus and suspect – even devilish. The West had 
reached the point of the “complete disenchantment of the world” (“ganze 
Entzauberung der Welt”) (Weber 1989: 450). 
This opposition in regards to magic leads to an even more important op-
position – the differing relationships with the world. For the Chinese, there 
is no question that the world makes “sense”, the good and the bad simply 
exist. For the Westerner there is a question of how to make sense of the 
world; i.e. how to account for evil in a world created by an all benevolent and 
omnipotent deity (Hanke 2001: 215–226). This is the question of theodicy 
and Weber even uses Leibniz’ phrase, that “this is the best of all possible 
worlds” to indicate the Chinese belief about this world. They believe in the 
natural harmony of the heavens and they believe that it can be found in the 
order of the human world as well. Piety is the cardinal virtue; the pious per-
son can look forward to a long life, health, and riches. There is, of course, 
something akin to the notion of sin; but, it is the type of a breaking of social 
norms. It is the matter of extreme tastelessness and is an affront against so- 
 
143 Weber 1989: 169. In this Weber is following the account written by P.D. Chantepie de la 
Saussaye and partially revised by Edmund Buckley. Chantepie de la Saussaye 1897: 56–57. See 
Weber 1989: 130.
144 Breuer 2001: 119–120. Stefan Breuer maintained that Weber’s emphasis on the over-
whelming importance of magic for the Chinese stemmed also from a Dutch scholar named 
Johann Jakob Maria de Groot. Breuer 2001: 130.
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ciety, thus, it generates shame. In contrast, sin is a personal matter, so it gen-
erates guilt, inner loneliness, and uncertainty (Weber 1989: 452). To under-
stand this, it is necessary to recall some important features of asceticism 
from the Protestantische Ethik. 
Neither in the Protestantische Ethik nor elsewhere does Weber provide a 
detailed account of asceticism (Adair-Toteff 2010: 109). A large part of this 
is because he was not a theological historian, but a larger part was that his 
account was not historical, but ideal typical. Hence, his concern is with the 
“spirit” of asceticism, just as he is preoccupied with the “spirit” of capitalism 
(Weber 1996: 53). Thus, he is not so interested in the “world-fleeing” asceti-
cism and mysticism; rather, he is concerned primarily with one specific type 
of asceticism – what he calls “inner-worldly” asceticism. The “original” 
form of this type of inner-worldly asceticism is Calvinism, but many of its 
features are carried over into later forms. The concern here is only with Cal-
vinism, because it is perhaps the “purest” form; thus allowing us to see the 
doctrinal beliefs better.
The single most important doctrine for Calvin was the doctrine of pre-
destination. It maintained that God ordained from the beginning that most 
of humankind is condemned and only a few have been elected for salvation. 
This decree is eternal and immutable; there is no possibility of change. Ac-
cordingly, Calvinists believed that there is an insurmountable “gap” 
(“Kluft”) between humans and God (Weber 1996: 61). God is an absolutely 
transcendent deity; unlike the loving God of Luther, Calvin’s deity is more 
like the Old Testament God. The difference was that the Israelis had a cov-
enant with God – which they broke. Calvin’s God has no such covenant 
with humans, because that would suggest that humans have an equal stand-
ing with God. Instead, Calvin’s God is far above and far removed from hu-
mans; and he would be indifferent to any entreaties by mere mortals. This 
doctrine has several results: first, there is an absolute emphasis on the be-
yond (“Jenseits”); that is really the question about salvation (Weber 1996: 55, 
65, 68). Second, there is an absolute preoccupation with the question of 
whether one is saved; and, there is absolutely no way of knowing whether 
one is or is not a member of the elect (Weber 1996: 60–63).
Taken together, these beliefs have far reaching implications. First, there is 
the “eternal loneliness” of the isolated individual. There is no priest, sacra-
ment, or church that can help the person. That also means that the person 
cannot trust anyone – not friends and not even family. It also means that the 
person has an absolute obligation to work solely for the greater glory for 
God, and that the person must maintain systematic self-control (Weber 
1996: 62–64, 75, 85, 120). Thus, the person is an ascetic with a single-minded 
152 8. Max Weber on Confucianism versus Protestantism
devotion to God; but unlike the Catholic ascetics who “fled the world” and 
retreated behind monastery walls, these Protestant ascetics were “in-
ner-worldly”. Following Luther’s expansion of the importance of “calling” 
to all vocations, the Calvinist believed in the restless work for God. In con-
trast to the passive mystic, who regarded himself as a “vessel” for receiving 
God, the active ascetic believed that he was the tool or instrument destined 
to do God’s work. To summarize: the followers of Calvin believed in a 
transcendent and unapproachable God; they rejected magic as well as sacra-
ments. They were cut off from friends and family, from society and even the 
natural world. They were doomed to inner loneliness, pessimism, and un-
certainty. Their only “recourse” was constant self-control and systematic 
rational activity, which because of its excessiveness, was basically irrational. 
The followers of Confucius believed in the order of the cosmos and sought 
it in the human world. They believed in magic and sacraments; their world 
was composed of spirits and family. They belonged in the natural world of 
beauty as well as the human world of order: their lives were filled with soci-
etal relationships, tempered optimism, and belief in the eternal order of 
things. There was no real sin, only the breach of decorum. The highest ideals 
consisted of temperance and cultivation. The Calvinist worked endlessly 
with the single focus on the afterlife; the follower of Confucius appreciated 
handwork and enjoyed the beauty of life.
Concluding Remarks
Weber’s work on China and Confucianism prompted him to reexamine the 
connection between rationalism and modern capitalism; however, it did not 
force him to change his opinion about it. His study of the economic ethics 
of the world religions underscored their shared similarities; but it also sharp-
ly pronounced the differences between East and West. From the power of 
the individual Old Testament prophets to the individual ascetic monks, 
from the Christian notion of individual sin and redemption to the leveling 
of worth of vocations, there is a pronounced emphasis in the West on the 
individual and change rather than that of the East on the community and 
continuity. In his last lectures in Munich on “Staatssoziologie” Weber in-
sisted that rationalism and charisma were the two most revolutionary pow-
ers (Weber 2009: 94–95). Charisma was the personal power from within; it 
was extraordinary and fleeting. Rationalism was the impersonal power from 
without; it was routine and permanent. Charisma was economically alien 
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whereas rationalism facilitated economic progress.145 But, both charisma 
and rationalism were inherently anti-traditional. It was the fact that ration-
alism tended to be anti-traditional which led Weber to determine that there 
were two types of rationalism – the moderate means of the Confucian form 
of rationalism and the excessive ends of modern Western rationalism. The 
first used rationalism as a means to maintain order, balance, and beauty, the 
second transformed rationalism into an end in itself (Schluchter 1980: 10). In 
closing, I want to stress two things. First, Weber insisted that he was cer-
tainly not trying to demonstrate that one type of economic ethics was supe-
rior to any other; he was simply trying to understand them. Second, Weber 
absolutely never implied that China could not become a capitalist economy; 
he only suggested that thus far the Chinese emphasis on order and tradition 
prevented it from becoming one. There is a recently published book that 
suggests that Mao was the unintended founder of modern Chinese capital-
ism, because it was he, and only he, who had the force and the conviction to 
break the power of tradition in China. Whether that is true is beyond the 
scope of my paper; what I wanted to show was how Weber’s study of Con-
fucianism made him realize more fully the immense power of tradition; and 
that was what prompted him to reexamine his Protestant thesis.
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“Sinn der Welt”: Max Weber and the Problem of Theodicy
Max Weber uses the term “sense” (“Sinn”) in a number of different senses. 
He uses it in the sense of “objective sense”, “possible sense”, and as in the 
“sense of action”.146 Then there is the “sense of the world” (“Sinn der Welt”), 
and by this Weber means the attempt to understand the world. For Weber, 
making “sense” of the world is not simply a scholarly task; it is fundamen-
tally an existential question. For Karl Jaspers, Weber’s focus was always on 
what it means to be a human being, and for Weber that is trying to find 
meaning in the world.147 Specifically, it is the attempt to reconcile the notion 
that there is suffering in a world which has been created by a deity who is 
both all powerful and is totally benign. This is the problem of theodicy, and 
it is one which Weber examined very carefully. This essay is devoted pri-
marily to setting out Weber’s discussion of the problem of theodicy, but it is 
also intended to show how this was an intensely important and personal 
matter for Max Weber.
The problem of theodicy is the age-old difficulty of attempting to recon-
cile the fact that there is evil and suffering in this world with the idea of a 
supremely benevolent and omnipotent God. Gottfried Leibniz had coined 
the term when he published a book by the same name in 1710. Since then, 
numerous German scholars have devoted considerable attention to the top-
ic. Its importance was underscored by the fact that in the early 1900s there 
146 In his Max Weber Dictionary Richard Swedberg’s entry “Sinn” simply directs the read-
er to the lengthy entry “Meaning”. In his lengthy introduction to Max Weber. Critique of 
Stammler Guy Oakes suggests that “Sinn” can be replaced by “Bedeutung” (“significance”). 
These suggest that something is “meaningful, understandable, or interpretable”. Richard 
Swedberg, Max Weber Dictionary. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 2005: 245; 160–163; 
Oakes 1977: 25. 
147 See Jaspers’ comments in his Max Weber. Eine Gedenkenrede as well as his Max Weber. 
Politiker, Forscher, Philosoph. Karl Jaspers, (Eine Gedenkenrede. Tübingen: Verlag von J.C.B. 
Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1921. 6–10) and Karl Jaspers, (Max Weber. Politiker, Forscher, Philosoph. 
München: Verlag von C.H. Beck). 1958. 8–9, 42, 49–50. Jaspers stressed that while Weber was 
a scholar, he recognized the limits of knowledge. Jaspers 1958: 61. In the section of his Psycho-
logie der Weltanschauungen on “Grenzensituationen” Jaspers utilizes Weber’s treatment of 
theodicy. Karl Jaspers. (Psychologie der Weltanschauungen. Berlin: Verlag von Julius Springer. 
1919). 253–254. 
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was a special competition in Germany devoted specifically to the impact 
and the history of the problem of theodicy. Several of the entries charted the 
development of the problem from Leibniz to Kant and from Schiller to 
Goethe, with one entry containing the claim that Goethe’s entire Faust 
could be considered as a “poetic theodicy”. (Lempp 1910, Kremer 1910, We-
gener 1909, Hanke 2001: 221–222, note  72, Troeltsch 1913b: 678–679, note  1, 
and Troeltsch 1913b: 682 and note  8). Weber was quite likely aware of this 
line of thinking, but if for some reason he was not, his attention would have 
been directed to it by his close friend and colleague Ernst Troeltsch. 
 Troeltsch not only wrote the second entry of “Theodicy” in the massive Die 
Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart but he also reviewed two of these 
prize submissions (Troeltsch 1913a and Troeltsch 1913b). In his entry he re-
ferred to the problem of theodicy as one of the most “fundamental questions 
of all religion” (Troeltsch 1913a: 1186; see Lempp 1910: 1). This notion is not 
just central to his sociology of religion; it also goes into the realms of his 
political thinking and even into his personal beliefs. This does not mean that 
this is a “core” or “central” theme in Weber’s writings. What it does mean is 
that it is a very important conception that occurs throughout many of We-
ber’s writings and that at different times he views it differently, depending 
on his focus of concern.148 Weber devotes a considerable amount of effort to 
the problem of theodicy; not just because he recognizes its significance in 
the realm of objective scholarship, but because he clearly acknowledges its 
enduring importance to him. Given such importance, it is surprising that so 
few scholars have paid any attention to Weber’s discussions of the problem 
of theodicy. Yet, Weber’s contributions are important, if not unique, for sev-
eral reasons. First, unlike most of the people who have addressed the prob-
lem of theodicy, Weber does not tackle the problem from a theological or 
ethical point of view; but rather, he appropriates it and discusses it primarily 
from a sociological perspective. Second, and in a similar vein, he takes up 
Nietzsche’s notion about “Ressentiment”, but he divests it of Nietzsche’s 
polemical overtones and offers a much more nuanced account of this impor-
tant notion. Third, Weber provides a detailed contrast between the theodicy 
of suffering and his unique theodicy of fortune; he argues that the lucky few 
also have a fundamental and critical need for one. Finally, Weber addresses 
the problem of theodicy, not simply from the detached viewpoint of the 
148 For a discussion of “pre-critical” and “critical” writings and how they relate to the Max 
Weber Gesamtausgabe see Klaus Litchblau, “Book Reviews”, Max Weber Studies. 2010. 
Vol.  10. No.  2. 251–256. 
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scholar; he also approaches it from the emotional viewpoint of the person 
who tries to make sense of the world.149 
The following discussion of Weber’s notion of theodicy necessitates a 
brief explanation of methodology. Two recent books on Weber’s Protestant 
Ethic and the Sprit of Capitalism exemplify two opposing methodological 
approaches: In Weber, Passion and Profits Jack Barbalet takes a sociological 
approach that is rather “critical and destructive” and insists that “it is a frag-
ment, it is polemical, and it is a personal manifesto” (Barbalet 2008: 8, 223). 
He concludes that it is the “best known but least worthy of Weber’s books”, 
in part because Barbalet sees Weber’s thinking as being mostly monolithic 
(Barbalet 2008: 225). In A Historian Reads Max Weber Peter Ghosh believes 
that The Protestant Ethic is extraordinary, but he insists that it must be ap-
proached “with the most ruthless disregard for any canonical status” (Ghosh 
2008: 3). His approach is “uncompromisingly historical” and he regards as 
“misplaced” the question whether Weber was historically correct. Instead, 
he insists that “we must understand the PE within Max Weber’s entire 
oeuvre, and within the fragile life of a single man” (Ghosh 2008: 3). Having 
said that, Ghosh correctly points out that Weber often held convictions 
throughout his life; however, he also points out that Weber did change his 
mind, and in fundamental ways. Ghosh offers as an example Weber’s views 
on capitalism; how he moved from connecting it with “landlords to uncov-
ering its religious origins” (Ghosh 2008: 79, 89). It will be evident from the 
following that I take an approach to Weber similar to Ghosh’s in that I will 
note  how much Weber’s views on the problem of theodicy remained the 
same throughout his life, but also how they were subject to revision. 
This paper is divided into four main sections: First, I show how Weber 
relates the social-psychological question of how to make sense of the world 
with the theological notion of theodicy. Second, I set out the three main 
“scientific” treatments of what Weber calls the “theodicy of suffering”: 
Hinduism, dualism, and predestination. Third, I discuss Weber’s notion of 
a Jewish theodicy and how he takes issue with Werner Sombart regarding 
the position of the Jews in world history. Here I show that his interest is 
scholarly as well as political and even personal. Fourth, I show how Weber 
moves from Sombart to Nietzsche and argue that the latter’s theory of 
“Ressentiment” helps to form Weber’s own, unique notion of a “theodicy of 
happiness”. In the concluding remarks I show how Weber’s strong personal 
149 Sam Whimster has appropriately and repeatedly drawn our attention to Weber’s emo-
tional side. For some of his latest comments, see Sam Whimster, Understanding Weber. Lon-
don: Routledge. 2007. 71–72. I would like to thank Sam Whimster for prompting me to think 
more about the existential aspect and for his thoughtful advice on a number of other issues. 
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considerations made the problem of theodicy so fundamentally important 
to him.
Theodicy and “Making Sense of the World”
In the “Religiöse Gemeinschaften” section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 
Weber writes that the theological problem of theodicy is the “unsolvable 
problem” of how to reconcile the recognition of the “imperfection of the 
world” with the belief in an all powerful deity (Weber 2001: 296–297). To-
wards the end of Politik als Beruf Max Weber provides a more complete 
version of the “age old problem of theodicy” when he poses the question: 
“How is it possible that such a power, which is both all powerful and all 
good, could have created such an irrational world which is filled with such 
undeserved suffering, so many unpunished injustices, and such unreforma-
ble stupidity?”150 
Weber’s concern is not so much with a particular version of a theodicy as 
it is with the general notion of it. Such a notion of a theodicy is fundamen-
tally a “justification” of God and that it is bound up with one’s conception 
of this deity (Weber 1989: 516, Weber 2001: 292). The person who contends 
that the deity that rules the world is an arbitrary despot has no need for such 
a justification; it is simply a matter of that deity’s will and power. Similarly, 
there is no need of a theodicy for a person who places everything in faith; the 
Church has the answer that will eliminate any doubts, and that is the doc-
trine of original sin (Lempp 1910: 1–3). However, for the person who be-
lieves that we are, or should be, in a position to understand, there is the 
problem of theodicy. As Lempp put it: “God is all powerful, all wise, all 
merciful, but the world that he created is bad, [it is] a valley of tears, human-
ity is ensnared in original sin, so why did not God make this world differ-
ent?” (Lempp 1910: 5). As long as religion remained a matter of faith, there 
would be little interest in thinking this is a problem (Troeltsch 1913b: 679). 
It is only with the rise of (Western) rationalism with its contention that we 
can understand virtually everything that the problem of theodicy arises 
(Lempp 1910: 7). 
150 Weber 1992: 241. “Das uralte Problem der Theodicee ist ja die Frage: Wie kommt es, daß 
eine Macht, die als zugleich allmächtig und gütig hingestellt wird, eine derartig irrationale 
Welt des unverdienten Leidens, des ungestraften Unrechts and der unverbesserlichen Dumm-
heit hat erschaffen können.” This is not to suggest that there is an equivalence of texts; in the 
first Weber’s concern is primarily scholarly and in the second it is mostly personal. 
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In Wissenschaft als Beruf Weber singles out two major innovations that 
paved the way for the rise of Western rationalism: the discovery of concept 
and the introduction of the rational experiment (Weber 1992: 89–90). These 
were part of the larger process of systemization, in which the world was 
increasingly “disenchanted” of magical powers. Wolfgang Schluchter ar-
gued that this process can be split into two: that which was performed by 
science and that which was accomplished by religion – specifically, by the 
religions of salvation (Schluchter 2009: 7–13). However, the two are linked 
because the rise of rationality broadened the ability to try to make sense of 
the world and by extension to solve the problem of theodicy. Unfortunately, 
the emphasis on understanding ultimately leads to the complete failure of 
providing satisfactory answers to the difficulties raised by theodicy. 
Understanding the world includes, as Lempp stated in his article on 
“Theo dicy”, determining the “reason, sense, or purpose of evil in the world” 
(“Grund, Sinn oder Zweck des Übels in der Welt”), or as Troeltsch main-
tained in his article, discovering the “final sense and reason of the world” 
(“letzten Sinn und Grund der Welt”) (Lempp 1913: 1177, 1183, Troeltsch 
1913a: 1186, 1188). Troeltsch also uses the simpler phrase, “Sinn der Welt”, 
which is the same phrase that Weber uses. Weber uses the term “Sinn” 
(“sense”) in a number of different ways. Wolfgang Schluchter claims to have 
found three different ways in which Weber uses “Sinn”: a metaphysically 
true sense, a dogmatically correct sense, and a subjectively meant sense 
(Schluchter 1991: 542). There is little doubt that this claim is correct; but for 
the purposes here I want to examine Weber’s use of “Sinn” from a different 
perspective. Weber often uses the word “Sinn” in an everyday way as when 
he writes of the “correct sense” in “Die ‘Objektivität’ sozialwissenschaftli-
che und sozialpolitische Erkenntnis” or the “sense of ‘Wertfreiheit’” in “Der 
Sinn der ‘Wertfreiheit’ der soziologischen und ökonomischen Wissenschaf-
ten” (Weber 1922b: 195 and 451). In Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft Weber 
writes of the “sense of religion” and the “sense of traditionalism” (Weber 
2001: 121, 346). And, in Wissenschaft als Beruf Weber introduces the topic of 
“Beruf” or “calling” by first setting out the “material sense of the word” and 
he refers to the “sense” of Plato’s “mania”. In these and other passages Weber 
is speaking of the technical or “Wortsinn” of the word or concept (Weber 
1992: 71, 85, 86, 105, 109). However, Weber frequently uses “Sinn” in a much 
larger and more metaphysical, if not more “ethical sense” (“ethischer ‘Sinn’”) 
(Weber 1989: 94). This is the “‘Sinn’ der Welt”, which Weber uses repeatedly 
(Weber 1989: 515, 519, Weber 1992: 92, Weber 2001: 324, 328, 356). In Wis-
senschaft als Beruf he introduces this notion by referring to Tolstoy’s ques-
tion whether death has any sense. As Weber puts it: “if death is a meaningful 
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occurrence or not” (“ob der Tod eine sinnvolle Erscheinung sei oder nicht“). 
For Tolstoy the answer was a clear “No” for the “Kulturmenschen”. Weber 
clarifies this by pointing out that the “Kulturmenschen” live by “thoughts, 
knowledge, problems,” and that they can only be “tired of life”. For them, 
death is meaningless. In contrast, death had sense for “Abraham or some 
peasant in the old days” because they were “sated with life” (Weber 1992: 
87–88). Weber elaborates upon this in the “Zwischenbetrachtung” when he 
writes of the “completion of life”. Not only do Abraham and the peasant 
have a meaningful death because they have lived a meaningful life; the “lord 
of the manor” (“Grundherr”) and the “war hero” (“Kriegsheld”) also do. 
They have fulfilled the “life cycle of their existence” (“Denn beide erfüllten 
einen Kreislaufs ihres Seins”) (Weber 1989: 518). In the “Zwischenbetrach-
tung” Weber’s point is that “culture” with its emphasis on progress is limit-
less (Weber 1989: 518). In Wissenschaft als Beruf it is the “sense” of “science” 
that it can never be “filled” or completed; it is the “progress of infinity”. We 
must expect that our scientific answers are destined to become outdated in 
10, 20, or 50 years. Weber says “that is the fate, indeed: that is the sense of the 
task of science”.151 His larger point is that science cannot give our lives 
meaning or sense. Weber does not maintain that the “scientific” person does 
not have a “meaningful vocation” (“sinnvoller Beruf”), but what he does 
maintain is that science cannot give life its meaning (Weber 1992: 88). Each 
of the previous attempts are illusions; regardless whether they are the “way 
to true being”, the “way to true art”, the “way to true God”, or even the 
“way to true happiness”. These attempts are all illusions; in addition, they 
lack sense because they cannot answer the two most fundamental questions: 
“What should we do? How should we live?” (“Was sollen wir tun? Wie sol-
len wir leben?”) (Weber 1992: 93). Science cannot approach the “last sense” 
(“letzter Sinn”), which is to answer the question of the relationship of “God, 
man and world” (Weber 1992: 93, Weber 2001: 167, 301, Hanke 2001: 215). 
This “last sense” is the relation between God and man. Or, to put it dif-
ferently, why is it that good and just people suffer and the bad and unjust do 
not? Weber formulates this into a general question: why is there such “unde-
served” or “unjust” suffering in the world? (Weber 1989: 94, 515, 519). This 
is what he calls the “theodicy of suffering” (“Theodizee des Leidens”) (We-
ber 1989: 93, 95). One of the earliest and best known stories of undeserved 
suffering is in the Old Testament Book of Job. Here the good, pious, and 
honest servant of God loses everything – family, property, and even his rep-
151 “Das ist das Schicksal, ja: das ist der Sinn der Arbeit der Wissenschaft... ” Weber 1992: 
85. 
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utation. One of Weber’s major sources on old Judaism, Hermann Gunkel, 
wrote that Job’s story is not just a moving story; it is also one of the first 
instances of doubt in the Old Testament. Previously, people simply believed 
that the pious would have health, happiness, and prosperity while the impi-
ous would suffer (Gunkel 1912: 39–40). They also believed that God pun-
ished only the wicked, or if he punished the good, it was to serve as an ex-
ample. However, Gunkel pointed out that neither of these applied in Job’s 
case (Gunkel 1912: 45–46). Bernhard Duhm, another of Weber’s sources, 
suggested that the primary focus of the book was the problem of misfortune 
(Duhm 1897: VII–VIII, XII). Lempp suggested that the Book of Job was 
designed to show that every theory about God’s justice “smashed against 
reality” (Lempp 1913: 1179). Weber held that the Book of Job was an attempt 
to intellectualize the problem of theodicy, but that it failed to offer a solution 
(Weber 2001: 275, 260). To the question whether there is a moral world or-
der, there is no answer; there is only God’s overwhelming power (Weber 
2001: 260, Duhm 1897: V). What the Book of Job did accomplish was to 
contribute to the increasing Jewish desire to provide answers in the form of 
doctrines, as the Old Testament prophets were doing (Weber 2001: 197). 
Weber maintains that the Book of Job comes from the Jewish intellectual 
circle and stems from the “natural rational desire of intellectualism to grasp 
the world as a meaningful cosmos”.152 As the belief in magic diminished so 
did the belief in the world’s “magical meaning”. As confidence in intellect 
grew the world began to make less “sense”; it was transformed into a place 
where things simply happened, and are merely happening now. As a result, 
there was an increasing demand for the world and one’s life to be ‘“meaning-
fully”’ (‘“Sinnvoll”’) ordered (Weber 2001: 273). It is by virtue of the move-
ment towards intellectualism that there is the need for the “pure thinking 
comprehension of the world and its ‘sense’” (“rein denkenden Erfassung der 
Welt und ihres ‘Sinnes’” (Weber 1989: 104). Weber emphasizes that this need 
for a “theodicy of suffering” is a rational need.153 This is the rational need to 
understand suffering. If one believes that one suffers because one is pos-
sessed by a demon or is punished because of God’s anger, then there is no 
need for a theodicy (Weber 1989: 89). Or, if one contends that the world is 
simply chaotic or that it is dominated by magical forces, then there is no way 
to comprehend it; hence no need for a theodicy. However, if one maintains 
152 “natürliche rationalistische Bedürfnis des Intellektualismus, die Welt als sinnvollen 
Kosmos zu begreifen...” Weber 2001: 272. See also “‘Sinn’ des Kosmos.” Weber 2001: 275. 
153 “Theodizee des Leidens”. He also refers to it as a “theodicy of dying” (“Theodizee des 
Sterbens”) or a “theodicy of death” (“Theodicee des Todes”). Weber varies the spelling. Weber 
1989: 94–95, 493.
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that we humans have the capacity to understand the world and that the God 
who governs does so justly then there is the need to explain why there is 
suffering. This is shown by the extraordinarily strong rational need for an 
explanation of why there is injustice in the world. Weber notes that this need 
continues even into the twentieth century and he points to a 1906 study that 
asked a number of workers for the reason why they lacked faith. Only a 
minority attributed this lack of faith to the results stemming from modern 
scientific theories while the majority placed the blame directly on the “in-
justice” of “this world order” (Weber 1989: 95). Thus, there is the continuing 
need to solve the problem of theodicy.
The Three Types of Theodicy
Every type of theodicy acknowledges that there is evil and suffering in the 
world. The task then is to try to explain why they exist – either by insisting 
that God is not all powerful or that God is not all good. Weber looks at the 
types of theodicy by their choice of explanation. According to him, there 
are three types of theodicy. In Wissenschaft als Beruf Weber merely lists 
them: they are the “Persian dualism”, the “Indian doctrine of Karma”, and 
the doctrine of predestination with its attendant notions of original sin and 
“Deus absconditus” (Weber 1992: 241). At the end of the “Zwischenbetrach-
tung” Weber lists these three again, but here he does more than simply enu-
merate them. 
Weber’s shortest treatment is on Persian dualism, and here the choice is to 
believe that God is not all powerful. In this dualism there are two dueling 
powers: the forces of light and the powers of darkness, or put differently, 
between the “pure” and the “impure” (Weber 1989: 520–521). Evil is not a 
“privation”, but is a “real” power and the world is the “showplace” of the 
“dramatic struggle” between these powers.154 God is not the cause of injus-
tice, unfairness, and sin; that is, all the conditions that provide for the need 
for a theodicy (Weber 2001: 298). There is no point in trying to justify God 
and the forces of light; rather one must help these good forces to overcome 
the dark powers (Weber 2001: 298–299, see Lempp 1913: 1178). The dark 
154 See Lempp 1913: 1178. I cite Lempp because, as I indicated above, Weber undoubtedly 
knew of Lempp’s work on theodicy because of Troeltsch. Moreover, Weber liked and used the 
Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart as indicated by his using other entries. Finally, the 
editors of the volume on the economic ethics of the world’s religions containing the “Einlei-
tung” refer to Lempp’s theodicy entry. However, they do not name him and the volume num-
ber that they give is wrong. It is not Band V; but Band IX. Weber 1989: 90, note  11. 
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powers are connected to the heaviness of the material world, while the 
 forces of good are linked to the pure and light. As a result, there is an “aris-
tocratic feeling of prestige” connected with the “pure and chosen” (Weber 
2001: 299). As an aside, Weber notes that Zarathustrian dualism is found in 
the general opposition between the forces of “heaven” and “hell” (Weber 
1989: 521).
The second form of theodicy that Weber lists in the “Zwischenbetrach-
tung” is the Indian “intellectual-religious” version, which he refers to as the 
“superior” (“hervorragende”) form of theodicy (Weber 1989: 522). Like the 
Persian dualism, the notion of an all-powerful deity recedes, but unlike the 
dualism, the “cause” of the suffering is not ascribed to any outside force, but 
rather to our own sinful nature. In his article on “Theodizee” Lempp sug-
gests that it is in the “Indian religion” that the problem of theodicy first is 
the major focus. It is also here that all human suffering is not blamed on 
some outside force but on the individual himself. As Lempp writes, all un-
filled needs and imperfections, all social necessities and the caste system, all 
political difficulties and even natural catastrophes are the result of our own 
bad deeds (Lempp 1913: 1177). And, he calls this a very “strict moral order”. 
In the volume devoted to Hinduism and Buddhism Weber speaks to this 
order by insisting that the Hindu theodicy is fundamentally rational. He 
adds that it is extraordinarily rich with doctrines (Weber 1996: 201–202, 
271). There are, he insists, two interconnected doctrines which no Hindu 
would contest: they are “Samsara” (“transmigration of souls”) and “Karma” 
(“repayment”). In essence these two doctrines combine to form the conten-
tion that the individual is destined to atone for his or her own transgres-
sions; or those of one’s family, by constantly being reborn. Weber contends 
that the idea that one is fated to eternally repeat one’s specific life is some-
thing that appears totally senseless and unendurable, so the question is, how 
does one get off this “wheel” of life? Lempp answers this by pointing to the 
need for a second theodicy. Here, the individual can hope to escape from the 
endless reincarnations by denying all bodily desires (Lempp 1913: 1178). 
Weber takes up this theme when he notes the demand for order and disci-
pline and by the need for everyday asceticism (Weber 1996: 241, 245, 250–
254). Weber notes that there is no economic influence on the development of 
these doctrines and that they instead grew out of the belief in a rational-
ly-ethically determined cosmos (Weber 1996: 206, 218). Weber believes that 
it achieves its “extraordinary metaphysical performance” (“außerordentli-
che metaphysische Leistung”) because it combines one’s self-dissolution 
with the universal approach to salvation and by the strictest “world-rejec-
tion” (“Weltablehnung”) with organic social ethics. It also achieves this by 
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combining the highest path to salvation with an “inner-wordly vocational 
ethics” (“innerweltlicher Berufsethik”) (Weber 1989: 522).  
The third type of theodicy is, in Weber’s opinion, the most important 
form of theodicy and is found in the Calvinist doctrine of predestination. As 
with the other two, the doctrine of predestination is prompted by the mas-
sive presence of “poverty, need, and destiny” (Troeltsch 1913c: 1706). As 
with the Hindu form of theodicy, the deity’s goodness is safeguarded by 
placing the blame for suffering in the world on its human occupants. But, 
here the emphasis on blaming humans is even greater. The world is a place of 
suffering because every human being is equally corrupted (Weber 1989: 
465). However, as Weber indicates, even if everyone is equally corrupt, not 
everyone has the same “chance” for religious salvation. Indeed, only a “cho-
sen few” are to be part of the “Ecclesia pura” while the vast majority are 
condemned to damnation (Weber 1989: 110, 464–465). Weber also empha-
sizes that this is not a temporal decree but an eternal one (Weber 1989: 465–
466, Weber 2001: 297). Elsewhere Weber insists that the salvation that is 
granted to the select few does not come from anything that they might have 
done or do, but is simply a “totally free foundationless gift of grace” (“ganz 
freies grundloses Gnadengeschenk”) (Weber 2001: 362). In the “Zwischen-
betrachtung” Weber directs us to what he had written about the doctrine of 
predestination in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Weber 
1989: 521, see Weber 1922a: 91). We cannot hope to understand God’s deci-
sion; it is based upon God’s “omniscience” (“Allwissenheit”) (Weber 1989: 
521, Weber 2001: 297). Nor are we in any position to evaluate it; to try to 
apply human standards is both senseless and an affront to God (Weber 
1922a: 92). Finally, we do not have any grounds for complaint; to do so is 
like an animal complaining that it was not born a human being (Weber 2001: 
297, Weber 1922a: 93). This deity is not the “revealed God”, it is the “hidden 
God” – the “Deus absconditus” (Weber 1989: 95, Weber 2001: 297). The sole 
point, or value, is God’s sovereignty, his majesty and his glory (Weber 2001: 
297, Weber 1989: 521, Weber 1922: 94, Troeltsch 1913c: 1707–1708). Any 
claim to God’s goodness is sacrificed, what remains is the intention to “save” 
God’s omnipotence. The “recognized impossibility” of measuring God’s 
decrees by human standards signifies with “lifeless clarity” (“liebloser Klar-
heit”) the impossibility of making “sense of the world” by human under-
standing. And, that puts an end to the problem of theodicy (Weber 1989: 
521). Thus, the problem is not with God, but with humans. Yet, this answer 
does not fully address the underlying problem of theodicy: even if humans 
are morally corrupt, why would an all powerful and all merciful God allow 
such horrible suffering. Rather than providing an answer to the problem of 
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theodicy, the Calvinist attempt ends in failure. As John Love pointed out, 
the emphasis on understanding was supposed to “master the world and 
transform it for God’s glory, but this had unexpected results for it led ulti-
mately to science and the disenchantment of the world” (Love 2000: 220).
The Jews and Sombart 
Weber believed that there was a group that should be considered forerun-
ners to Calvinism, and this group was the Jews (Fleischmann 1981: 266, 
270–271). He also believed that the Calvinists shared certain features of 
their attempts at a theodicy, as evidenced by the form used by the Old Tes-
tament prophets (see Hanke 2001: 223). Both are strictly limited in their 
pursuit of an answer to the problem of theodicy (Weber 2001: 298, Weber 
2005: 668, note  86). Both the Calvinists and the prophets believed in an 
all-powerful deity and both held that humans, because of their weaknesses 
and defective natures, were responsible for their sufferings (see Weber 2005: 
667). However, the Calvinists believed that this was true of all human-kind, 
whereas the prophets focused almost exclusively on their own people. The 
problem of theodicy was not an abstract and remote question. Rather the 
“entirely great questions of theodicy” go directly and immediately to the 
heart of the Jewish religion and that the Jews suffered massively under the 
“difficult theodicy problem” (Weber 2005: 530, 532). This “final question” 
was a “fundamental thesis of prophecy” (Weber 2005: 541–542). Since the 
prophets in particular and the Israelis in general rejected the power of mag-
ic they could not blame the undeserved suffering on demons and evil spirits. 
Human suffering did not come from irrational sources such as “blind acci-
dent” or through magical powers. Instead, it was an understandable and 
“fundamental thesis” that all evil stemmed from God (Weber 2005: 551, 
666). While the evils came from God, humans brought them on themselves. 
Weber relies on Hermann Gunkel’s article on the God of the Old Testament 
in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Weber 2005: 661, note  51). Origi-
nally, God loved “Israel as a father loves his sons” and he “protected, led, 
and cared” for it as a shepherd does for his flock (Gunkel 1910: 1532). Even 
Israel’s military victories were regarded as a direct result of “help” from 
God. However, God was also Israel’s “highest judge” so when Israel turned 
away from God’s justice and morality and engaged instead in injustice and 
sacrilege, God moved to punish it (Gunkel 1910: 1533). The true prophet 
believed that he was the “guardian of morality” (“Sittenwächter”) and he 
repeatedly emphasized that God is a “sovereign” (“Herrscher”) and he re-
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peatedly warned of God’s “wrath” (“Zorn”) and impending catastrophe 
(Weber 2005: 666–667, 671, 730, 735). Loss of property, sickness, and pover-
ty were all taken as indications of God’s wrath (Weber 2005: 738). Weber 
maintained that all of this pain, suffering, and poverty led to the creation of 
“the single real, earnest Theodicy” (“die einzige wirklich ernsthafte Theodi-
zee”) (Weber 2005: 736). While the Jews regarded themselves as the chosen 
“people”, they also believed that they were chosen to suffer. 
In 1911 Sombart published Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben. In it, he 
explains that he was prompted to return to the question of modern capital-
ism by Weber’s Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. In particular, 
Weber’s attempt to trace the origins of modern capitalism to Luther’s notion 
of “Beruf” and specifically to the religious ethics of Calvinism prompted 
Sombart to examine more carefully the role of the Jews in the rise of capital-
ism (Sombart 1911: V). Sombart acknowledged both Weber’s influence on 
his thinking and he admitted to the similarities between the Puritans and 
the Jews (Sombart 1911: 292–295). However, Sombart believed that there 
was an even closer affinity between the Jews and capitalism than one might 
believe, and because of their extensive connections and their specific eco-
nomic practices they were really the ones who were responsible for the ex-
pansion of capitalism throughout Europe (Sombart 1911: 49, 199–205, 242). 
Weber completely rejected Sombart’s claim that the Jews were responsible 
for the rise of modern capitalism (Fleischmann 1981: 268–269). In Weber’s 
view, Sombart had critically erred in attempting to locate its origins in the 
Jewish money economy when it was the Protestant emphasis on productiv-
ity that actually accounted for the rise of modern capitalism (Fleischmann 
1981: 268; Lichtblau 2001: 285). Finally, Weber dismissed Sombart’s claim 
for the massive Jewish economic power; arguing instead that the Jews were 
a “pariah people”. I do not want to take up Weber’s contentious claim re-
garding the “Pariavolk”, but to briefly address another one; that is, the issue 
of Nietzsche’s impact on Weber. In one regard there is little doubt that 
Nietzsche was a major force on Weber’s thinking; Weber himself said that 
Nietzsche’s influence on German thinking was paramount; only Karl Marx 
could be considered to have a similar impact (see Baumgarten 1964: 554–555, 
note  1). 
Nietzsche, “Ressentiment” and the “Negative Privileged”
Several scholars have suggested that it was not Sombart but Nietzsche who 
was the focus of Weber’s concerns (Otto 2002: 239 265; Lichtblau 2001: 285–
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286). Both Weber and Nietzsche contended that the Jews occupied a special 
place in the history of religion and that they both approached this from a 
shared problematic (Lichtblau 2001: 279). This is not the place to enter into 
the discussion about Nietzsche’s influence on Weber; rather, the sole focus 
here is on Nietzsche’s notion of “Ressentiment” and the function that it 
plays in Weber’s conceptions of theodicy. 
In the Preface to Zur Genealogie der Moral Nietzsche referred to his first 
literary attempt. As a thirteen year old boy he tried to tackle the age old 
question of the origin of evil. In it he gave “God the honor” and made him 
the “father of evil” (Nietzsche 1988: 249). In the first part of Zur Genealogie 
Nietzsche makes a far more sophisticated attempt at determining the origin 
of evil, and this time he attributes it to the Jews. Previously human history 
suggested that there was an equivalence of values: “Good=noble=power-
ful=beautiful=fortunate=God-loved” and that was accompanied by a ha-
tred of weakness (Nietzsche 1988: 267). The noble and fortunate simply be-
lieved that they were entitled to their good fortunate and they had no reason 
even to reflect upon the question whether or not they deserved it (Owen 
1991: 80). In marked contrast, the Jews spent an inordinate amount of effort 
on the question of why they “deserved” to suffer. In Nietzsche’s narrative, 
the Jews adopted what he called a “slave morality” and developed hatred of 
strength. They rose up against “the good, the beautiful, the fortunate”, 
whom they “hated” and “resented”, hence Nietzsche’s notion of “Ressenti-
ment” accompanied by his theory of “the revaluation of all values” (Nietz-
sche 1988: 270–271). 
It is to Eckart Otto’s credit that he stresses the importance of Nietzsche’s 
notion of “Ressentiment” on Weber’s thinking, which he does in the fourth 
section of his Max Webers Studien des Antiken Judentums and in his lengthy 
introduction to the volume Das antike Judentum (Weber 2005: 70, 128–130, 
Otto 243–245). However, it is mentioned only a couple of times in Das an-
tike Judentum and in one of those times the term is used in describing God’s 
“passionate wrath or sharp resentment” against the godless (Weber 2005: 
732, 813–814). Weber’s discussions of it are instead found in two other  places: 
in the Introduction to Die Wirtschaftsethik der Weltreligionen and in the 
“Religiöse Gemeinschaften” section of Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Ac-
cording to Weber, Nietzsche was the first to recognize that “Ressentiment” 
was at the foundation of the Jewish ethical salvation-religiosity and that he 
had set this out in his “brilliant essay” Zur Genealogie der Moral (Weber 
2001: 257, Weber 1989: 88). For the Jews, suffering was not something to be 
looked down upon but to be embraced; the fortunate people who looked 
down on the unfortunate should not to be envied but should be despised. 
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Weber specifically points to the Psalms as being filled with the need for re-
venge (Weber 2001: 258). The Jewish religion was one of revenge and retri-
bution (Weber 2001: 259). In Weber’s view the “feeling of revenge” is ex-
pressed by the notion of “Ressentiment” (Lichtblau 2001: 291). In many 
points, Weber shares Nietzsche’s insights; but there are fundamental differ-
ences. First, Nietzsche was wrong to attribute this simply to the “‘rising up 
of the slaves’” (“‘Sklavenaufstand’”) (Weber 1989: 89, Weber 2001: 263). Sec-
ond, Weber’s treatment of the notion of “Ressentiment” differs fundamen-
tally from Nietzsche’s: he offers a dispassionate scholarly analysis of it, 
whereas Nietzsche provides a passionate denunciation of it. Weber thinks 
that this is a small but important sociological notion; Nietzsche contends 
that it is the fundamental metaphysical/ethical point of view that is respon-
sible for virtually the entire decline of Western civilization. Weber is quick 
to acknowledge that it was Nietzsche who first drew attention to this notion 
and that it grew out of the forceful recognition of the “unequal distribution” 
of suffering. And, it led directly to the form of a theodicy of what Weber 
calls the “negative privileged” (Weber 2001: 258). Unfortunately, Nietzsche 
did not pursue this last point, so the third difference is that Weber’s own 
treatment is bound up with the important, but neglected notion, of the “neg-
ative privileged”. 
The Jews were not the only “negative privileged” people in the world, 
there have been many other disadvantaged people as well. Weber also point-
ed out that it was not just the Jewish religion, or even the Christian religion 
which was the only salvation religion. Rather, virtually all of the religions of 
the oppressed peoples were religions of salvation – and the more the people 
were oppressed, the more powerful was their hope of salvation (Weber 2001: 
255–256). In contrast to the noble and privileged people who have no need 
for salvation religions, they hold a special place for the poorer and “negative 
privileged” people (Weber 2001: 249, 252). In the past, the positive privileged 
people were the nobles; in the present they as well as the bureaucrats make 
up this class (Weber 2001: 234). In the past, the negative privileged people 
included the slaves and the free day laborers; today, it also includes the pro-
letariat (Weber 2001: 234, 246). These are the economically, politically, and 
socially disadvantaged classes who have little hope of being able to better 
their lot in life. Weber singles out Sombart’s 1906 book entitled Das Prole-
tariat for its “beautiful form” in describing how the modern factory worker 
and his family have lost almost all sense of freedom and the ability to relate 
to nature (Weber 2001: 246). Instead, the masses have almost nothing to 
soothe their lives; even their most basic needs are often unsatisfied (Weber 
2001: 247). Weber insists that it is, in fact, the special need of the negative 
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privileged to seek release (salvation) from suffering.155 The Jews may have 
felt singled out for suffering and that in turn led to the “Ressentiment” to-
wards the more fortunate. The Jews may have had a special need for a theo-
dicy, but the need for religious salvation is found in every type of the “nega-
tive privileged classes”.156 
The “Theodicy of Fortune” 
Weber notes that throughout history people believed bodily deformities and 
other types of sufferings were considered to be indications of God’s wrath. 
In contrast, those who were strong and beautiful were believed to have been 
blessed by the gods (Weber 2001: 253–254, Weber 1989: 89). This does not 
mean that the fortunate were indifferent to religion, because they were not. 
Unlike Nietzsche, Weber maintained that the beautiful and strong also 
looked to religion. They did not, however, seek it as a source of consolation: 
a “theodicy of suffering”. Instead, they saw religion as a source of legitimacy 
for their fortune – in other words, a “theodicy of fortune”. As Lichtblau put 
it, they had a need for “religious justification”, i.e. the need to feel that their 
fortune was “legitimate” (Lichtblau 2001: 281). Or, as Weber put it, this was 
a “psychical need for comfort for the legitimization of fortune” (“seelische 
Komfortbedürfnis nach Legitimät des Glückes”) (Weber 2001: 253). This 
need manifested itself in the search for legitimizing one’s political destiny, in 
the difference in economic situations, in bodily health, and even in account-
ing for success in erotic competition, among other things (Weber 2001: 253). 
Weber acknowledges that not every privileged person has this need and not 
everyone has the need for legitimization to the same degree (Weber 2001: 
253–254). However, Weber insists that “The fortunate are seldom satisfied 
with the fact of the possession of their fortunateness” (“Der Glückliche be-
gnügt sich selten mit der Tatsache des Besitzes seines Glückes”) (Weber 
1989: 89). Just as the person wanted to believe that those who were less for-
tunate, somehow “deserved” that, he also wanted to believe that he “de-
served” his happiness. The person wanted a “right” to justify his fortune, to 
show how his power, the honor, the possessions and enjoyments were 
“earned” (Weber 1989: 90). If the world’s poor masses needed a “theodicy of 
suffering”, the fortunate few also required a “theodicy of fortune”.    
155 “Ihr spezifisches Bedürfnis ist Erlösung von Leiden.” Weber 2001: 254.
156 Weber 2001: 261. The particular need for salvation was not only an issue of class; Weber 
points out that throughout history women have often been the ones seeking salvation. Weber 
2001: 250–252. 
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Max Weber counted himself as being one of the fortunate ones – in at least 
one respect. He was appointed professor at Freiburg at the age of 29 and then 
took over the prestigious chair in national economy at Heidelberg at 33. He 
recognized that he was very fortunate and he must have thought about it 
throughout his life. He refers to it in Wissenschaft als Beruf where he warns 
his student audience of the hazards and dangers of pursuing a scholarly po-
sition. He told them that he was fortunate to be promoted to full professor 
at a rather young age while many older and more deserving candidates were 
passed over. Because of this Weber insisted that he has such a “sharpened 
eye” for an “undeserved fate” (“unverdientes Schicksal”) (Weber 1992: 75). 
For most people, making the choice for an academic life is a “wild hazard”, 
and for some there is no chance. For those who are Jewish, Weber advises 
them to remember Dante’s “abandon all hope” (Weber 1992: 75, 79–80). For 
those who do begin the effort, he cautions that they must be able to tolerate 
the fact that “year after year the mediocre ones will be promoted over you.” 
If you are not favorably regarded by the students as a good teacher you will 
receive the “academic death sentence”, even if you are one of the best schol-
ars in the world (Weber 1992: 80, 78). And, the students may base their un-
favorable opinion upon the smallest of factors, like one’s temperament and 
even tone of voice. In Weber’s opinion, the academic life is dominated in the 
highest degree by “chance” and “accident” (“Zufall”); indeed, he insists that 
he can scarcely imagine any other career on earth (“Laufbahn auf Erden”) in 
which “chance” and “accident” play such a role. One person who took We-
ber’s advice seriously was not his student in any technical sense, but one 
who was immensely influenced by Weber’s life and writings: Karl Jaspers. 
Concluding Comments
In his philosophical autobiography Jaspers talks about his decision to write 
his Psychologie der Weltanschauungen and how it grew out of the terrible 
years during the First World War. He points specifically to the section on 
“Grenzensituationen” where he writes about death, suffering, accidents, 
and struggle (Jaspers 1977: 33; Jaspers 1919: 229–280). Both Kierkegaard and 
Nietzsche feature prominently in this section, but when Jaspers discusses 
the notion of theodicy he specifically draws on Weber’s treatment of the 
three types (Jaspers 1919: 252–255). For Jaspers, philosophy was the attempt 
to understand existence and that is why he looked to Weber. In his speech 
given shortly after Weber’s death, Jaspers spoke of how Weber was a philos-
opher, but not in the general sense (Jaspers 1921: 3). Jaspers admitted that 
173Concluding Comments
Weber had no philosophical system and that it would be impossible to set 
out Weber’s philosophical ‘doctrine’ (Jaspers 1958: 65). But, for him, Weber 
was the living embodiment of philosophy – not the abstract and sterile phi-
losophy of Rickert and Windelband (Saner 1970: 34; Jaspers 1977: 35). Jas-
pers insisted that Weber was more important than anyone else for the devel-
opment of his “Existenzphilosophie” and he suggested that that philosophy 
began with the Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (Jaspers 1977: 34). He 
believed that Weber’s philosophy was a “philosophy of life” and that he pro-
vided a “justification of the world”. In Max Weber. Politiker, Forscher, Phi-
losoph Jaspers refers to Weber’s comments in the “Vorbemerkung” to his 
collected essays on the economic ethics of the world religions (Jaspers 1958: 
69). There, Weber offered this unusually revealing observation: “It is true 
that a glimpse of even a portion of the course of human destiny shocks and 
brands the heart.”157 Jaspers took these kinds of expressions and went on to 
make a philosophy out of Max Weber (Adair-Toteff 2002). However, Weber 
himself counseled “One would do well to keep one’s little personal com-
mentaries to oneself….”. At the close of Wissenschaft als Beruf Weber notes 
that “all theology is the intellectual rationalizing of the possession of reli-
gious salvation” (Weber 1992: 106). But, he counsels those who cannot face 
the existential fate to go quietly into the embracing arms of the church (We-
ber 1992: 110). He admits that with these sentiments he is close to sounding 
like a prophet; however, he knew that there are those rare occasions when it 
is necessary to move from being the detached scholar to the subjective hu-
man who makes his own values clearly evident.158 Wissenschaft als Beruf was 
one of those times in which he believed it important to make his “little com-
mentaries” – commentaries about “making sense of the world.” 
157 “Daß der Gang von Menschenschicksalen dem, der einen Ausschnitt daraus überblickt, 
erschütternd an die Brust brandet, ist wahr.” Weber 1922a: 14.
158 Whimster notes another occasion, that is in Weber’s Freiburg Inaugural lecture, but 
questions how Weber “squared that” with his belief that “it was wrong to reveal to students 
what one’s own personal viewpoint was.” Whimster 2007: 274, note  41. I rarely take issue with 
Whimster, but I would suggest two points. First, Weber’s complaint was that so many of his 
colleagues moved silently between facts and values with the result that students rarely recog-
nized the difference. That is why in the “Objectivität” essay Weber insists that a person has 
the duty to make clear (to all but also especially to oneself) where the argument ends and the 
belief begins (Weber 1922b: 157). Weber readily admits that it is a “hair-fine line” that sepa-
rates science from belief (Weber 1922b: 212). Second, in the Freiburg speech Weber is 
convinced that in order to safeguard Germany’s future, it is necessary to speak about the need 
for radical social and economic change.
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Chapter Ten
Statistical Origins of the Protestant Ethic159 
In his A Historian Reads Max Weber. Essays on the Protestant Ethic Peter 
Ghosh makes the general claim: “…that the Protestant Ethic has been a cel-
ebrated and profusely discussed text since its first publication in 1904–5, yet 
historical exploration of its origins, genesis and meaning of its most central 
themes is still in its infancy.” (Ghosh 2008: 4). This is particularly true re-
garding the origins and genesis of the Protestant Ethic; many readers are 
unaware of what prompted Weber to write this work and most are puzzled 
by Weber’s use of the statistics that he utilizes in the opening section. Weber 
uses these statistics to set out the economic differences between Protestants 
and Catholics, and he explicitly borrows them from Martin Offenbacher; 
consequently, Offenbacher plays a critical role in providing the statistical 
origins for the Protestant Ethic. There have been a few scholars who have 
examined Offenbacher’s work, but in their eagerness to disprove Weber’s 
thesis, they have underappreciated Offenbacher’s overall contribution to 
Weber’s thinking.160 Yet, Offenbacher’s contribution is crucial because it is 
the empirical starting point for Weber’s entire Protestant Ethic thesis. The 
topic of Offenbacher and the role that he plays is not as narrow as it may 
seem; my goal is to begin to satisfy Ghosh’s demand that we address the 
origins and genesis of the Protestant Ethic, and I do so by illuminating Of-
fenbacher’s importance for Weber. Only when we have a better understand-
ing of the origins and the meanings of the general themes will we be able to 
appreciate his Protestant Ethic thesis.161 
159 I want to thank the four reviewers from the Journal for Classical Sociology for their 
careful reading and their constructive criticisms. I also want to thank Stephen Turner for 
commenting on several drafts of this essay.
160 Ghosh is an exception: he notes that Offenbacher’s work “supplies the academic foun-
dation of its opening chapter” but his concern is with Jews. Ghosh 2008: 129.
That Weber would use the work of his former student as a foundation for the Protestant 
Ethic is not necessarily unusual. As Lutz Kaelber has shown, Weber’s own “Doktorvater”, 
Levin Goldschmidt, cited Weber’s work “time and time again” in his own major writing. 
Kaelber 2003: 32, 35. 
161 Of the four collections devoted to the Protestant Ethic (Weber’s Protestant Ethic, Max 
Webers “Protestantische Ethik”, The Protestant Ethic Turns 100, Asketischer Protestantismus 
und der ‘Geist’ des modernen Kapitalismus) and the volume devoted to Weber’s work on 
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In this essay I will argue that the origins of Weber’s Protestant Ethic are 
found in a significant series of statistics which were compiled by one of We-
ber’s own students – Martin Offenbacher. In 1900 Offenbacher published a 
small volume entitled Konfession und soziale Schichtung in which he used a 
massive amount of statistics to help explain the social and economic superi-
ority of Protestants over Catholics. His statistics supported his claim that 
Protestants were better educated workers with more high paying jobs which 
resulted in their economic superiority over Catholics. His study was fo-
cused on the southwest German state of Baden but he also mentioned simi-
lar studies about the Rhineland and eastern Germany. He does not cite them 
specifically but he does say that they also contributed to the “‘protestan-
tischer Charakter des Kapital’” (Offenbacher 1900: 1). Offenbacher’s notion 
of the “Protestant character” prefigures Weber’s “Protestant Ethic” while 
Weber actually uses Offenbacher’s title as his own title to the first section of 
the Protestant Ethic. In addition to this, Weber cited Offenbacher and his 
statistics eight times in the first several pages of the Protestant Ethic. With 
impressive and comprehensive research Offenbacher provided Weber with 
the statistical basis to develop his Protestant Ethic thesis. 
There are important reasons for believing that Offenbacher was Weber’s 
source for inspiration, but to explicate them properly first necessitates dis-
cussing Weber’s years during and, especially prior, to his breakdown and 
illness. Accordingly, I will proceed in the following way: First, I will briefly 
Western Christianity (Max Webers Sicht des Okzidentalen Christentums) show that of 60 
articles only one can be said to deal with the origins of Weber’s thesis: Helmut Lehmann’s 
“The Rise of Capitalism: Weber versus Sombart”. Lehmann 1993. See also Poggi 1983: 5; 
Brocke 1987: 36; Guttandin 1998: 13; Kaesler 1998: 106. 
The thinking is that since Sombart had investigated the genesis of capitalism in his 1902 
Der moderne Kapitalismus and that Weber cites him several times, he must simply be re-
sponding to Sombart. To show that this is erroneous would require its own essay; suffice it to 
say that there are many problems with this answer. To offer two: Weber’s references in The 
Protestant Ethic to Sombart are fleeting and very general. Moreover, Weber was not impressed 
with Sombart’s scholarship; he often considered it shoddy and was intended solely to be pro-
vocative. Sam Whimster writes “Weber’s references to Sombart, while aiming to be corrective 
are also slightly belittling, and they give the effect that Sombart’s thesis can be disregarded.” 
Whimster 2007: 35. Weber wanted a response to Sombart, but as co-editor of the Archiv with 
Sombart, he felt that he should not be the one to write a review. Thus, he turned to the expert 
Lujo Brentano. Despite repeated requests, Brentano did not write this review; instead his 
critical review came in 1913. Lehmann suggests that Brentano’s refusal might have prompted 
Weber to look at the origins of capitalism more closely. While this is an intriguing possibility, 
it does not undermine my thesis about Offenbacher’s earlier role. Lehmann 2012: 88–94. In 
his introduction to Weber’s last lectures on economic history, Wolfgang Schluchter has a brief 
account about Weber’s repeated requests for Brentano to review Der moderne Kapitalismus 
and he also notes that most experts thought that Sombart was vain and self-promoting with 
an inclination to provocation, in short, an “Enfant terrible”. Weber 2011: 24–25. 
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discuss Weber’s “lost years” – the “silent” years which immediately followed 
his breakdown. Second, I will spend the major portion of this essay focusing 
on Martin Offenbacher’s Konfession and discuss his goals and his reasoning. 
In the third section I will examine the criticism of Offenbacher’s statistics 
and how Weber makes use of them. In the final section I will address the 
claim that Weber had “misunderstood” the cause of modern capitalism and 
that it was to be found in something other than Confessional differences; the 
so-called “alternative hypothesis”. Accordingly, my overall goal here is to 
examine Offenbacher’s writing and show how he prompted Weber to write 
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. 
Weber’s “Lost Years”
In the summer of 1897 Max Weber had a violent quarrel with his father over 
his mother’s right to continue her Heidelberg visit. Shortly afterward his 
father died, without reconciliation. For the next six years Max suffered from 
extreme nervousness and sleepless nights and often relied on drugs for help. 
He struggled to teach but often could not complete the semester (Weber 
2008: 50). Weber asked the ministry of Baden to be let go, it was finally with 
his third request in 1903 that it was granted. For long periods of time Weber 
was unable to concentrate on work. The years from 1898 to 1903 are often 
regarded as Weber’s “lost years” and a glance at his publications tends to 
confirm this: In 1898 Weber rewrote one work and published a single two-
page article. In 1899 he published a brief note  and two editor’s remarks – the 
total number of pages for that year was 14. The following year was no better: 
three editor’s comments which totaled fewer than ten pages (Kaesler 1998: 
274–275). But, it would be a mistake to believe that Weber was so incapaci-
tated that he could not function either as a scholar or a teacher. While he 
could not lecture he was actively involved with a number of students and 
aided them with the completion of their dissertations. One such student was 
Leo Wegener who wrote Der Wirtschaftliche Kampf der Deutschen mit den 
Polen um die Provinz Posen: Eine Studie and which has all the markings of 
Weber’s influence. While it is dedicated to a medical doctor who apparently 
saved his life, Wegener indicates that it was Max Weber who prompted his 
interest in this project (Wegener 1903: III, V). Wegener offers Weber one of 
the highest tributes that a student can offer when he concludes his preface 
with the words: “Whoever has had the privilege to be allowed to name Pro-
fessor Max Weber as his teacher, knows that he will remain in his debt for-
ever.” (Wegener 1903: VI). Wegener’s book was published in Posen, but sev-
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eral of the other dissertations were published in Weber’s home state of 
Baden. Perhaps the most famous of these dissertations was the one written 
by Weber’s own wife. Marianne had studied under Heinrich Rickert and 
wrote her dissertation under his direction, but Max seemed to have support-
ed her.162 Her Fichte’s Sozializmus und sein Verhältnis zur Marx’schen Dok-
trin was published as part of the series Volkswirtschaftliche Abhandlungen 
der Badischen Hochschule. This series was started in 1897 and its editorial 
board originally consisted of four members: These included Heinrich Herk-
ner, Carl Johannes Fuchs, and Gerhart von Schulze-Gävernitz. The fourth 
member was Max Weber himself. The publisher was none other than We-
ber’s own, J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck) located in Tübingen. Weber wrote a 
short text in which he noted that the works published in the series would 
either be from teachers in Baden or from their students.163 He wrote the 
editor’s remarks for several volumes, including the one by Marianne; how-
ever, he did not write anything for Offenbacher (Kaesler 1998: 275). Martin 
Offenbacher’s Konfession und soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie über die 
Wirtschaftliche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden was pub-
lished in two versions, one in 1900 and a second one in 1901; but it appears 
to be a reprint of the previous version. Like Wegener, it is obvious that We-
ber had a major influence on him and his writing. The second title page of 
Offenbacher’s book reads: “Aus dem SEMINAR DES HERRN PROF. Dr. 
MAX WEBER in Heidelberg”. The seminar was likely Weber’s 1897/1898 
Heidelberg seminar on agrarian politics, which he based upon his earlier 
agrarian studies. Offenbacher refers to Weber’s work showing the notable 
difference between Protestants and Catholics in Eastern Germany (Offen-
bacher 1900: 1). Weber’s work on agrarian policies was not just theoretical, 
but he knew from personal experience what was happening in parts of Prus-
sia. He was stationed in Pozen in 1894 during his second tour of military 
service.164 As a result, he saw first-hand the social-economic problems which 
came from the religious-cultural differences. Weber was rather concerned 
with what was happening because of his own experiences as well as his re-
search. As a result, he was able to pass on his expertise in the agrarian mat-
ters to his students, both at Freiburg and then at Heidelberg. 
162  Bärbel Meurer contests this and insists that Max was too envious of her ability to work. 
Meurer 2010: 144.
163 Fuchs and Schulze-Gävernitz were teachers who published in the series; students in-
cluded Robert Liefmann, Walter Borgius, and Walter Abelsdorff. Weber 1993: 674–675.
164 Baumgarten 1964: 687–688; Weber 2008: 69. Mommsen insists that Weber was also 
there in 1888. Mommsen 1974: 22.
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Martin Offenbacher and Max Weber 
In Weber’s view one of the most pressing problems facing Germany was the 
influx of workers from the East. So, it was natural for him to advise students 
who were interested in this problem and to support their research and their 
dissertations. For comparison’s sake I begin with a brief look at Wegener’s 
Der Wirtschaftliche Kampf der Deutschen mit den Polen um die Provinz 
Posen. Although there is no concrete evidence it is likely that the title was 
Weber’s suggestion – the phrase “economic struggle” is found throughout 
Weber’s writings. Like many of Weber’s own writings, Wegener’s book is 
both dryly statistical and highly political; Wegener has dozens of pages of 
tables coupled with political analyses. And, as with Weber’s work, it is both 
historical as well as contemporary; Wegener offers a lengthy discussion of 
the history of the movements of Germans to the East as well as noting the 
current problems. Most interesting, he discusses the growing Catholic pop-
ulation and the resulting issues with Catholic schools. Partially because the 
schools were overfilled and partially because the parents needed the chil-
dren to work, the children were less inclined to attend classes (Wegener 
1903: 75–76). More importantly, Catholics are not as “tüchtig” (“industri-
ous”); they do not work as hard as the Protestants nor do they appreciate the 
competency of the Protestant doctors, lawyers, and other trained profes-
sionals (Wegener 1903: 207–208). Although Wegener concentrated on the 
differences between Protestants and Catholics, there were other factors at 
play: not only was there the social-economic difference, there were also cul-
tural, linguistic, and even racial differences. 
If a study were to be undertaken in order to show the differences based 
solely or primarily on religious difference then that study would have to 
eliminate all of these other factors. That is what Martin Offenbacher does in 
his study. By focusing on one part of Germany he could focus just on the 
differences between Protestants and Catholics. It is this focus that Weber 
then uses in The Protestant Ethic. Weber makes the connection to Offen-
bacher explicit in a number of ways. First, Weber’s choice of title for the in-
troductory section of Part One is Konfession und Soziale Schichtung – which 
is the exact title of Offenbacher’s book. Second, Offenbacher wrote of the 
“Protestant character of capitalism” which is very similar to Weber’s “Prot-
estant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.” Third, Weber cites Offenbacher 
more often than just about any contemporary scholar. 
Very little seems to be known about Offenbacher and not very much 
about his book. Some commentators have mentioned it but it is unclear 
whether they have actually read it. It is a rather short work, running to just 
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over one hundred pages. Unlike Wegener’s book, Offenbacher’s is not po-
lemical; but, like his, it is often very dry. Offenbacher devotes thirty pages 
alone to statistics. He also provides four detailed maps of Baden as well as a 
number of smaller maps, all designed to help illustrate his points. 
In 1900 Baden was a member of the German Reich, a comparatively small 
state compared to Prussia and Bavaria, but one of considerable importance. 
In the north was the university city of Heidelberg and nearby was Mann-
heim, one of the leading manufacturing cities. The Rhine served as a western 
border and Lake Constance was to the south. Constance was also part of 
Baden. The state was long and narrow; it would not be enlarged until 1952 
when it merged with Württemberg to become Baden-Württemberg. Offen-
bacher deals briefly with Baden’s history, which he divides into three un-
equal periods. The first period ran up to the time of the Peace of Augsburg, 
meaning 1555. The second continued until 1571, and it included the rapid rise 
in the number of Protestant converts and the reintroduction of Catholicism. 
The third began with the reaction and continued until 1799. Offenbacher 
suggests that things did not deviate much after that (Offenbacher 1900: 4). 
If Baden’s history is not of paramount importance to Offenbacher, it is 
obvious that methodology is. He makes several critical remarks about how 
his study is related to pressing contemporary issues and how his differs from 
those of others. The pressing issue is the continuing question of how one’s 
social-economic situation is connected to one’s religious affiliation. Both 
Protestants and Catholics fought over it, with the former claiming that the 
Catholics were inferior and the latter insisting that they were not. This was 
not some idle question; it was of major concern for decades and with both 
sides arguing for their respective superiority. A major point of conflict came 
during the 1870s with Bismarck’s “Kulturkampf”, which was a response to 
the recent Infallibility Decree. Bismarck insisted that a citizen’s allegiance 
was to the State and not to the Church. Others chimed in to insist on the 
intellectual freedom needed for science. Many Catholics simply avoided the 
conflict while others sided with the Pope. There were also some who tried to 
combine religious conviction with intellectual progress. Two of these schol-
ars were B. Schell and von Hertling. The first wrote Der Katholizisimus als 
Prinzip des Fortschrittes and the second published Das Prinzip des Katholi-
zismus und die Wissenschaft. Both authors took pains to try to establish that 
Catholics were not anti-science and anti-progress: Catholicism is the princi-
ple of progress and the principle of Catholicism is science. These works were 
of such contemporary importance that Offenbacher cites them and Weber 
also (Offenbacher 1900: 23–24, Weber 1904: 1). Offen bacher mentions addi-
tionally that research into the confessional differences has been going on for 
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decades; however, in his opinion most of this research was flawed because of 
methodological problems. He points specifically to the research done in the 
East and notes that one cannot get accurate results in comparing religious 
affiliations with social-economic situations because there are so many other 
factors involved (Offenbacher 1900: 1). To minimize these difficulties and to 
maximize the accuracy of his conclusions Offenbacher decided to focus on 
Baden – it had a single language, it was relatively compact, and was cultur-
ally relatively homogeneous. He makes it clear that he is uninterested in 
doctrinal and theological issues; his single focus is on the economic condi-
tions of both religious groups. Thus, he claims that the way that he intends 
to use it is in the “anthropological” way (Offenbacher 1900: 1). 
Offenbacher notes how Baden embodies a number of important features. 
First, is the “natural and the political-historical influences” of the region. 
Baden is a region rich in natural resources – from the many forests to the 
fertile agricultural lands. It is also divided rather clearly into different sec-
tions – those populated by Protestants and those by Catholics. In Offen-
bacher’s view, this land is fruitful and blessed for both Confessions (Offen-
bacher 1900: 12–13). Besides the “natural and political-historical influences” 
he will also examine what he calls the “cultural influences”, by which he 
primarily means the educational differences. Given this background, Offen-
bacher believes that it is less difficult here than in other territories to answer 
the two questions: Which factors are present in the different regions for the 
different Confessions, and more importantly, how do the different Confes-
sions make use of the “natural” resources found in Baden. Offenbacher aims 
to answer these questions by looking first at the differences in the types of 
properties that the Protestants and Catholics own. He admits that this may 
not be the single cause of the differences in the economic situations, but he 
insists both that it is legitimate to consider this a result and that there both 
parts stand in an indisputable interconnectedness. 
Offenbacher contends that it is necessary to investigate the “cultural in-
fluences”; that is, he intends to investigate the general and the vocational 
educations of both Protestants and Catholics. When one Confession places 
considerably more value on education than the other, then it is reasonable to 
assume that this has a direct relation on the social and economic positions of 
the adherents to that faith. It is this last point that Offenbacher suggests 
deserves special attention (Offenbacher 1900: 2–3).
Offenbacher begins by providing historical statistics regarding the divi-
sion of Baden into Protestant, Catholic, and mixed regions. The earliest sta-
tistics are from 1828, the next are from 1861, with the most recent stemming 
from 1895. Offenbacher immediately notes as interesting the increasing 
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numbers of Catholics in Baden’s south (Offenbacher 1900: 7). But, even 
more interesting to him is the increase in Protestants throughout Baden 
(Offenbacher 1900: 7–8). These are important points; however, what strikes 
one as being more important are the differences in numbers. Offenbacher 
gives the numbers for seven predominately Catholic areas as a total of 6301 
Catholics but only 101 Protestants; for four predominately Protestant areas 
there are 4864 Protestants to only 70 Catholics (Offenbacher 1900: 6). This 
radical difference seems startling in 2012, but it must not have seemed un-
usual to Offebacher in 1900. This major difference is found not only among 
regions but also among towns. Again, the north/south divide is present; 
Catholic towns and cities are found primarily in the south while the Protes-
tant ones are located in the north. To use two Catholic examples: Constance 
was 92.9% Catholic and only 5.7% Protestant; Freiburg was 73.8% com-
pared to 24.5%. For two Protestant examples there is Mannheim with 52.6% 
Protestant and 42.2% Catholic; Heidelberg had 61.8% compared to 35.5% 
(Offenbacher 1900: 9). The differences for the northern Protestant cities 
may not have been as strong as for the southern Catholic ones; there are still 
significant differences.
Offenbacher then moves to discuss the “cultural influences” which he be-
lieves can be set out in terms of education. He notes that education is com-
pulsory for both Protestants and Catholics so it is relevant to look at the 
educational differences. In contrast to the United States, Germany in 1900 
as well as today had a variety of different types of schools. Offenbacher had 
no need to explain the German education system and its hierarchy of schools 
to his readers but it is helpful to try to explain some of this here. The “höhe-
ren Bürgerschulen” were the most basic of the school types that Offen ba-
cher lists and were the easiest to get into and to finish. “Realschulen” were 
higher and required better grades to enter and were more difficult to finish. 
“Oberealschulen” were the next step up, followed by “Realgymnasien”. 
These were a combination of vocational and academic schools. At the high-
est level were the “Gymnasien” – which had the most stringent entry re-
quirements. They required the highest entry scores and grades and were al-
most exclusively devoted to humanistic training. The primary purpose of 
these was to educate the students in such a manner that they could go on to 
a university. The numbers here are also interesting: in the four lower catego-
ries Protestant students made up a significantly higher percentage than 
Catholics, but at the “Gymnasium” level it was reversed, but only slightly.165 
165 Catholics 46% to 43% Protestants. The remaining percentage was Jewish. Offenbacher 
1900: 16.  
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This is explained by the large numbers of Catholics who study theology. In 
line with this Offenbacher discusses other vocational choices: Protestants 
are the majorities in the military, in law, in medicine, and in science. Catho-
lics have the higher percentage in the fields of finance, tax, and veterinary 
medicine (Offenbacher 1900: 19–20).
However, in terms of education and vocation these percentages are not 
fully understandable; unless one places them within the context of the entire 
population of Baden. In 1895 there were a total of 1,725,464 inhabitants in 
Baden, of which 25,903 were Jewish, 637,946 Protestant, and 1,057,075 were 
Catholic. Thus, the Jewish percentage was 1.5, the Protestant was 37.0, and 
the Catholic was 61.3. So, in the context of these percentages the percentages 
of Catholics who continue in the higher schools and take up the “higher” 
vocations are far less than it would otherwise seem. Offenbacher’s point is 
that Protestants generally make up the larger percentage of students in the 
higher levels than do Catholics, but when one factors in the smaller number 
of Protestants to Catholics then this percentage is really much larger and 
much more important.
Offenbacher then moves to take up his other issue, the one about proper-
ty ownership. This is, as Offenbacher noted, related to his first issue; that 
the better educated one is the greater income the person is likely to have and 
the greater the income the greater the likelihood of owning more/more val-
uable property. He cautions that these numbers are general and they are 
based upon various types of taxes. And, he notes that the numbers are some-
what skewed because of the difference in the cultural and economic practic-
es of the different religions. He points specifically to the Catholic practice of 
donating money to the churches and monasteries. But, he also suggests that 
this is not sufficient to account for the noticeable difference between Protes-
tant and Catholic property owners (Offenbacher 1900: 22). What he points 
to instead is that overall one finds that the significant beginning of modern 
German industry occurred in Protestant areas. In the second section of his 
book Offenbacher sets out the relationship between confessions and con-
temporary economic differences. What is immediately noticeable is how 
Protestants tend to be found more in the cities than in the rural areas (Of-
fenbacher 1900: 33, 38). He then contrasts this with two specific rural areas, 
the forests in the Schwarzwald in the Southwest and the Odenwald in the 
Northeast. The first is almost exclusively Catholic; the second is more 
mixed. He then considers two types of major vocation in these areas – for-
estry and hunting. In both Catholics are heavily represented (Offenbacher 
1900: 39–40). In contrast to these two areas with their two primary voca-
tions, Offenbacher next considers the other areas of Baden and notes that 
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the number of different types of vocation in the areas of industry, mining, 
etc. is 160. He focuses on two types of workers – the untrained or less trained 
worker and the heavily trained one – and he looks at the areas with the lo-
cally recruited industrial workers and those areas without locally recruited 
workers. With regards to the first, Offenbacher looks to specific industries 
within specific areas. For example, he looks at the tobacco industry in 
Mann heim and Karlsruhe in the North and Freiburg in the South. This is 
the lowest social and economic group of workers and the majority is Catho-
lic (Offenbacher 1900: 43). He then compares this with the textile industry 
in the three areas and he finds that the officials and the independent workers 
are overwhelming Protestants (Offenbacher 1900: 45). With respect to the 
second, he looks at the building and machine fabrication as well as breweries 
and paper industries. He again finds that in these fields the higher social and 
economic workers tend to be Protestant. (Offenbacher 1900: 46–55). The 
individual numbers tend to confirm the result: Protestant workers are con-
siderably better off economically. Based on his statistics, Offenbacher’s con-
clusion is that Protestants are better educated, better trained, work in larger 
industries, are better paid, and own more property (Offenbacher 1900: 17, 
22, 42). Protestants are more likely to consider hard work as a virtue (“Ehre 
der Arbeit”; “honor of work”) whereas Catholics appear to think that other 
practices are more important (Offebacher 1900: 19). Weber quotes exten-
sively from Offenbacher’s conclusion: Catholics are content with less in 
contrast to Protestants; they do not care to work too hard in contrast to the 
ever striving Protestants. Weber suggests that the saying may be meant as a 
joke: “Either good eating or peaceful sleeping. In the preceding case the 
Protestant eats well, while the Catholic wants to sleep peacefully.”166 
That citation was one of a total of eight that Weber uses regarding Offen-
bacher’s Konfession und Soziale Schichtung. And, all eight occur within the 
first seven pages of The Protestant Ethic.167 These include page 2 notes 3, 4, 
5, 6; page 4 notes 7, 8; page 5 note  9; and page 7, note  11. Some of these are 
short references, such as notes 4, 7, and 11 but some are Weber’s confirming 
166 “Der Katholik [in Baden] ist ruhiger; mit geringerem Erwerbstrieb ausgestattet, gibt er 
auf einen möglichst gesicherten Lebenslauf, wenn auch mit kleinerem Einkommen, mehr, als 
auf ein gefährdetes, aufregendes, aber eventuell Ehren und Reichtümer bringendes Leben. 
Der Volksmund meint herzhaft: entweder gut essen, oder ruhig schlafen. Im vorliegenden Fall 
ißt der Protestant gut, während der Katholik ruhig schlafen will.” What Weber does not men-
tion but certainly would approve of is Offenbacher’s insistence that he is not judging one or 
the other, because “the choice is a matter of faith, not a matter of science.” Offenbacher 1900: 
68. Weber 1904: 6–7. 
167 The number is nine if one counts footnote  2; that is, the reference to Schell and von 
Hertling.
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that he relied primarily on Offenbacher’s statistics and conclusions. These 
include notes 5, 6, and 9. However, note  3 is the most important one because 
in it Weber first mentions Offenbacher and notes how much he relies on his 
student’s work. Because of its importance I give it here in its entirety:
Several years ago one of my students had worked through the most exhaustive mate-
rial on this matter which we possess, the Baden Confessional statistics. See Martin 
Offenbacher, Konfession und soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie über die Wirtschaftliche 
Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden, Tübingen and Leipzig 1901 (Volume 
IV, Issue 5 of the Volkswirtschaftlichen Abhandlungen der badischen Hochschulen). 
The facts and numbers that will be used for illustration all stem from this work. 168 
Notes 5 and 6 indicate how immensely Weber relies on Offenbacher’s work. 
Most commentators overlook Weber’s use of Offenbacher, but there are two 
scholars who do not. Unfortunately, Richard F. Hamilton and Kurt Samu-
elsson are highly critical of both Weber and Offenbacher’s use of statistics.
Statistical Criticisms
In The Social Misconstruction of Reality Richard Hamilton spends a consid-
erable amount of effort criticizing Max Weber and his Protestant Ethic and 
the Spirit of Capitalism. He makes a number of criticisms, but he focuses 
primarily on Weber’s statistics. Not content to regard them as erroneous, he 
also takes aim at Weber’s source – Offenbacher. Hamilton is not alone in 
attacking Weber and Offenbacher; he is joined by Kurt Samuelsson and his 
Religion and Economic Action. A Critique of Max Weber. Since Hamilton 
acknowledges that he relies heavily on Samuelsson’s book, it seems fair to 
examine Hamilton and Samuelsson together. 
Hamilton’s The Social Misconstruction of Reality has the subtitle Validity 
and Verification in the Scholarly Community. He defines “social miscon-
struction” as the “widespread agreement about facts or interpretation that is 
mistaken” (Hamilton 1996: 1). Hamilton’s intent is to debunk a number of 
social misconceptions or as he also puts it, myths. Hamilton is very proud of 
his skepticism which he claims “has allowed me to get behind texts that 
168 “Einer meiner Schüler hat vor einigen Jahren das eingehenste statistische Material, 
welches wir über diese Dinge besitzen, die badische Konfessionsstatistik, durchgearbeitet. 
Vgl. Martin Offenbacher, Konfession und Soziale Schichtung. Eine Studie über die wirtschaft-
liche Lage der Katholiken und Protestanten in Baden. Tübingen und Leipzig 1901 (Bd IV, 
Heft 5 der volkswirtschaftlichen Abhandlungen der badischen Hochschulen). Die Thatsa-
chen und Zahlen, die nachstehend zur Illustration vorgeführt werden, entstammen alle dieser 
Arbeit.” Weber 1904: 2, note  3.
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other readers have taken at face value.” (Hamilton 1996: xi). He takes on a 
number of myths; including the myth that Mozart died in poverty and that 
Hitler’s support did not come from middle-class, educated German citizens. 
He bemoans the fact that too often academics are not skeptics but he admits 
that skepticism is often difficult to practice. He admits to having given the 
Protestant ethic “credence through the early 1970s before gradually recog-
nizing and discovering many serious difficulties.” (Hamilton 1996: x–xi). 
However, he did not recognize these difficulties on his own, as he admits that 
he relies heavily on Samuelsson’s work. Samuelsson, a Swedish economist, 
published his book in 1957 with the English translation appearing in 1961.
Both Hamilton and Samuelsson take issue with the vast majority of works 
written about Weber’s Protestant thesis. They both claim that virtually 
everyone agrees with Weber that there is a connection between capitalism 
and Protestantism; the disagreement was only about how much of a connec-
tion there was. In Samuelsson’s view, neither Weber’s proponents nor his 
critics framed the question properly – they were too preoccupied with de-
termining what the relation was between Protestantism and capitalism 
when, in Samuelsson’s view, the more fundamental issue was whether there 
even was such a relationship (Samuelsson 1961: 26). He then spends the re-
mainder of this short work attempting to show that there was no such rela-
tionship. Hamilton shares this conviction with Samuelsson; indeed, he bases 
much of his own criticism of Weber on the earlier work (Hamilton 1996: 33). 
Specifically, he looks at Weber’s use of Offenbacher’s statistics and, like 
Samuelsson, claims that they are wrong. While I believe that there are sever-
al fundamental problems with Samuelsson’s and Hamilton’s criticism, I will 
focus only on the criticism of Weber’s and Offenbacher’s statsistics. 
I begin with Samuelsson: he correctly points out that Offenbacher’s book 
contains a typographical error which skews his reading of the Protestants 
by 15%; an error which is carried over by Weber (Samuelsson 1961: 138). 
But, as Hamilton notes, Samuelsson’s numbers are also incorrect (Hamilton 
1996: 33). Moreover, Samuelsson is highly selective; he reproduces only a 
handful of Offenbacher’s charts; thus, it is difficult to verify his own num-
bers. Samuelsson suggests that the most that Weber could claim is that there 
is a regional, and not a religious, correlation. He notes that Weber’s and 
Offenbacher’s statistics show that Protestants tended to live in cities, in con-
trast to Catholics who lived in rural areas. He acknowledges that Catholics 
owned large estates whereas Protestants tended to invest differently (Samu-
elsson 1961: 142, 144). However, he does not address the issue that Catholics 
would keep their lands within the family, thus they would not benefit from 
the sale whereas the Protestants would be able to profit from their invest-
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ments. Nor, does Samuelsson address the issue of schooling, other than to 
say only that Catholics tended to go to Catholic schools whereas Protestants 
went to Protestant ones. Thus, he misses Weber’s point that the rural Catho-
lic schools tended to be more traditional and conservative in contrast to the 
more innovative and modern Protestant schools. This lack of understanding 
is also shown by his statement regarding the claim that 35 Protestants chose 
the officer corps in contrast with only 14 Catholics: “In what way the officer 
corps could be more “capitalistic” than the priesthood, which was a more 
usual career amongst Catholics, is not specified.” (Samuelsson 1961: 142). It 
should be obvious that priests are primarily interested in souls and less in-
terested in money, but that the officer corps is a means of establishing one’s 
reputation and developing future financial connections. For Offenbacher 
there was no question that religious affiliation played the most important 
role in determining one’s financial well-being. More valuable property and 
better education gave Protestants a greater opportunity for better jobs, thus 
contributing even more to greater wealth. In contrast, the traditional incli-
nation to live in traditionally rural areas and be engaged in traditional agri-
cultural work meant that they continued to be less productive and less 
wealthy than the Protestants. In this Weber followed Offenbacher’s conten-
tion that the social and economic differences between Protestants and 
Catholics could be traceable to their religious traditions and beliefs.169
The “Alternative Hypothesis” Criticisms
Hamilton’s statistical criticisms appear relatively minor compared to his 
complaint about Weber’s main thesis about Confessional differences. He be-
lieves that there is an “alternative hypothesis” that Weber simply ignored. 
This is a powerful charge and Hamilton expends considerable effort to make 
it. He begins again with Offenbacher, noting that he had begun his work by 
setting out the natural and historical background. Hamilton is rather care-
169 George Becker has three articles purporting to undercut both Offenbacher’s and We-
ber’s conclusions. Becker 1997, Becker, 2000, and Becker 2009. However, the target of Be-
cker’s critique seems to be Robert Merton. Becker also believes that we should be “struck by 
Weber’s failure to view Offenbacher’s school enrollment statistics in the politically and reli-
gious charged context of the times.” Becker 2000: 321; Becker 2009: 199–200. However, We-
ber’s whole work indicates that he was well aware of this context. Equally important, Becker’s 
emphasis on the “Kulturkampf” reinforces the scholarly and objective importance of Offen-
bacher’s and Weber’s statistics. Even Becker admits that the statistics are mostly correct and 
he acknowledges the lack of educational parity between Protestants and Catholics. Becker 
1997: 491; Becker 2000: 320; Becker 2009: 202. What Becker really seems to object to, is We-
ber’s “idealist” misinterpretation. Becker 1997: 494; Becker 2000: 322; and Becker 2009: 209.
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ful here and he is mostly correct. The only real point of contention is Ham-
ilton’s claim that the land in the Catholic southern part of Baden was of 
“very poor quality” whereas Offenbacher stressed that all of Baden was fer-
tile (Hamilton 1996: 45; Offenbacher 1900: 12–13). Hamilton’s larger point 
focuses on something different – the location of Protestants and Catholics. 
He notes that Weber had pointed out that in the sixteenth century cities 
overwhelmingly turned Protestant, and that allowed Weber to draw a con-
clusion about the nineteenth century, and that was that cities continued to 
be predominantly Protestant. The corollary was that Catholics tended to 
live in small towns and rural areas, and the distances in the rural areas made 
access to education difficult. Hamilton maintained that in the late nine-
teenth century the Realgymnasiums, which emphasized modern languages, 
sciences, and mathematics, tended to be found in heavily urban areas. His 
conclusion was that “on the whole, that attendance in such schools was eas-
ier for Protestants than for Catholics” (Hamilton 1996: 45). Hamilton de-
rived part of his support for his conclusion from Samuelsson; Samuelsson 
had indicated that more Protestants lived in cities than did Catholics and 
that Protestants were more likely to send their children to schools in which 
the education was better suited for future merchants (Samuelsson 1963: 137). 
However, Samuelsson contended that Weber was premature in identifying 
the causal relationship between economic development and religious beliefs, 
and he insisted that Weber had ignored other possible grounds for this rela-
tion (Samuelsson 1963: 137, 144–146). Samuelsson does not spend much time 
on this question and moves to making (unwarranted) criticisms of Weber’s 
heuristic device of “ideal types”. In contrast, Hamilton devotes a considera-
ble amount of effort to examining this question. He begins by insisting that 
“Most methods texts list three requirements for a demonstration of causali-
ty.” (Hamilton 1996: 47). He concedes that Weber easily meets the first two: 
that there the two variables are associated, and that one is chronologically 
prior to the other. However, in Hamilton’s opinion, Weber paid “little atten-
tion” to the third requirement. In Hamilton’s words the third requirement 
is: “that no other prior third variable can, when held constant, cause the 
original association to disappear.” This is what he calls the “alternative hy-
pothesis” and he claims that Weber’s treatment of this was “extremely 
casual” (Hamilton 1996: 47). Hamilton himself does not set this out. In-
stead, he casts doubt on Weber’s use of sources purporting to connect Prot-
estantism and business sense, calling it “casual citation” and complaining of 
Weber’s “confident judgment” (Hamilton 1996: 49). What he seems to be 
suggesting is that Weber has overlooked another possible explanation for the 
connection between Protestantism and economic success.
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What this “alternative hypothesis” could be is relatively easy to answer: it 
could be the correlation between cities and economic prosperity. After all, 
both Hamilton and Samuelsson note  that more Protestants lived in cities 
than did Catholics. More importantly, both Weber and Offenbacher argue 
that financial prosperity is found in Protestant cities and that economic 
backwardness is a Catholic rural phenomenon. An “alternative hypothesis” 
could be that economic differences are not predicated on the differences be-
tween Protestants and Catholics, but on the differences between urban 
centers and rural areas. It might be simply a happenstance that the majority 
of city dwellers were Protestants and that most Catholics lived in rural re-
gions. In light of the above, this “alternative hypothesis” has much to re-
commend it. Nonetheless, this “alternative hypothesis” can be dismissed.
Offenbacher does spend a great deal of time and effort discussing the dif-
ferences between Protestants and Catholics in cities. He divides the towns 
into those with under 2,000 inhabitants, those between 2,000 and 5,000, 
those between 5,000 and 20,000, and finally those over 20,000 (Offenbacher 
1900: 90–99). I want to focus on the larger towns, those over 20,000 people. 
These in the south include Constance, Ueberlingen, and Freiburg. In 1828 
Ueberlingen proper had 7,352 Catholics and only 10 Protestants; by 1895 it 
had been joined by the towns of Meersburg and Salem and had 25,708 
Catholics and 1,003 Protestants (Offenbacher 1900: 71). Freiburg had 60,689 
Catholics and 18,576 Protestants, thus being more like the northern cities 
because of the higher ration of Protestants to Catholics. In the north the 
cities include Heidelberg (with Neckargmünd) and had 53,302 Protestants 
and 27,179 Catholics; Pforzheim, which had 55,525 Protestants and 12,474 
Catholics, and Mannheim; which had 63,580 Protestants and 53, 768 Catho-
lics. Not only were the northern towns composed of a more mixed ratio 
than the southern ones, but there were other fundamental differences. Like 
Constance, Ueberlingen, Meersburg, and Salem were and still are resort ar-
eas but had (and have) virtually no major industries. Freiburg also lacks in-
dustry but it did have the university (Constance did not gain a university 
until 1966). Compare this with some of the northern cities: Like Freiburg, 
Heidelberg had a university, but it also had some major industries: cement 
and printing press manufacturing. Pforzheim had jewelry and leather facto-
ries, and Mannheim was and is a major trading city. Furthermore, it was 
(and) is the major intersection for European rail and ship traffic. It also had 
a significant reputation in the 1880s and 1890s for modern technological 
innovations with names like Siemens and Benz. These three northern Baden 
cities share the fundamental feature of heavy industry.
192 10. Statistical Origins of the Protestant Ethic
In a final move, Offenbacher focuses on the major industries in these cit-
ies and he differentiates between the untrained and trained workers in them. 
There are some revealing statistics: In Mannheim, Protestants made up 
64.2% of highly trained machine builders compared to 35.8% of Catholics, 
and these figures held true to some degree in Karlsruhe (64% to 35.6%) and 
Freiburg (64.3% to 35.7%); only in Constance are these reversed (14.7% to 
85.3%). (Offenbacher 1900: 96). In contrast, Catholics made up the greater 
percentage of untrained employees. Mannheim had 52.2 % Catholics to 
47.8% Protestants; Freiburg had 64.2% to 35.8%; Constance 58.9% versus 
41.1%. Only in Karlsruhe are these columns reversed with 56.4% Protes-
tants in contrast to 43.1% Catholics. To give another example: in Karlsruhe 
77.8% of the gold and silver smiths and jewelers was Protestant, compared 
to 22.2% of the Catholics. These are just a fraction of the statistics that Of-
fenbacher uses to help show that Protestants were better educated and better 
employed than Catholics and that served to explain the economic discrepan-
cy between the two Confessions. In light of the above, it is hard to believe 
that neither Offenbacher nor Weber had considered the “alternative hypoth-
esis”; indeed, it seems that both went out of their way to show that it was not 
possible. Martin Offenbacher had focused on the considerable importance 
that Protestants placed on higher vocational choices, thus prefiguring We-
ber’s emphasis on the heightened importance of “calling” and the greater 
conviction that money seems to matter more to Protestants. Accordingly, 
both showed that there was a correlation between Confessional conviction 
and prosperity. Weber made use of these statistics and observations and then 
traced them back to Luther’s notion of “Beruf” and Calvin’s doctrine of 
Predestination.
Concluding Remarks
There is very little information regarding Offenbacher, and I have been un-
able to learn anything about him after finishing his time as Weber’s student. 
What we have learned, however, is that Offenbacher had been a diligent 
student and that it is evident that Weber instilled in him the importance of 
empirical inquiry and the value of objective scholarship (Offenbacher 1900: 
68). Offenbacher’s dissertation, with its focus on educational and profes-
sional differences between Catholics and Protestants in Baden, provided 
Weber with a “paradigm case” for developing his Protestant thesis. Further-
more, Offenbacher’s work seems to have prompted Weber to rethink the 
relationship between capitalism and Protestants and to realize that it was 
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more complex than either he or Offenbacher had originally believed. The 
result was that Weber came to understand that this relationship was not 
merely about capitalism and Protestants; but, it rather was more about the 
different types of Protestants. Offenbacher’s efforts helped spur Weber to 
think more about Protestants and money, but it was Weber himself who 
realized that the key to understanding the Protestant ethic and the spirit of 
capitalism was not to be found with the comfortable lives of late-nineteenth 
century German Protestants, but in the beliefs and doctrines of sixteenth 
and seventeenth century Protestant ascetics. The investigation into the sta-
tistical origins of the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism provides 
us with a much needed beginning into the inquiry of the genesis of that fa-
mous work.
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